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Abstract 
The last fifteen years have seen the concurrent development of hazard 
analysis and the North Sea Oil Industry. In 1980 the Burgoyne 
Committee, reporting on Offshore Safety, recommended that some form of 
hazard analysis should become a mandatory part of the offshore design 
process. 
Through the generosity of Conoco (UK) Ltd, I have investigated the 
use of several different methods of hazard anaysis by applying each to 
the gas compression system on the Murchison Platform. 
The analyses are qualitative and the comparison of the methods is 
necessarily subjective, being based upon: 
the knowledge of the system which is required 
the ease with which the method can be applied 
the results of the analyses, and 
the time required to carry out the analyses. 
These criteria were used to evaluate the suitability of each method 
for application during the design process. Four studies have been 
carried out, using: 
Mond Fire, Explosion & Toxicity Index 
API RP 14C. The recommended practice for Analysis, 
Design, Installation and Testing of Basic 
Surface Safety Systems on Offshore Production Platforms. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
The thesis also comments on the use of other methods not 
specifically studied, and on the approach to hazard analysis adopted 
by the major oil companies. 
It is concluded that the API RP 14c should be used to study 
offshore processes, but where the application of the RP is unclear, 
FMEA or FTA should be used to examine the problem in greater detail. 
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1.1 Introduction 
During the last decade, considerable advances have been made in man's 
ability to exploit offshore oil and gas deposits. The impetus behind 
the rapid development of the United Kingdom's offshore resources has 
been the need to create economic wealth at a time of world recession 
and to counter OPEC's monopoly on world oil supplies. 
The advent of the enclosed, integrated, offshore oil production 
platform resulted in a significant change in the risk to life and 
capital. Many of the platforms already installed in the Southern 
North Sea gas fields were single function platforms dedicated to 
accomodation, drilling or production. However the economics of 
developing oil fields in the Northern North Sea demanded that one 
structure support all three functions. 
In the period 1971 to 1978 several statutory instruments were enacted 
under the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 [1] and 
included legislation in 1974 on construction [2], on life-saving 
appliances [3] in 1977 and in 1978 on fire-fighting equipment [4]. 
These regulations applied retrospectively to installed platforms and 
to those under construction. The legislation was backed up a year or 
so later by the publication of guidance notes [5] on several of the 
Statutory Instruments which provided detailed information about the 
way in which the standards could be met. 
In 1978 during a workover on well B14 on the Bravo Platform in the 
Ekofisk field, the well blew out. In its conclusions the Norwegian 
Royal Commission [6],  which investigated the accident, noted that the 
insufficient training of operatives and poor managerial standards were 
the most significant contributory factors to the accident. The well 
did not catch fire, but it took Red Adair's team of blowout control 
experts several weeks to cap the well. This accident has resulted in 
the Norwegians investing large sums of money for research into various 
aspects of offshore safety. 
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The Ekofisk blowout resulted in the UK government instigating its own 
enquiry into offshore safety which was led by Professor Burgoyne. The 
committee published its findings in 1980 [7]. 	This thesis is set 
against this background. 	Its concern is with the steps that can be 
taken to assess the safety of offshore processes at the design stages. 
It examines the operators' attitude to the systematic analysis of 
hazards at the design stage and presents a considered view of the role 
of hazard analysis in helping to ensure the safety of production 
platforms. 
1.2 Objective of Study 
The primary objective of the study was to compare several different 
methods of hazard analysis in order to provide information that would 
help the offshore process design team select the most suitable methods 
of analysis. 
1.3 Reasons for the Study 
Speaking about the importance of systematic safety assessments the 
Burgoyne report states that 
"the Department of Energy should give a lead in defining 
objectives, evaluating methods and achieving some uniformity of 
practice" [8]. 
One contributor went as far as to state that 
"a Safety Report should be a necessary condition of a 
certificate" 19]. 
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The Burgoyne Report did not specify the method of analysis to be 
used nor did they give any indication of whether in their opinion 
/ 
the analysis( quantified. 	Thus their recommendations were open 
ended. 
The growth of the nuclear and aerospace industries in the mid 50's 
and 60's, necessitated the development of techniques which would 
assure the reliability and safety of the new and complex systems 
which were being designed. It was recognised that although 
learning from mistakes was of great value, methods for identifying 
and assessing the frequency and consequence of failures were needed 
if accidents involving large loss of life and capital were to be 
avoided. 
It was not until the late 60's that ICI led the way in applying and 
developing new techniques to help counteract the increasing risks 
associated with the large single stream chemical plants which were 
constructed to minimise production costs. 
The effect of accidents at Feyzin and Flixborough was to give the 
discipline of Loss Prevention Engineering a much needed boost. 	It 
brought an increased awareness of the shortcomings of the 
traditional design methods which omitted to pay close attention to 
the risks inherent in the processes that were being planned. 
By the late 70's regular courses in hazard analysis were being run 
by several universities; some in conjunction with the Professional 
Institutions. 
In common with other industries, oil companies have learnt from 
their accident experience. By investigating the causes, guidance 
is given and processes are modified in order to reduce the 
likelihood of the hazard recurring. This method is adequate when 
exploiting land based oil resources where there is little to limit 
the segregation of accomodation from the drilling and production 
facilities. 
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However, when all the facilities are situated on an enclosed 
platform, the risk is significantly greater. For example, the 
probability of safe escape from a platform in the Northern North 
Sea is reduced as it is dependent on the sea state at the time of 
evacuation. The use of systematic methods of analysing hazards, 
can assist the operator to ensure that the highest standards of 
safety are met, without having to rely solely on experience based 
techniques of loss prevention. 
1.4 Summary of Investigation Technique 
In order to ensure the relevance of the study to the offshore 
industry, four methods of hazard analysis were used to study the 
gas compression system on the Murchison Platform which is operated 
by Conoco (UK) Ltd. 
The four methods selected were: 
The Mond Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index 
API BY 14c 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, and 
Fault Tree Analysis. 
Each method represents a different generic type of analysis being 
respectively: 
Points Scheme 
Code of Practice 
Component orientated Analysis, and 
Event orientated Analysis. 
These represent the principal generic types of hazard analysis that 
have been developed. 
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The analyses are qualitative and the comparison of the methods 
necessarily subjective, being based upon: 
the knowledge of the system required 
the ease with which the method can be applied 
the results of the analyses, and 
the time taken to carry out the study. 
1.5 Help from Industry 
Throughout the course of the study, I have been helped by various 
sources in the offshore oil industry. 
Conoco (UK) Ltd. have provided me with financial backing and with 
detailed information about the Murchison Oil Platform. In January 
1981 it was agreed that the Gas Compression System (GCS) be 
analysed by the different methods. There were several reasons for 
this. 
Firstly, the GCS had not been investigated in detail by the Project 
Support Group who had carried out Failure Mode and Effects Analyses 
during the design phase on the processes considered most critical 
to continued production. 	At the time, there were no restrictions 
on the amount of process gas which could be flared. 	Since the 
introduction of such restrictions, the failure of the gas 
compression system results in production being cut back so that the 
gas flared does not exceed the government's limits. This not only 
affects production rates but also the revenue stream which is 
critical in the first few years of operation when the capital cost 
of the installation is being recouped. 
The GCS was being installed at that time and I was able to visit 
the platform and discuss the process with the engineers who were 
intimately associated with the system. 
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Finally, the increased cost of energy together with the 
Government's restrictions on flaring, was causing many operators to 
consider installing additional compression equipment to their 
platforms in order to recover the gas and maintain planned 
production schedules. 
On my visits to numerous companies during the course of my studies 
I was always well received and found most engineers willing to 
relate their company's experience, good and bad. All were eager to 
express their opinions about hazard analysis and the function it 
had in assessing offshore safety. 
1.6 Layout of Thesis 
In order to present the results of the study clearly, the analyses 
of the GCS are to be found in appendices Dl to D4. The main text 
draws on the appendices but since the objective was to compare the 
methods of analysis, it was decided to confine the actual analyses 
and detailed description of the methods to the appendices. 
Appendix Al contains a list of the abbreviations used throughout 
the text. 
A short review of the generic types of hazard analysis and some 
detail about the methods in each type is given in Chapter 2 so as 
to define the discipline of hazard analysis. 
Chapter 3 reviews the current state of the art of hazard analysis 
in the offshore oil industry and draws heavily on the information 
derived from the contact with different sections of the industry. 
The evaluation of the four methods tested in Chapter 4, includes 
the results pertaining to the GCS on the Murchison Platform. 
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A detailed description of the process, piping and instrumentation 
diagrams and a photographic record are contained in appendices 31 
to B4. 
Chapter 5 discusses the role of each method of hazard analysis in 
evaluating offshore processes. It aims to provide the engineer 
with the advice he requires in order to choose the most suitable 
method of hazard analysis for his application. 
This thesis should not be regarded as 
offshore gas compression systems. The s 
Murchison Platform was restricted and 
control systems. However it is valid to 
conclusions pertaining to the GCS as well 
study as a whole. 
a study of the hazards of 
udy of the GCS on the 
limited to the process 
present in Chapter 6, the 
as the conclusions of the 
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2.1 Introduction 
The terminology associated with 
assessment is not rigidly defined. 
by different authors. 
systematic safety analysis and 
Many terms are used interchangebly 
In order to assist the reader and convey understanding of the way in 
which I shall use terms like hazard analysis, risk analysis, 
reliability analysis and the like, this chapter discusses what each 
term is commonly held to mean. 
Having defined the most important terms, several methods of analysis 
are briefly described. The reasons for choosing the methods used in 
this study are also discussed. 
2.2 Reliability Analysis 
The reliability of a component, device or system is defined as the 
probability of the Item functioning correctly when it is called upon 
to do so over a defined period of time. 
Reliability analysis is the term given to the methods used to 
determine the reliability of a component. For example, if a system is 
being studied, the reliability of each component is determined by the 
use of historical records of failure rates. The interactions of the 
components are then investigated and functional dependency diagrams 
are drawn to illustrate the interactions. From this a mathematical 
model of the ways in which the system will fail is constructed; 
usually by drawing a fault tree. 
The primary objective of reliability analysis is to indicate methods 
of ensuring that the unavailability of the system is minimized and 
kept to an economically acceptable level. 
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2.3 Hazard Analysis 
Hazard is the term used to describe the existence of a condition, or 
the existence of a set of conditions which may result in the 
occurrence of an event which causes loss of life, injury to the 
public, the operating personnel, or damage to the plant. Throughout 
the text I have called this a hazardous event. This event may equally 
well be called a dangerous event. 
The inherent characteristics of a petrochemical plant make the whole 
complex a hazard. The nature of the hazardous events that may occur 
provide the analyst with the basis upon which to compare plant with 
plant, or units within a plant with similar units. As a result, it 
can be said that one plant is more hazardous than another. 
Hazard analysis is to a certain degree a misuse of the term hazard, 
since the analysis concentrates on the ways in which hazardous events 
occur because of the hazards identified as being inherent in the 
plant. 
For example, a pressure vessel is a hazard. 	Because it operates at a 
pressure there is the chance that the vessel will rupture. 	A vessel 
that operates at a pressure of 350 Bar g is thought to be more 
hazardous than a vessel that operates at 30 Bar g. Given that both 
vessels are designed according to the same mathematical relationships, 
the probability of rupture will be similar. However, we perceive that 
the consequences that may result are greater if the 350 Bar g vessel 
ruptures, since more energy is released. The basis upon which 
comparisions are made includes a perception of both probability of 
occurrence and the possible consequences. Hence, we say the 350 Bar g 
vessel is more hazardous than the other. 
To further complicate matters, we know that the occurrence of 100 
individual vessel ruptures will not result in identical consequences. 
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If we consider loss of life, we must take into account the probability 
that a person is in the vicinity when the vessel ruptures, and the 
probability that the person will be killed if he is there when rupture 
occurs. 
The sum of all the possible consequences together with the probability 
of rupture, is the risk. The term risk is applied also to the 
possible consequences of the occurrence of a natural calamity, an 
earthquake for example. 
Hazard analysis, is the method or methods by which hazards are 
identified, and hazardous events are analysed. Simple events which 
may result in the occurrence of a hazardous event are identified and 
their interrelationship is investigated. These simple events may 
themselves be hazardous. They are at the least undesirable. The 
hazard analysis can be purely qualitative, or the probability of the 
occurrence of hazardous events may be quantified. 
Hazard analysis is restricted to the analysis of hazardous events 
which may happen in the system or process being studied. It does not 
consider the occurrence of external events. Where external events 
which may cause the top event are considered, a risk analysis is 
carried out. If the occurrence of a fire in an offshore module was 
being studied, the possibility of arson would be excluded in a hazard 
analysis, but included in a risk analysis. 
A hazard analysis does not investigate the consequences that the 
occurrence of a hazardous event may cause. 	This is an arbitrary 
distinction. 	I recognise that some perceive hazard to be an 
assessment of probability and the extent of the consequences of 
hazardous events. In this sense, hazard can mean the same as risk. 
However, the word hazard is not used in this sense in the text. 
The degree of hazard, and the hazard potential, are terms used to 
describe the product of probability of occurrence and consequence. 
Chapter 2 	 18 
They are synonymous with risk. 	They 
at
are used solely in connection 
with a specific item or plant, antherefore do not include the risk 
associated with external events. These terms are used sparingly in 
the text. Where they are used, it is because the author of the method 
of analysis being discussed uses the term. 
2.3.1 Hazard Identification 
Before an assessment of hazardous events can take place, the hazards 
associated with the system or process being studied must be 
identified. 
The quality of the analysis depends on the analyst's successful 
identification of all the hazards inherent in the system. An 
important tool in hazard identification is a checklist.. A checklist 
is drawn from the past experience of many operators and summarizes the 
aspects of a process which are known to be important. The checklist 
is valuable but restricted when considering a new process which 
utilizes new technology. 
Points schemes do not identify specific hazards but compare an entire 
system against a predefined standard. Their most efficient use is in 
ranking processes against each other and thus directing the analyst's 
attention to the worst cases. Standards and codes of practice gather 
together sound design principles and give the designer some assurance 
that an acceptable level of safety has been achieved. The inherent 
weakness is that codes are not specific and lag behind new 
technologies. 
The increasing complexity of plants has resulted in the development of 
fundamental component orientated methods of hazard identification such 
as hazard and operability study (FIAZOP), and failure mode and effects 
analysis (FMEA). Both methods discipline the analyst to look at small 
parts of the system and ask the question "What if ? ". 
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The value of these methods, particularly of HAZOP, is that if the 
review takes place during the design phase of the project, operating 
problems are identified and can be rectified before the plant is 
commissioned. 
2.3.2 Assessment of Hazardous Events 
Having identified what hazards are inherent in the system being 
studied, the hazardous events that may occur are investigated. If the 
analysis terminates once this is complete, 	the analysis is 
qualitative. 	However, using techniques appropriated from reliability 
analysis, it is possible to predict the probability of the occurrence 
of hazardous events. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA), presents in diagrammatic form the way in 
which a hazardous event can occur. The objective is to identify the 
primary causes and failure paths which result in the top event. By 
studying the tree, the analyst can recommend design changes to reduce 
the probability of the occurrence of the hazardous event being 
studied. Since the tree is a mathematical model, it can be used to 
calculate the probability of the top event and also used to evaluate 
the cost benefits of alternative design changes. 
There are three principal problems associated with quantitative hazard 
assessment: 
the accuracy of the model 
the difficulty in quantifying the probability of operator 
error, and 
the amount of time required to gather the data. 
These problems are discussed in Appendix D4. 
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2.4 Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis investigates the possible consequences of a hazardous 
event, as well as determining its causes. In this way it differs from 
hazard analysis which does not investigate consequences. 	Risk 
analysis considers risk from all sources. 	For example, a risk 
analysis of an offshore platform would include the consequence on the 
platform of a ship collision, a helicopter crash, an earthquake, or of 
a process fire or explosion. 
Unlike hazard analysis, risk analysis considers events which are 
initiated by external events, and predicts the probability and the 
extent of the consequences. 
The definitions of risk analysis and hazard analysis that I have 
adopted seem to accord with the thinking of others on the subject. 
For example, Atallah [1] states that 
"Industrial risk is defined as the probable annual loss by a 
corporation due to abnormal events that injure employees and 
public, cause damage to a plant, public property and/or the 
environment". 
Tveit [2] also says that the following events should be studied when 
carrying out a risk analysis of an offshore platform: 
"- events originating from activities within the platform itself 
- events originating from external systems and environment 
occupational accidents". 
I am aware that the distinction I have drawn between hazard analysis 
and risk analysis is arbitrary. However I have made the distinction 
in order to clarify the meaning of the terms as I use them in the 
text. 
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Risk analysis is the more comprehensive of the two methods and often 
include the cost of lost production due to plant downtime, thus 
necessitating a complete reliability study of all systems on an 
offshore platform. 
2.5 Generic Types of Analysis 
The different methods of hazard analysis can be classified into four 
generic types: 
Points Schemes 
Codes of Practice 
Component orientated techniques, and 
Event orientated techniques. 
Each type has its own purpose and function. 
Each category contains several methods of analysis and two methods in 
each category will be described. 
2.6 Points Schemes 
A points scheme is a rapid assessment tool in which each factor which 
increases or reduces the risk is assigned a score. The total score is 
then compared with a standard value which represents a predefined 
acceptable level of risk. 
The best use of a points scheme is to identify areas which are more in 
need of attention than others. A review of a chemical works may 
indicate that the risk associated with one process is more significant 
than the risk from the other processes on the site. 
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An analysis of a process unit may reveal that it is deficient in one 
aspect and this may focus attention on remedial work that can be taken 
to bring the process up to an acceptable standard. 
The disadvantage with points schemes is that the user juggles numbers 
in order to meet the standard but may not logically think through the 
measures that are being proposed to improve plant safety. This is 
known as the "numbers game". 
The proper use of a points scheme can be of great advantage to the 
analyst, but the restrictions and limitations must be recognised if 
errors are to be avoided. 
The Mond Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index, and the Instantaneous 
Fractional Annual Loss Method (IFAL), are discussed in more detail in 
the following sections. They represent the best-developed points 
schemes that are applicable to the petrochemical industry. 
Several companies have their own rapid ranking techniques which have 
been developed for their own use, for example ICI Pharmaceutical 
Division and Shell Expro have such schemes. Having been written 
specifically for their own use, these methods are not generally 
applicable. 
Insurance companies issue their surveyors with schemes that help them 
to assess industrial risk and to calculate an appropriate insurance 
premium. These schemes are generally not published and therefore 
unavailable for wider application. 
A useful review of the various points schemes available, including 
those for buildings, has been written by Berenblut and Menashe [3]. 
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2.691 The Mond Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index 
The Mond Index j4] has been developed by Dr D.J. Lewis, formerly of 
ICI Mond Division. The latest edition, due to be published shortly 
has been revised by Dr P. Doran and Mr R. Greig. 
The Mond Index is a modification of the Dow scheme [5]. 	Because of 
the products manufactured by ICI Mond Division, the method was 
developed to take account of toxicity hazards. It has also been 
successfully used to provide guidance to designers on plant separation 
distances [6]. 
ICI Mond Division runs regular training courses on the use of the 
Index and has produced a computer programme which prompts the analyst 
for the required information and calculates the index. This relieves 
the analyst of the computational work involved, and reduces the time 
required to complete an analysis. 
The Mond Index first calculates the inherent risk of the process being 
studied by assigning values to these components: 
Material factor (B) 
Special Material Hazards (M) 
General Process Hazards (P) 
Special Process Hazards (S) 
Quantity Hazards (Q) 
Layout Hazards (L), and 
Toxicity Hazards (T). 
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At the completion of this stage, the following indices are calculated: 
Overall Index (D) 
Fire Load (F) 
Internal Unit Explosion Index (E) 
Aerial Explosion Index (A) 
Unit Toxicity Index (U), and 
Overall Risk Rating (R). 
Each numerical index is assigned a descriptive category which is 
defined by the technical manual. 
The Overall Risk Rating (R), reflects the risk inherent in the process 
and takes no account of the measures which mitigate the risk. Using 
the indices calculated, the high contributory factors are identified 
and this may result in changes. being made to the process in order to 
reduce the risk. Once the indices have been reviewed and the process 
modified, the indices are recalculated and given the subscript 1. 






material isolation, and 
fire fighting. 
The indices are again recalculated to take account of these offsetting 
measures. Each index is offset by the relevant factors. For example, 
the Fire Load (F) is reduced by the offsetting factors for containment 
hazards, fire protection and material isolation. 
Both the offset Overall Index 0 2) and the offset Overall Risk Rating 
(R2) are used to determine the acceptability of the risk. 
Chapter 2 	 25 
The risk categories range from "mild" where R 2 does not exceed 20, to 
"very extreme" where R2 exceeds 65,000. 
Commenting on the use of the Mond Index, Lewis stresses that it is a 
supplementary technique which, if used sensibly, will guide the user 
to the more hazardous process or identify aspects of a process which 
merit more extensive investigation. 
The indices themselves are dimensionless and are not a direct measure 
of frequency or consequence of hazardous events. They are a 
reflection of the product of the two, but do not quantify risk in 
measurable terms. 
A more detailed description of the Mond Index is to be found in 
Appendix Cl. 
2.6.2 Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss Method 
The IFAL is the theoretical, annual loss rate for a plant operated 
under constant conditions for .a long period of time. The Insurance 
Technical Bureau (ITB) has developed the technique [7] in order to 
provide the insurance industry with the means of calculating insurance 
premiums in a more systematic way and in a manner that more accurately 
evaluates the financial risk that companies underwrite when insuring a 
plant. 
Munday [8] indicates that 
premiums but that this 
infrequently occurring ca 
vapour cloud explosions. 
these major catastrophies 
the IFAL appears to over estimate insurance 
Qoui\t 
is due to its long term view, which takes/ 
tastrophic hazards like percussive unconfined 
An historically based method underestimates 
because they occur infrequently. 
The IFAL is a function of the process hazards, the standard of 
engineering, and the way in which the process is managed. 
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IFAL = p.e.m 
where p = process factor 
e = engineering modifications 
in = management modifications 
In evaluating e and in, standard good practice (SGP), is defined and 
the values of e and in reflect the comparison of the plant to SGP. The 
effect of e and in on the components which comprise the process factor, 
is based upon subjective judgment, and depends on the analyst's 
personal experience. As these factors can take positive or negative 
values they can increase or reduce the risk. 
Having been designed to evaluate petroleum and chemical plants, IFAL 
evaluates five classes of fire or explosion. These are: 
liquid pool fires (p1) 
vapour flash fires (p2) 
percussive unconfined vapour cloud explosions (p3) 
confined vapour cloud explosions (p4), and 
internal explosions (p5). 
It omits to investigate running liquid fires or jet fires, two types 
of fire which are likely on an offshore platform. 
Each p factor is evaluated by the analysis of a chain of events. 
These events are: 
loss of integrity or containment (c) 
ignition (1) 
spread of fire or extent of explosion (s), and 
damage (d). 
The first step is to consider the likelihood of internal explosions 
occurring in the equipment being studied. The types of fire that may 
result from missiles damaging surrounding plant are evaluated by 
considering the amount of material released. 
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The loss of containment failure rate for different types of equipment 
is given for small and large releases. Depending on the inventory of 
the material being processed by each unit, the frequency of emissions 
in the range 1 to 20 tonnes and 20 to 100 tonnes are calculated. The 
i factor represents the probability that the material released is 
ignited. 
The fraction of the whole plant likely to be damaged is quantified by 
the spread factor (s). It is a function of the size of the loss of 
containment and the nature of the hazardous event, which may be a fire 
or an explosion. 
Factor (d) is the cost of repair or replacement of damaged plant 
expressed as a fraction of the total plant value. It does not include 
consequential losses like lost income due to production downtime. 
Rather than looking at individual items, the plant is divided into 
convenient blocks. On an offshore platform each module would be 
analysed and the effect on other modules investigated if an accident 
should occur within it. In this way the most hazardous modules would 
be identified and then be subjected to more rigorous analyses. 
Like the Mond Index, IFAL can be used to investigate changes in: 
the layout of plant 	 - 
measures taken to prevent hazardous events occurring, and 
protective systems which limit the damage that may occur. 
It does not appear that its evaluation of preventative and protective 
measures is as developed as that in the Mond Index. 
Chapter 2 	 28 
2.7 Codes of Practice 
A code of practice is a summary of good design procedure and is an 
expression of the experience of senior design personnel who have 
collaborated to pass on their experience in the form of checklists and 
design rules. 
The American Petroleum Institute issues guidance on offshore design 
practice. In 1978 it published API RP 14c which is called 
"The American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice for 
Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of Basic Surface 
Safety Systems on Offshore Production Platforms". 
This is the only code of practice which specifies the requirements of 
the safety and shutdown systems on the offshore platforms. There is 
no equivalent UK. code of practice. 
2.7.1 API RP 14c 
API RP 14c describes itself as 
"a systematization of proven practices for providing a basic 
surface safety system for offshore production platforms. Proper 
application of these practices, along with good design, 
maintenance and operation of the entire production facility 
should provide an operationally safe platform. " 
The objective of the safety analysis is to identify undesirable events 
which constitute a threat to safety and to prescribe measures that 
reduce the frequency of hazardous occurrences and minimise the 
consequences should undesirable events occur. 
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The purpose of the safety system is to attempt to prevent the release 
of hydrocarbons, 	but should a leak occur, to minimise the 
consequences. 	The consequences can be minimized by isolating the 
leak, preventing ignition, and by removing flammable material from the 
location of the release. 
The authors of API BY 14c identify eight undesirable events of 
significance when considering how to prevent and control the release 







direct ignition source, and 
excess combustible vapours in the firing chamber. 
The Safety Analysis Table (SAT) for each process component considers 
how the applicable undesirable events may be caused, and prescribes 
two levels of protection, primary and secondary, which reduce the 
likelihood of the events occurring. For example, a high pressure 
switch, which initiates the shutdown system of a process, protects the 
discharge line of a compressor against overpressure. Secondary 
protection Is provided by a pressure safety valve which will limit the 
pressure by releasing excess gas to the flare system. 	Each process 
component Is considered independently. 	The required protection is 
determined from the SAT before the component is studied in its process 
configuration. In certain cases, the process configuration may permit 
the omission of specific safety devices as the component is protected 
by a device on another component. Details of acceptable alternative 
means of protection are given in the Safety Analysis Checklist (SAC) 
for the component. 
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As each component is studied, the results of the analysis are listed 
on the Safety Analysis Function Evaluation Chart (SAFE). This table 
can also be used to determine the specifications of the process 
shutdown system. 
The RP contains additional information concerning the requirements of 
maintenance and testing procedures, the emergency support systems, and 
the fire and gas detection systems. 
Appendix C2 contains a detailed description of API RP 14c. 
2.8 Component Orientated Analyses 
Failqre mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and Hazard and Operability 
study (HAZOP) are the principal component orientated analysis 
techniques. In each method, the process under review is studied in 
detail and the question "What if. ?", is used to identify hazards and 
investigate the way in which hazardous events can occur. 
Although a top down approach can be used in FMEA, both methods are 
more generally used to study a process from the bottom up. This 
causes the analyst to carry out a disciplined and comprehensive study 
of a process. 
The major disadvantage of these methods is the time taken to carry out 
the study as they require the analyst to have a detailed understanding 
of the process. Therefore, these methods are often taught to design 
engineers and a team approach adopted when carrying Out the analyses. 
This helps reduce the time required to complete the study. The team 
consists of design personnel and a hazard analyst may chair the study 
group. 
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2.8.1 Hazard and Operability Study 
The method of hazard and operability study (HAZOP) was developed by Dr 
H.G. Lawley [9, 10], formerly of ICI. Since its development in the 
late 60's it has been promoted by the Chemical Industries Association 
1111 and it has been widely taught through the short courses sponsored 
by the Institution of Chemical Engineers [12]. 
A HAZOP is carried out by a small team of people who are responsible 
for the design and operation of the process that is to be studied. 
They carry out an in depth, linevby-line analysis of the plant by 
visualizing deviations from normal operating conditions during 
startup, normal operations and shutdown. The deviations are defined 
by guide and property words (see Table 2.8.1). 
Guide Word Property. Word 




AS WELL AS CONCENTRATION 
PART OF HEAT 
OTHER THAN COOLING 
Table 2.8.1 
Each guide word is applied to each applicable property word. For 
example, the guide words NO, MORE and LESS apply if PRESSURE is being 
considered. As each deviation is considered, progressing through the 
list of property and guide words, one finds that causes and 
consequences have already been considered. For example, NO 
CONCENTRATION may have been investigated when PART OF FLOW was 
considered. The work would not be duplicated. 
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The study identifies hazards by considering the causes and 
consequences of deviations and recommends solutions which reduce 
hazards by improving the plant design and/or the operating procedures. 
Carrying out a HAZOP helps to ensure that operating problems, 
particularly during the commissioning phase and first startup, are 
kept to a minimum. The study requires that each team member be 
acquainted with the process but not to the degree required if the 
analyst was working on his own. The use of a team helps to avoid 
overlooking problems, an inherent risk when a single analyst studies a 
system. It is important that the team has the authority to instigate 
changes, and generally this necessitates the appointment of a senior 
member of staff to the team. 
As each deviation is considered, the results are noted on a standard 
form which records the section of the process under review, the 
deviation, its causes and consequencies, the recommended action and 
the team member responsible for ensuring that the changes are made. 
The HAZOP is reviewed before first startup in order to check that all 
the recommendations have been implemented. 
The method itself is being improved and Dr D. Lihou [13] has developed 
a method of recording the results of the study so as to enable fault 
trees to be produced by computer. This provides the analyst with a 
powerful tool as HAZOP is a useful way of acquiring a detailed 
knowledge of a system. Lihou's technique is similar to the approach 
to fault tree analysis discussed by Powers and Tompkins [141 who 
utilized FMEA to help construct fault trees. 
HAZOP often identifies aspects of the process that require to be 
studied in greater depth. It is therefore primarily a hazard 
identification tool but with the advantage that it considers the 
effects that the operator can have on the system. The strength of the 
technique is that it identifies hazards and operating problems 
simultaneously. 
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ICI require that all their new processes and all process modifications 
be studied by }IAZOP and claim that their new processes are 
commissioned more quickly as a result. However, a HAZOP of a large 
plant may take several months. 
2.8.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
In the technical manual on Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (MIL-STD-1629A), the USA Department of Defence defines 
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) as 
"a procedure by which each potential failure mode in a system is 
analysed to determine the results or effects thereof on the 
system and to classify each potential failure mode according to 
its severity. " [15] 
FMEA is a comprehensive method of analysis but has not been applied 
extensively in the UK chemical industry because of the popularity of 
HAZOP. FMEA is primarily a tool for reliability analysis as it 
endeavours to Identify and examine all the ways in which a system can 
fail. 	By applying failure rate data, system availability, system 
reliability and system downtime can all be estimated. 	FMEA has also 
been used to study maintenance and repair policies in chemical plants 
[16]. 
Before carrying out an FMEA, it is necessary to define the system to 
be analysed and to identify the hierarchical or indenture levels in 
the system. For example, Table 2.8.2 shows the indenture levels for 
an offs , hore production platform where the effects of instrument 
failures are to be analysed. 









The indenture level at which the FMEA is begun is determined by the 
objective of the study as it is possible to start the analysis at 
different levels. This is generally decided after the objective of 
the study has been written by the analyst. 
A list of typical failure modes is given below in Table 2.8.2a. 
Premature Operation 
Failure to operate in prescribed time 
Intermittent operation 
Failure to cease operation at the prescribed times 
Loss of output or failure during operation 
Degraded output 
Other unique failure conditions 
List of Modes of Failure 
Table 2.8.2a 
The failure of each component is considered in turn. The failure 
modes and causes are listed and the effects of the failure on the 
higher indenture levels are identified. Consideration is then given 
to the way in which the failure may be detected through dedicated 
warning devices or by other indications. The means of isolating the 
failure if this is possible, is recorded. 
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Since most systems incorporate means of mitigating any failure by 
redundant or standby components or by the installation of protective 
systems, these design provisions should be noted. For example, the 
provision of a pressure relief valve protects the system from the 
effects which may result if the high pressure trip system fails. The 
action that the operator can take to mitigate the effects of a failure 
must also be considered. 
The component is studied in all of its operating modes including 
startup and shutdown. Clearly FNEA is not only comprehensive, but 
extremely time consuming. 	Cross [17] points out that FMEA is a 
flexible methodology for investigating failures. 	It embodies all the 
principles necessary for carrying out systematic identification and 
assessment of failures. The analyst's responsibility is to apply the 
principles and adopt the method he considers appropriate in order to 
accomplish his defined objective. 
Powers and Tompkins [18] say that FMEA is little more than the 
formalization of the question "What if ?". It may be equally well 
applied to studying operator error as to hardware failures. 
FMEA is described in greater detail In Appendix C3. 
2.9 Event Orientated Methods 
In contrast to FMEA and FIAZOP, which start at the most detailed levels 
of a system and work up, event orientated methods are referred to as 
top down techniques. 
An event of interest, for example a fire, Is specified as the top 
event and the events that cause the top event are Identified. Events 
that must occur concurrently, and alternative causes, are related in 
the form of a logic tree, so called because the final diagram looks 
like a tree. 
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Where the top event is a hazardous event, failure, or fault condition, 
the diagram is known as a fault tree. Conversely the absence of a 
fault may be specified as the top event and the diagram is called a 
success tree. The NFPA success tree is a useful example of this [19]. 
Other tree orientated methods have been developed such as event tree 
analysis (ETA) [201, and cause consequence analysis (CCA) [21]. Both 
techniques model the possible outcomes of the occurrence of the top 
event. 
Tveit [2] presents the following diagram to differentiate between FTA, 
CCA, and ETA. See Figure 2.9 below. 
FAULT TREE ritical 	
consequences 
event I EVENT TREE 
failures leading vent chains leading , 
up tocntjcul event up to unwanted 
corseq u ences 
Figure 2.9 
2.9.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis (ETA) has its origins in the safety evaluation of 
the Minuteman Launch Control System by the Bell Telephone Laboratories 
in 1961. Its potential was quickly realized by the nuclear and 
aerospace industries and it is within these fields that it has been 
most widely used. During the 70's several alternative techniques have 
been developed which are based upon FTA, including Cause Consequence 
Analysis by Nielsen and Taylor of Riso, and Hazard Warning Trees 
discussed in a recent paper by Lees [22]. Rasbash and Beard have 
applied the technique to the evaluation of fire processes in buildings 
[23, 24]. 
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Several papers have appeared which discuss the relevance of FTA to the 
analysis of chemical process hazards [14, 18, 25 to 301. 
A fault tree illustrates the sequence of events which could lead to 
the defined failure or top event in the form of a logic diagram. 
Because it is in this form it may be modelled mathematically using 
boolean algebra. It is no more than a word picture which clarifies 
the interaction between various events. 
For example, Figure 2.9.1 shows a fault tree derived from API RP 14c. 
The top event is a process fire. This results if there is a leak of 
hydrocarbons, sufficient air is present and also an ignition source to 
ignite the flammable material. There are two ways in which 
hydrocarbons can be released; by physical deterioration of the 
containment system, or by the rupture of the containment system. At 
an AND gate, the output event occurs only if all input events are 
present. At an OR gate, the output event exists if any one input is 
present. (The symbols used in this figure are explained in Appendix 
C4.) 
It is the analyst's objective to trace the failure paths to the most 
basic events, generally the failure of components. 
Fussell [31] identifies four stages to FTA being: 
System definition 
Fault tree construction 
Qualitative evaluation, and 
Quantitative evaluation. 
Critics of FTA point to the fact that a fault tree must be drawn for 
each hazardous event if the system is to be completely analysed. This 
is time consuming and generally impractical. 	It is also easy for the 
analyst to overlook events. 	However, the lower down the tree this 
occurs, the less significant is the omission. Logical errors can also 
result in the top event being overestimated. 
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This is particularly true when events in the domain of an AND logic 
gate are mutually exclusive, that is one event specifies "system B 
works" whilst another specifies "system B fails". 
Once the tree has been drawn, the analyst evaluates the system. As a 
general rule, he is looking to see AND gates at the higher levels of 
the tree as this infers that the top event will occur less frequently 
as the number of alternative failure paths are reduced. A failure 
path is called a minimal cut set. 
FTA is employed in reliability analysis because it can be used to 
derive a mathematical model of system failure. The relation of events 
to the top event is given by a boolean algebraic equation. By 
gathering failure rate data for the most basic events, the frequency 
with which the top event occurs can be calculated. 
Lees's hazard warning tree approach [22], makes use of the fact that 
events lower down the tree can be expected to occur more frequently 
than the top event. If the frequency of occurrence of the lower 
events is monitored, it can be compared to the predicted value. This 
comparison can be used to verify the quantitative estimate of the top 
event occurrence frequency. 
Appendix C4 contains a detailed description of FTA. 
2.10 Selection of Methods 
It was originally proposed that the following methods be compared in 
this study: 
Mond Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index 
API RP 14c 
Hazard and Operability Study 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, and 
Fault Tree Analysis. 
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As insufficient time was available to complete all the analyses, it 
was decided to omit the HAZOP. All other analyses were completed 
successfully. 
The Mond Index was chosen in preference to the IFAL method because it 
is the more developed method. Points schemes by their very nature are 
dedicated for use in a particular environment. Although the Mond 
Index might appear to be unsuitable because it was designed to 
evaluate chemical plant used in the open, it is doubtful whether the 
IFAL method would have been a more useful tool. As yet the ITB have 
still to publish algorithms for assessing management and engineering 
factors against standard good practice. Although retrospectively it 
would have been useful to evaluate the IFAL process factor, the Mond 
Index was the generally more applicable method. The Mond Index's 
assessment of the offsetting factors made it the more suited to 
application in the offshore environment, given the reliance placed 
upon protective systems. 
API RP 14c is widely used throughout the offshore industry to assess 
and set safety standards having been written for that purpose. Given 
the Burgoyne Committee's recommendation, it was considered that a 
comparison between API RP 14c and fundamental methods of safety 
analysis would be of interest to the offshore community. 
The choice between HAZOP and FMEA was difficult. Essentially there is 
little to choose between the two methods. HAZOP however is carried 
out by a team. Although Conoco Engineers provided advice and 
commented on the study, it would have been impractical to organize a 
team study. My original intention had been to carry out the HAZOP on 
my own. Thus, because FMEA does not necessitate a team approach it 
was chosen in preference to HAZOP. Apart from the work carried out by 
Powers and Tompkins [14], there are no other published papers where 
FNEA has been applied to chemical plants. By comparison, HAZOP has 
become a popular method of hazard analysis in the UK. The Conoco 
Project Support Group led by S. Hoyle had however influenced Conoco to 
favour FMEA. 
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Thus as much to benefit Conoco as to benefit the study, the HAZOP was 
omitted and the FMEA carried out. 
The last analysis to be completed was the FTA. 	Of all the event 
orientated methods, this has consistently been the most widely adopted 
technique. 	Although Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA) has a 
considerable following in Scandinavian countries, it is primarily a 
risk analysis tool. 	Whereas PTA quantifies the frequency of 
occurrence of the top event, CCA quantifies its consequence. 	CCA is 
rarely used at detailed hierarchical levels but it is generally used 
to study the consequences of an event already defined by FTA. 
The objective of the study was to provide the offshore process design 
team with advice on how to select the method most suited to their use. 
CCA is an assessment technique and therefore primarily a risk 
analyst's tool. By comparison, FTA aids understanding, evaluation and 
design of complex systems, particularly those which depend on 
protective devices to mitigate hazard. FTA was chosen for these 
reasons. 
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3.1 Introduction 
It has been stated in Chapter 1 that there is no mandatory requirement 
to carry out hazard analysis. Some companies do however carry out 
limited analyses of the most sensitive areas of the platform. The 
areas are chosen by considering the effect of downtime on cashf low. 
For example, at the time the Murchison Platform was being designed, a 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the third stage oil/gas 
separator was carried out by Conoco's Project Support Group. The 
configuration of the separation train is such that if this separator 
is inoperative, production must cease. 
The purpose of this chapter is firstly to discuss the approach and 
attitude of the offshore oil industry to systematic hazard analysis. 
Secondly, it is to review the work that has been published which is 
closely related to'the analysis of offshore hazards. 
3.2 Legislative Requirements 
Every platform operator is required by law to submit plans and 
procedures of their offshore installations to a Certifying Authority 
for approval. The Certifying Authority checks the design and 
subsequently ensures that the installation is constructed in 
accordance with good practice and the submitted specification. 
Neither the platform operator nor the Certifying 'Authority is required 
to carry out a hazard analysis of the installation. 
Each operator must publish an Emergency Procedures Manual for each of 
its installations. This manual contains the contingency plans which 
describe the action to be taken in the event of emergencies like fire, 
explosion, blowout, man overboard, and helicopter crash. 
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The preparation of this manual necessitates a coarse cause—consequence 
type of analysis to be carried out so that the action to be taken in 
the event of each emergency is adequately prescribed. It does not 
force the operator to review how these events occur but to consider 
how such emergencies should be handled. 
3.3 Company Policy 
Attitudes and policy towards hazard analysis vary considerably amongst 
operating companies. The large multinational companies have the 
capability to carry out hazard analysis by drawing upon expertise 
throughout their staff worldwide. These safety experts however, tend 
to be consulted only when specific problems are identified. Hazard 
analysis may be used to review processes but it is rarely used 
comprehensively as a design tool. 
A number of consultants in the UK are being employed by oil companies 
to look at offshore safety problems, amongst them YARD, Cremer and 
Warner, and Technica. The Department of Fire Safety Engineering at 
the University of Edinburgh is also strengthening its contribution to 
offshore fire safety. 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that as the pace of development 
slackens, operators are reviewing their safety policies and are 
employing the consultants mentioned above, to assess the adequacy of 
these policies and provisions made to ensure the safety of the 
platform. 
3.3.1 Shell Expro 
Shell Expro have recruited Dr H.G. Lawley, the author of the HAZOP 
method, and are currently developing their ability to conduct safety 
audits. 
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With several developments delayed due to the present financial 
climate, they are conducting a review of their installations which 
include the four platforms in the Brent Field. 
They have developed a coarse hazard ranking technique akin to that 
developed by Gillette of ICI Pharmaceuticals Division [1]. This is a 
combination of a checklist and a points scheme. The survey is carried 
out by a Safety Specialist and the Process Manager prior to startup, 
and all remedial action agreed on the spot. A short report is 
presented thereafter which records the findings and any agreed 
modifications to the plant and the operating procedures. 
The method is purely qualitative and arguments about the acceptability 
of hazards on a quantitative basis are avoided. 
Where complex problems are identified, these are subjected to more 
rigorous study using hazard analysis. This generally involves 
constructing fault trees which may then be quantified in order to 
assist cost effective decision making. Plant safety as opposed to 
life safety is the vehicle used to communicate the necessity for and 
advantage of process modifications. 
3.3.2 Conoco 
During the design of the Murchison Platform, the Project Support Group 
was established. Its function was to keep a watchful eye on the 
project and to examine those aspects they considered to be most 
important to safety and continued production. 
Several FMEA studies 2] were carried out including analyses of the 
wellhead safety system, the third stage oil gas separator and the 
platform structure upending system. Boeing were commissioned to 
report on the reliability of the pipeline to riser tie-in connections 
[3]. 
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The notes prepared by S. Hoyle on FNEA 121 are comprehensive. He 
includes FTA and other event orientated analysis techniques under the 
auspices of FMEAO 
A full safety review [4] of the Murchison Platform was carried out and 
the notes of this safety audit amount to over 900 pages of text. 
During this review a small team of senior personnel examined every 
aspect of the platform and checked the adequacy of the safety 
provisions. A similar review of the Hutton Tension Leg Platform (TLP) 
has also been carried out. 
The Project Support Group is capable of carrying out in—depth analyses 
of various aspects of safety. Their efforts have made the design and 
engineering staff aware of the different approaches to reviewing 
designs for safety and this has been a valuable contribution to the 
safe operation of Conoco's platforms. 
3.3.3 Other Companies 
Chapter 2 indicated that there is a close connection between 
reliability, hazard and risk analysis. BNOC commissioned a study of 
the reliability of their Thistle "A" Platform. (This study is reviewed 
in section 3.6) Referring to logic tree based analysis, in their 
submission to the Burgoyne Committee, they state 
"Although such studies can be useful in a qualitative sense, the 
overall philosophy should assume that even the most unlikely 
incident will occur even though it has a very low probability, 
and safety measures must be provided to deal with all 
foreseeable incidents however rare."[5] 
Their Chief Safety Officer ensures that engineers carry out adequate 
safety audits for all parts of the installation. They do not state 
however which methods are used to carry out these safety audits. 
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British Petroleum (BP) indicated to the Burgoyne Committee [6] that 
their standard practice is to carry out multistage safety reviews 
which includes a HAZOP of all aspects of the production and process 
facilities. 
O.M. Slye, Head of Mobil's Fire Protection Research Division, has used 
FTA to model the causes of having to abandon a platform. 	It is a 
qualitative analysis and has not been published. Like other 
companies, Mobil has commissioned several reliability and hazard 
studies. They express the general feeling of distrust that the whole 
industry holds towards quantified hazard analysis [7]. 
3.4 Role & Responsibility of Contractors 
The specification and basic design of a production platform and its 
associated processes is carried out by the operating company. This 
information is then passed to a number of contractors who submit a 
tender price for the project. 
The specification contains a list of the codes of practice and 
standards the contractor must design to. Oil companies have-their own 
design standards some of which conflict with the national standards 
that apply. Should such a conflict arise the higher standard is 
deemed to prevail. 
Over the years the American Petroleum Institute has published many 
codes of practice. In 1978, Recommended Practice RP 14c for the 
Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of basic surface safety 
systems on Offshore Production Platforms was published. Most 
contractors design the process safety systems in accordance with this 
code of practice. 
O%)R 
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Contractors place the same emphasis on safety as their client does. 
If the client requires that a detailed hazard analysis be carried out 
they do so and are paid for carrying it out. Although a contractor 
may feel strongly that a more detailed analysis should be carried out 
on one part of the process, to include this in his tender price may 
result in the contract being awarded to a competitor. 
At present therefore, whilst there remains no legal requirement to 
carry out a hazard analysis, the client must instigate and pay for 
this analysis. Although a contractor recognises the long term 
benefits of hazard analysis he works to his client's instructions. 
Under the terms of the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) the 
contractor is responsible for the design work he carries out. If a 
design was found to be unsafe he would be liable even though the 
design conformed to the specifications given by the client. The 
client is liable for operating an unsafe process but not responsible 
for the design. 
In order to clarify the situation and to put all contractors on the 
same footing hazard analysis and a specific form of analysis would 
have to be a mandatory requirement. 
3.5 Summary of Attitude towards Hazard Analysis 
The attitude to hazard analysis varies from company to company and 
varies from department to department within any one company. In 
general where a person has had little or no exposure to hazard 
analysis they are not favourably disposed towards it. Even though a 
company places a high priority on safety and communicates this 
attitude through its line management, its personnel are not 
automatically predisposed to hazard analysis. 
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3.5.1 Attitude of Design Personnel 
Design personnel are under pressure to design the platform in the time 
allocated and hazard analysis introduces delays into the project by 
requiring that the design be frozen whilst the analysis is taking 
place. 
Hazard analysis would have to be carefully phased if the whole 
contract were not to grind to a halt. Thus, one section must be 
analysed whilst another is still on the design board. 
Most of the major items of plant, compressors, pressure vessels, 
pumps, heat exchangers and the like, require to be ordered at the 
start of a contract so as to ensure that construction is not held back 
by the late order of a long delivery item. Hence the basic philosophy 
of the system Is, unlikely to be altered during the design stage. The 
result of hazard analysis in this case is to require the installation 
of additional measures to ensure safe operation. 
Ideally a coarse hazard analysis should be carried out on the basic 
design philosophy. It is always cheaper to design a hazard out at 
inception, if at all possible, than to protect against it at a later 
date. 
Few design engineers have a proper. training in hazard analysis and 
therefore regard it with some sceptism. However those who have been 
on short training courses or involved in projects where some form of 
hazard analysis has been carried out, are generally positive to 
applying it in their situation. 
Emphasis is placed on the importance of good engineering design and 
experience and one is given to believe that engineers feel defensive 
about their skills. 
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Yet hazard analysis in no way threatens sound engineering principles 
but provides the designer with an additional tool that enables him to 
verify the safety of his work. This is particularly true where the 
originality or complexity of a project necessitates the use of a 
fundamental method of analysis as a si:mple checklist is inapplicable. 
Hazard analysis is no substitute for good engineers backed with years 
of experience. But it is a tool which enforces the logical appraisal 
of a design in order to verify its integrity. 
3.5.2 Operating Personnel 
By the very nature of their job operating personnel are involved with 
the practical problems of operating processes. 
Their principal complaint is that the designer does not appreciate the 
practical difficulties that must be faced by those who operate the 
system he has designed. Because the designer works for a contractor 
there is, in general, little feedback from operator to designer and 
thus mistakes are repeated. Unless an engineer moves from an 
operating company to a contractor there is no channel for this 
information to get back to the design teams. The salary differentials 
between the oil companies and contracting firms make it unlikely for 
an engineer to move from an oil company to a contractor. 
During the commissioning phase a multidisiplinary team of operating 
and contracting engineers work together. The duration of the 
commissioning phase however is too short to provide the operating 
experience that reveals design problems. A new method of hazard 
analysis called Action Error Analysis may help to identify these 
problems at the design stage. This method developed by Taylor [8] 
investigates the effect of incorrect action by the operator and by the 
system. 
Chapter 3 	 54 
The typical operative's view is that Hazard Analysis is too 
theoretical to be of any real value to their circumstances. What if, 
anything, has been communicated is that the result of hazard analysis 
is a number which predicts the frequency of a catastrophic accident on 
the platform. 
Perhaps because they are so involved in the day to day operation of 
processes which are inherently dangerous they grow insensitive to the 
hazards to which they are exposed. This very insensitivity may be a 
significant factor in causing accidents in processes where the 
operator frequently intervenes to take corrective action. Process 
operators do not readily admit that they make mistakes. 
The component orientated methods of hazard analysis lend themselves to 
identifying the ways in which the operator may influence the system or 
alter the sequence of events in such a way as to cause an accident. 
This may or may not be quantifiable but even as a qualitative study it 
is of much value and provides the operator with valuable information 
about the response of the operator to process alarms. 
3.6 Published Work 
To date no detailed hazard analysis or comparison of methods based on 
a test of real design has been published in the open literature. 
However many organisations who carry out such work, under contract, 
are not permitted to publish their work as confidential information 
relating to their client's processes would have to be divulged if the 
analysis were to be independently verified. 
I have been fortunate to see some of the limited studies that have 
been carried out. Mobil for example have a detailed fault tree which 
has platform collapse as the top event. Shell Expro are carrying out 
a systematic review of their facilities using a rapid ranking method 
and HAZOP. 
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3.6.1 Institute of Offshore Engineering 
During 1979 the IOE at Heriot Watt University carried out an 
investigation into the concept of running Safety Workshops [8] in 
conjunction with the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association 
(UKOOA). They provided a neutral venue for representatives of 
different operators to exchange information about offshore safety. A 
small team investigated the use of risk analysis and attempted an 
analysis of offshore loading systems. This analysis was not 
completed. 
In order to define risk analysis, several experts from the nuclear, 
aerospace, and chemical industries were invited to outline the methods 
used in their industry. It is interesting to note that Dr.H.G. Lawley 
was subsequently recruited to Shell where he now acts as Consultant 
Hazard Analyst. 
It is stated in the IOE's report [9] that 
"The benefits of the application of qualitative techniques (of 
risk analysis) should not be underestimated" 
and also that 
"The potential for the application of quantitative risk 
assessment techniques to offshore operations is considerable" 
The report favours the use of fault tree analysis (FTA) as both a 
qualitative and quantitative tool. 	FTA is the best method with which 
to investigate how system and operator failures are interrelated. 	It 
proposes that HAZOP and FMEA could be used to the greatest benefit in 
the study of operator error. 
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3.6.2 Oil and Gas Journal 
The oil and gas journal is a weekly magazine which serves the oil 
community. It features general news items as well as more academic 
papers. A number of articles have appeared over the last five years 
which are relevant to hazard analysis. 
Leroy 	1101 	outlines Total Petroleum's use of fault tree analysis to 
study the safety of the production 	riser 	in 	a floating production 
system, 	utilizing 	a coverted 	semisubmersible drilling rig. 	The 
emphasis is 	on 	the qualitative 	use 	of 	FTA in 	safety 	analysis, 
qualitative 	analysis being 	used only when a reliability analysis is 
carried out. 
Smith 1111 in the last of three articles on offshore production 
utilities outlines the extensive study of the shutdown systems that is 
necessary to assure correct operation. It is a useful introduction to 
the requirements and philosophy of shutdown systems. In a later 
article [12], several hazards which may have catastrophic consequences 
are identified: 
external hazards 
1) tanker collision 
ii) helicopter crash 
well drilling hazards 
1) well blowout 
ii) casing rupture 
production system hazards 
1) riser failure 
gas explosion 
vessel rupture 
This paper discusses the role of the safety and shutdown systems in 
preventing and mitigating the consequences of the hazards and 
concludes with details of a vessel overpressure protection system. 
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The use of hazard analysis to quantify the risk of offshore fire and 
explosions is discussed by Bosler [13] who goes as far as to say that 
The probability of a major fire or explosion at an offshore oil 
platform can be reduced two or three times" 
Comments like this may miscommunicate by implying that offshore 
process design is poor. Based on the reliability analysis of BNOC's 
Thistle "A" platform [14] he presents the following diagram (see 
Figure 3.6.2) which shows the risk of multiple fatally accidents on 
production platforms relative to natural and man made disasters. 
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3.6.3 Reliability Analysis 
Several papers have appeared which illustrate the use of reliability 
analysis in offshore engineering [14-19]. 
The paper by Bosler and Dolan [14] has already been referred to in 
paragraph 3.6.2. It presents the results of the reliability analysis 
of the Thistle "A" platform operated by BNOC. The reliability 
assessment identified the fire and gas de tection system to be the 
system that most limited production. Its availability was calculated 
to be 97.4 percent and the analysis showed spurious failures of rate 
of rise heat detectors and frangible bulbs in the deluge systems to be 
the major contributory factors. This was because these detectors did 
not operate on a voting basis where no single alarm can trigger the 
system. 
Howey and Gaardner 1151 consider hazard analysis, to be a derivative 
of reliability analysis commenting that 
can conveniently differentiate three levels of reliability 
analysis: hazard analysis, traditional reliability analysis, and 
event-consequence analysis". 
Hazard Analysis is defined as 
"a qualitative evaluation of hazard to the environment of the 
equipment under consideration"[15]. 
They regard hazard analysis as the means of assessing that the degree 
of environmental protection required by regulatory bodies is met. I 
would prefer they used the term risk analysis as this would be less 
confusing. I do not however disagree with the sentiments they 
express. The emphasis of this paper is on demonstrating the use of 
reliability analysis in making correct economic decisions in offshore 
design. 
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3.6.4 Risk Analysis 
The certifying authorities are responsible for issuing a certificate 
of fitness for each installation. They generally not only check the 
design and inspect the installation but also provide insurance cover. 
Two certifying authorities have published papers on risk analysis, Det 
Norske Veritas [20] and Lloyds [21, 22]. 
Risk analysis quantifies all the possible consequences of accidents 
occurring in all the operational modes of the platform. Hazards 
capable of causing fire, explosion, blowout are considered, as are 
external hazards like ship collision, and earthquakes. Figure 3.6.4. 
is taken from reference [22] and shows the primary hazards for fixed 
offshore steel production platforms. 
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DNV's department of systematic safety assessment has carried out 
extensive risk analysis studies [20] and have also developed a 
technique for modelling fires and explosions in offshore modules. 
They carry out a Monte Carlo simulation by computer which provides a 
quantitative estimate of the frequency and probable consequence of a 
fire in industrial plant [23]. Tveit et al [20] conclude that at the 
conceptual design stage risk analysis should be used to compare 
different concepts. During the detailed design stage 
"the objectives should then be to optimize the safety design and 
to assure the achievement of satisfactory safety levels". 
Vinnem [24] lists five steps in risk quantification 
identification of events, 
identification of system states, 
identification of critical events, 
identification of consequence, and 
quantification of risk. 
Using a model similar to the Fault Tree Event Tree (FTET) model 
presented in WASH 1400 [25]', he presents a complex comprehensive 
mathematical model for risk analysis. It is unlikely that an analysis 
of the depth advocated could ever be carried out, as the data required 
to quantify the model are not available. Even if the data were 
available, the effort required to construct the model is so great, 
that the analysis would be precluded for economic reasons. While this 
holds true for the offshore industry, his method may be more 
applicable to the study of major hazards such as nuclear plant and 
large single train petrochemical plant where the public, particularly 
those living nearby, may be subjected to high levels of involuntary 
risk. 
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4.1 Comparison Criteria 
Four methods were selected and applied to the Murchison Platform Gas 
Compression System (GCS). 	These were outlined briefly in Chapter 2 
and each discussed in detail in Appendices Cl to C4. 	The results of 
their application to the GCS are documented and discussed in 
Appendices Dl to D4. This chapter draws heavily on the material 
contained in these Appendices. 
It is clear from the brief descriptions already given in Chapter 2 
that the methods are dissimilar. Although the procedures are very 
different, the principles upon which the methods are based and the 
objectives of the techniques are alike. Each aims to identify aspects 
of the design which are unacceptable and require to be modified. Thus 
each aims to help to ensure the safety of the personnel and of the 
platform. 
Because the methods are different, we are not comparing like with 
like. Therefore the basis upon which the methods were compared was 
subjective, being based on "hands on" experience gained during their 
use in studying the GCS. The following criteria were chosen: 
the understanding of the process required 
the ease of application 
the results of the analyses, and 
the time required to carry out the analyses. 
4.2 Understanding of the Process Required 
The first criterion upon which the comparison was based was the. 
understanding of the process which the analyst required before the 
analysis could begin. This is directly dependent on the level of 
detail into which the method itself goes. 
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The more detailed methods, like FTA, require a greater understanding 
of the system before the study can begin. The understanding required 
of the analysis technique to be used is discussed in section 4.3. 
4.2.1 Mond Index 
The analyst needs to be acquainted with the general design parameters 
of the process being studied. As the method is a rapid ranking tool, 
the analyst can use approximations of various factors without 
seriously affecting the outcome. The detailed information that the 
Mond Index needs can be easily obtained from the design 
specifications. 
4.2.2 API RP 14c 
The analyst requires very little knowledge of the process since RP 14c 
was written with the intention that it be used at the early stages of 
design. This method can be used to define the safety devices required 
or to check an existing or proposed scheme. The analyst needs to have 
the process flow sheet, and the piping and instrumentation diagrams 
(P&IDs). 
4.2.3 FNEA 
The understanding of the process required by the analyst before an 
FMEA is begun is dependent on the indenture level at which the system 
is studied. At high levels, at for example the failure of whole 
systems, the analyst needs to understand how the system interacts with 
the other systems on the platform. Drawing functional dependency 
diagrams is a useful way of gaining this knowledge. 
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Where the failure of instruments is being studied, the analyst must 
know what types of devices are being used and the ways in which they 
can fail. The FMEA of the GCS required such knowledge and I spent a 
considerable amount of time reading material on compressors and their 
associated instrumentation. During the study I constantly referred to 
Conoco's Precommissioning Instruction Manual and the Basic Systems 
Manual. 
4.2.4 FTA 
The analyst requires an intimate knowledge of the system and of the 
operating procedures used to control the process. The breadth of 
knowledge required is dependent on the top event or events which are 
to be investigated. 
This understanding of the system can be gained by studying the piping 
and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), the design specification, the 
operating procedures and the system description manuals. Where an 
existing system is studied, a visit to the process and a discussion 
with the operator are invaluable. 
My visit to the Murchison Platform was most helpful. During the visit 
I took photographs of the GCS and a selection of these are contained 
in Appendix B3. Where the construction of fault trees has to take 
into account geographical factors, plot plans and photographs greatly 
assist the analysis. 
4.3 Base of Application 
The second criterion used to compare the methods of hazard analysis 
used in this study was the ease with which the techniques could be 
applied during the design phase of an offshore project. 
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This criterion is based on the understanding of the method required 
before it can be used. It is also based on my experience of using 
each method to study the GCS. 
4.3.1 Mond Index 
In general points schemes do not require the user to have a detailed 
understanding of the principles inherent in the approach they adopt. 
For example, the user does not need to understand why an index is 
calculated in the way it is. This is certainly true of the Mond 
Index. The analyst needs only to be conversant with its use and can 
become so by proceeding step by step through the technical manual. 
The principles inherent in the Mond Index are applicable to offshore 
process. However the values assigned to certain factors must be 
interpreted by the analyst in order to take account of the constraints 
placed upon the design by the offshore environment. Consequently, the 
analyst has to make subjective decisions based on his experience about 
their value in order to assign certain factors. This makes the Mond 
Index difficult to apply. 
A version of the Mond Index could be written for application to 
offshore processes. This would overcome some of the difficulty in 
applying the existing technique. 
4.3.2 API EP 14c 
The RI' was found to be readily applicable to the GCS. This was 
expected as it had been written for use in the offshore industry. 
During the analysis however, several ambiguities in the RP were 
identified. These are discussed in greater detail in Appendix C2. 
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There are instances where the analyst must judge how the RP applies to 
the particular component being studied. Although the application of 
the method is clearly explained, its application to more complex plant 
requires to be explained in greater detail. 
In particular, the RP sets no limit on the number of plant components, 
vessels and the like, that any one safety device can be deemed to 
protect. The Safety Analysis Checklists should be amended so as to 
restrict the consequence of single device failures on the system. 
4.3.3 FMEA 
The most definitive document available on FMEA is MIL-STD-1629A from 
which the procedure described in Appendix C3 was written. Although 
many papers have been published on the use of FMEA in the nuclear 
industry by Taylor of Riso, the method has not been used extensively 
in the petrochemical industry. 
The procedure described in Appendix C3 was found to be readily 
applicable to the GCS. The standard forms which are completed as the 
analysis progresses ensure that the study is adequately documented. 
This also assists the review of the analysis by an independent 
analyst. 
Once the user becomes familiar with the method, the analysis could be 
shortened by recording only information about failures which have a 
severe effect. For example, failures with a severity class of 4 , the 
lowest category, could be omitted from the analysis record sheets. 
Appendix C3 recommends that functional dependency diagrams (FDDs) be 
drawn for each subsystem studied. However I found that it was more 
helpful to redraw the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) as 
these are in themselves FDDs. 
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4.3.4 FTA 
An analyst must have a detailed understanding of FTA before beginning 
an analysis of a complex system. It is very easy to make logical 
errors which may stem from an inadequate understanding of the process 
or of the technique. Of the four methods used in the study I was most 
familiar with FTA and had used it on several occasions. In spite of 
this, I found the method difficult to apply 'to the GCS. 
It is also difficult to model a dynamic system using a fault tree as 
the state of the system is constantly changing. The use of inhibit 
gates helps to overcome this problem by allowing the analyst to 
specify the extent of the failure before the top event can occur. An 
example of this is the condition that the pressure exceeds the rupture 
pressure in FTA 60/1 in Appendix D4. 
The difficulty of modelling the system is lessened if the analysis is 
qualitative and is restricted to the study of failure paths. The 
assumptions that are made must be documented particularly those 
relating to the intervention of the operator to rectify faults. 
4.4 Results of Analyses 
The suitability of the methods for application to offshore processes 
is dependent on the information which they impart to the analyst. The 
following subsections summarise the results of the application of each 
method to the GCS. 
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4.4.1 Mond Index 
Appendix Dl contains a detailed description of the application of the 
Mond Index to the GCS. 
The Mond Index highlights the importance Conoco places on safety 
measures. They depend on these measures to mitigate the hazards which 
necessarily result from the need to compress gas for exportation or 
reinjection. The Overall Index, D2, changes from 265 to 7 when the 
offsetting safety and preventative measures are taken into account. 
The Overall Degree of Hazard also falls from "highly catastrophic" to 
"mild", which is the lowest category. 
The calculation of the Index showed that the high operating pressure 
of 350 Bar g and the layout hazards made significant contributions to 
the value of the Overall Index. The score assigned to Layout Hazards 
reflects the increased risk caused by the cramped conditions in 
offshore processes. 	High scores were assigned to each subsection of 
the offsetting safety and preventative measures. 	It was concluded 
that the safe operation of the GCS is dependent on the reliable 
operation of the safety and shutdown systems. 
4.4.2 API RP 14c 
The application of the API RP 14c to the GCS is described in Appendix 
D2. 
The analysis showed that the GCS complies with API RP 14c. There are 
instances where protection is provided in addition to the requirements 
set out in the RP. 	For example, the compressor surge protection 
system is not required by the code. 	The design philosophy of having 
process alarms in addition to devices which initiate the shutdown 
system has provided the GCS with a level of protection which exceeds 
that required by the HP. 
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The Safety Analysis Tables in section D2.4 of Appendix D2 show that 
each vessel has primary and secondary protection against the 
applicable undesirable events. The safety and shutdown systems 
provide protection against deviations from the normal operating 
parameters which could lead to hazardous events should these abnormal 
conditions persist. 
4.4.3 FMEA 
The FMEA of the GCS is described in Appendix D3. 
The analysis showed that the failure of a single device in the GCS 
does not significantly reduce the level of protection. The diverse 
approach Conoco has adopted to protect the GCS is a factor which 
contributes to the reliable operation of the shutdown system. 
The analysis did not investigate the effect of failures in the Unit 
Control Logic (UCL) which controls the shutdown system. Logical 
errors resulting from the incorrect wiring of the hermetically sealed 
relays could severely affect the correct operation of the shutdown 
system. 
The system has been designed to fail safe. Thus the failure of 
devices and the valves in the shutdown system normally result in the 
shutdown system being initiated. The study therefore concentrated on 
identifying the fail to danger modes of failure and investigated their 
effect on the ability of the shutdown system to function correctly. 
The venting of the first stage pipeline compressor is discussed in 
detail in section D3.3.1 of Appendix D3. Consideration should be 
given to providing the facility to override low pressure switch 15 PSL 
1510 so that the first stage pipeline compressor can be vented should 
no alternative means of venting be available. 
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4.4.4 FTA 
The FTA analysis investigated the failure paths that can result in 
rupture of equipment in the GCS. The fault trees are discussed in 
Appendix D4. 
It was concluded that the probability of equipment rupture was low as 
in all cases a minimum of four simultaneous failures must occur to 
cause the top event. 
The analysis was restricted to rupture caused by the failure of 
instruments. Other mechanisms which can be contributory factors such 
as corrosion and erosion, were not considered. The analysis showed 
that liquid overflow could result from the simultaneous failure of the 
level transmitter and the extra high level switch fitted to the 
compressor suction drums and the first stage condensate knockout drum. 
Further investigation showed that the fault tree drawn was too 
pessimistic as the operator would normally have a minimum of one hour 
to observe and rectify the fault. A slug of liquid carried over to 
the compressor could cause severe damage if a blade failed. 
The failure of the compressor speed control system was recognised to 
be a common mode failure. The failure affects all four stages in the 
Dresser Clark compressor unit. However the FTA showed that existing 
protection was adequate. 
4.5 Time Required 
The final criterion upon which the evaluation of suitability to 
offshore application has been based, is the time required to carry out 
the study. 
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In the following subsections estimates are given for the amount of 
time required to become familiar with the method of analysis and the 
system to be analysed, and thirdly for the time required to carry out 
the study. These estimates are based upon my personal experience. 
The figures apply to any system of similar size and complexity to the 
GCS. 
4.5.1 Mond Index 
The application of the Mond Index can be learnt in two working days 
and experienced users would be able to carry out a calculation in less 
than one hour. This however depends on having all the information 
required on hand when calculating the Index. A design engineer who is 
familiar with the technique would be able to carry out the calculation 
in the same time, perhaps even less as he is already acquainted with 
the design specification. 
It can take longer to carry out an analysis of existing plant because 
the design information must be sought out first. These data are 
generally not readily available. 
4.5.2 API RP 14c 
API RP 14c is a lengthy, complex document which is best understood by 
applying it as it is read. I estimate that a competent engineer would 
require one week to become acquainted with the RP and to become versed 
in its application. 
The learning time would be shortened if it was taught to small groups 
of engineers who then discussed its application to an example that was 
being attempted. A hurdle in learning is that the individual pupil is 
quickly demotivated by the complexity of the method. 
0 
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Before the analysis can start, the user should have a - basic 
understanding of the system. This can be gained in two or three days. 
The analysis would take about a week to complete and another week to 
write up. 
If the RP is used as a design tool by a member of the design team, the 
analysis may take only a week as the SAFE charts would be completed at 
the same time as the design as a report would not be required. 
4.5.3 FMEA 
An FNEA is often used by an analyst to gain a better understanding of 
a system. The analyst need not therefore spend a lot of time to gain 
an understanding of the process before starting the analysis. 
Approximately three days would suffice. He does however require to 
have a good background understanding of the devices used in the 
system. 
The description and FMEA procedure set out in Appendix C3 explains the 
basic principles of FMEA. It would take about a week to become 
familiar with FMEA. 
The amount of time required to carry out the analysis is dependent on 
the detail to which the analyst studies the process. ii estimate that 
the analysis of the GCS would take an experienced analyst two weeks. 
A further two weeks should be allowed for report writing. 
Again, I think that an engineer who is familiar with the method and 
the system, particularly an instrumentation engineer, could complete 
the study in less time. 
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4.5.4 FTA 
Like FMEA, there are few practical descriptions of how to carry out 
FTA. Appendix C4 brings together the basic principles that the 
engineer must be familiar with before attempting to carry out an FTA. 
It would take about seven working days to become familiar with the 
technique. 
FTA requires a thorough knowledge of the process which is to be 
studied. This takes a minimum of one week and further study of the 
system may be needed as the analysis is completed. 
The objectives of the FTA will affect the amount of time the analysis 
would take to complete. If the analysis is qualitative, three weeks 
should be sufficient. A quantitative study requires the collection of 
data and also requires greater accuracy of the trees. This could take 
over five weeks to complete. 	A point that is easily overlooked is 
that it takes quite some time to draw the trees. 	I estimate that a 
draughtsman would take three days to draw the trees for the GCS. In 
all I would expect that a qualitative FTA of the GCS would take five 
man weeks to complete. - 
4.6 Suitability 
The criteria discussed in sections 4.2 to 4.5 were used to evaluate 
the suitability of each method's application to offshore processes. 
The suitability of each method is discussed in the following 
subsections. 
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4.6.1 Mond Index 
The Mond Index is not suitable for general application in the offshore 
industry. 
The Mond Index offers the engineer a method of comparing a unit 
against a norm, based on an evaluation of the inherent risks and 
offsetting safety features. The inherent risk in the principal 
offshore 'processes is high because they process large quantities of 
flammable material at high pressures. Thus the Mond Index tells the 
engineer what he already know/Sabout the plant and only evaluates the 
offsetting features. 
The nature of the hazards inherent in offshore processes, in my 
opinion, requires to be studied by more rigourous and detailed methods 
of analysis. Even if a version of the Mond Index were developed for 
application to offshore processes, the method would in my opinion be 
of limited use. 
4.6.2 API RP 14c 
Of the four methods of analysis studied, API RP 14c was found to be 
the technique best suited to use in studying offshore processes. 
The application of the RP to the GCS showed that it was easy to apply. 
Applying the RP helps to ensure the safe operation of a process which 
has been protected in accordance with the RP's philosophy. It has 
already been pointed out that there are aspects of the RP which need 
to be clarified. These however do not make it less suitable. 
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4.6.3 FNEA 
FMEA is a suitable tool which can be used to analyse offshore 
processes. 
FMEA was relatively easy to apply to the GCS once the principles of 
FMEA had been established and written in the form of a procedure. The 
results showed that single device failures do not effect the integrity 
of the shutdown system. 
The FMEA investigated the failures of all devices in the shutdown 
system. This included devices which were fitted in addition to those 
required by API RP 14c. 
4.6.4 PTA 
The analysis of the GCS using PTA showed that this method is suitable 
for application to offshore processes. 
PTA was found to be difficult to apply because of the complexity of 
the GCS. It was particularly hard to model the compressor surge 
system because gas can be recycled from the compressor discharge to 
the suction line. Appendix C4 sets out the principles of FTA and 
provides the user with practical advice on how to construct fault 
trees. The results showed that several devices must fail 
simultaneously before a hazardous event such as the rupture of a 
vessel, can occur. 
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CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDED USE OF METHODS 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Mond Index 
5.3 API RI' 14c 
5.4 FMEA 
5.5 FTA 
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5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the design engineer with a 
summary of the information he needs in order to select the method of 
analysis that will best meet his requirements. 
The advice is given on the assumption that the method of hazard 
analysis to be chosen is to be used by the design engineer during the 
design phase of the project. The scope and recommended use of each 
method of analysis used in the study is discussed in the following 
sections. Should an engineer wish to use an alternative method to 
those discussed here, the review of methods of analysis in Chapter 2 
may be of some use. 
5.2 Mond Index 
The use of the Mond Index is not recommended as it tells the engineer 
what he already knows about the offshore process he is designing. It 
may however be used to evaluate alternative protection strategies by 
assessing the way each mitigates the risk inherent in the process. 
The Mond Index could be developed to take account of the constraints 
the offshore environment places on design, particularly the layout, 
spacing and enclosing of plant. The method could then be used at the 
preliminary stages of design to compare alternative process designs. 
The chosen process would however require to be studied in more detail 
during the later stages of the design. 
The Mond Index updated in this way could also be used to identify 
weaknesses in existing processes which require attention. It may 
however be more cost-effective for a company to develop a rapid 
ranking points scheme for its own use. This type of in-house scheme 
can be written so as to reflect company policy and can be used to 
review existing processes as well as those that are being designed. 
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5.3 API RP 14c 
API RP 14c can be used at the early design stages to specify the 
requirements of the safety and shutdown systems required for the 
offshore processes. 
Items of plant which are not specifically covered by the RP can be 
analysed by identifying the undesirable events to which the equipment 
may be subjected. After this is done, primary and secondary 
protection must be specified for every undesirable event. A Safety 
Analysis Table should then be drawn up, and a Safety Analysis 
Checklist written stating the devices which may be omitted if adequate 
protection is already provided by other devices. 
The API RP 14c does not place sufficient emphasis on the hazards 
caused by the layout and spacing of plant. It assumes that if each 
item is correctly protected, their integration into the process does 
not increase the risk. This assumption is incorrect. Where the 
designer considers that the hazards due to layout require 
investigation these must be studied by using more fundamental methods 
of analysis. This may necessitate calling upon the services of a 
consultant, for example, a fire safety engineer, who has the expertise 
required to examine the problem. 
The reliability of the systems which controL the operation and 
response of the shutdown system is important, as are its devices. The 
RP does not provide a means of analysing these systems. The designer 
should instigate an independent review of the relay or computer 
control system that is to be used. This review should investigate the 
effect of failures in the control system on the overall function of 
the shutdown system. It should be shown that the failure of any 
instrument does not significantly hinder the function of the shutdown 
system. 
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The objective of the testii ig and reporting procedures laid down in 
Appendix I) of API RP 14c is to ensure the continued integrity of the 
safety system. As part of the safety analysis the maintenance 
procedures should be reviewed. In particular, the test frequency of 
critical devices should be specified in order to ensure that the 
fractional dead times of these devices are acceptable. 
5.4 FMEA 
FMEA is a useful fundamental method of analysis whose principles can 
be applied by the user to study the causes and effects of failures in 
any system or process. FHEA is a tool which enables the user to 
identify the hazards inherent in a process, and to assess the way in 
which these hazards may cause the occurrence of hazardous events. 
The offshore design engineer should use FMEA to study systems which 
are not covered by API RP 14c, or where a proposed design adopts a 
different protection strategy compared to the approach recommended in 
API RP 14c. FMEA could for example be used to study the causes and 
effects of failure in the platform fire protection systems. 
There are several offshore processes to which API RP 14c does not 
apply. The liquefaction of reservoir gas, and the drilling systems, 
are noteworthy exceptions. FNEA would be a suitable method for 
studying the hazards of either, since it can be orientated to the 
failure of equipment or to consider the failure of the operator. In 
this way FMEA is similar to Taylor's Action Error Analysis mentioned 
in Chapter 3. The effect of incorrect operator action can be easily 
studied using FMEA principles. 
The design engineer may be required to estimate the reliability of the 
process that is to be constructed. Where this is the case, the FMEA 
can be used both in the hazard analysis and in the analysis of the 
process availability. In this way work does not need to be duplicated 




Although FNEA is a laborious method, if it is carried out as the 
design progresses, the analysis should not delay the project. Care 
must be taken to review any modifications in the design as the 
conclusions of the FMEA may be annulled by these design changes. 
FMEA is also a useful aid to more detailed analyses such as FTA or 
Cause Consequence Analysis. The FNEA can be used to help to 
discriminate between minor problems and those which require thorough 
investigation. 
5.5 FTA 
FTA should be used to study problems which have been identified during 
less detailed analysis such as one carried out using FMEA or API RP 
14c. 
FTA is time consuming and difficult, and the analysis may need to be 
carried out by an experienced analyst in preference to the design 
engineer. For example, the complexity of the system to be modelled 
may prevent the design engineer from carrying out the analysis as he 
has neither the time nor the experience needed. Where a problem 
requires to be investigated using FTA, the analysis should be started 
at the earliest possible opportunity. An analysis which is begun at a 
late stage in the design may result in the project being delayed or 
modifications having to be made during rather than before the 
construction phase. As the resulting financial penalties incurred are 
great, the engineer should ensure that the hazard analysis begins when 
the design process starts. 
Where a quantitative analysis must be carried out, FTA is the obvious 
choice as it lends itself to this form of analysis. 	It is a popular 
misconception however that fault trees must be quantified. 	In many 
cases the decisions reached by a visual inspection of the tree by an 
experienced engineer are likely to be the same as those decisions 
which have a quantitative basis. 
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There are instances where the design engineer is required to justify 
the inclusion of additional safety measures to senior management. 
Fault trees can be used by the engineer to illustrate the value of the 
proposed measures. These diagrams can be readily understood by senior 
personnel who may be unfamiliar with the process. 
Where the process system is to be controlled by computer, the computer 
specialists also model the system. Considerable duplication of effort 
could be avoided if the hazard analyst were to work alongside the 
computer specialists. 
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6.1 Hazard Analysis of Offshore Processes 
There is a wide variety of techniques that the offshore design 
engineer may use to carry out a hazard analysis of an offshore process 
which is being designed. The methods that are available should be 
used in conjunction with each other rather than applyin each 
technique singularly. 
The choice of the primary technique is dependent on the systeia to be 
studied and the objective of the analysis. Where further engineering 
studies are to be carried out, such as reliability analyses, it will 
be more cost effective to use FMEA, the results of which will be 
applicable to both the hazard analysis and the reliability analysis of 
the process. 
The industry's own code of practice, API RP 14c, ensures that the 
design of safety and shutdown systems meets minimum standards which 
have been set to ensure the safe operation of the platform. As new 
processes are included on offshore platfoims the American Petroleum 
Institute should update and extend API RP 14c to take account of these 
processes. 
6.1.1 Legislative Requirements 
It is now two years since the publication of the Burgoyne Report which 
recommended that the Department of Energy: 
"should give a lead in defining objectives, evaluating methods 
and achieving some uniformity in practice" [1]. 
I know of no such initiative to comply with this recommendation. New 
legislation is needed to ensure that hazard analyses of the principal 
platform systems are carried out by the platform operator and 
independently verified by a certifying authority. 
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As many operators already carry out such analyses, this requirement 
would only effect those who do not. The legislation should not be 
retrospective, nor should any one method be made mandatory. Instead, 
the Department of Energy should issue "Guidance on Offshore Hazard 
Analysis" to explain the different ways in which analyses can be 
carried out and thus comply with the legislation that is being 
proposed. 
I would suggest that compliance with API RP 14c be recommended, and 
that noncompliance has to be justified by showing that the protection 
offered is at least equivalent to, if not greater than that required 
by API RP 14c. It would be best not to specify design to the RP as 
mandatory, as this will hamper innovation and enforce an accepted 
minimum standard. At present the standard of protection that some 
companies adopt exceeds that required by the API. To enforce a 
minimum standard may therefore cause standards to drop. 
The American Committee on Assessment of Safety of Offshore Continental 
Shelf Activities in a comment about how to ensure offshore safety 
state that 
"It is far easier (and in the long run more effective) to obtain 
compliance by fostering a climate of cooperation rather than 
coercion. " [2]. 
In the U.K. this could be achieved by issuing a guidance note that 
defines objectives for the hazard analysis of offshore processes, and 
provides methodologies that can be used. 
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6.1.2 Quantitative Analysis 
There is considerable resistance to carrying out quantified hazard 
analysis. The reasons are twofold. 
- Firstly, the offshore industry has avoided entering the arguments 
over acceptable risk. Quantified hazard analysis will force this 
argument upon the industry. The potential financial losses in the 
offshore industry motivate most companies to ensure that they are 
kept to a minimum. In most cases where a problem has been 
identified, oil companies are prepared to spend money to rectify 
it. Every improvement in financial loss prevention has a 
commensurate effect on life safety. 
- Secondly, quantified hazard analysis is resisted on the grounds 
that the models used are incomplete and that the basic failure rate 
data are unavailable or inapplicable. These reasons will steadily 
diminish in importance as failure rate data are obtained, modelling 
tools improve, and computer controlled systems are developed. 
Whilst such hostility to quantified hazard analysis remains in the 
offshore industry, proponents of hazard analysis should emphasize the 
value of qualitative analysis as a design tool. The introduction of 
these methods together with other developments will in time lead to an 
acceptance of quantitative techniques. 
6.2 Murchison Platform Gas Compression System 
The Murchison Platform Gas Compression System is well designed and 
adequately protected. The strategy Conoco has adopted has helped to 
ensure that deviations from the normal operating parameters are 
quickly identified and that automatic action is taken to prevent the 
occurrence of hazardous events. 
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The level of protection in the GCS exceeds the standards recommended 
by API RP 14c. The process control system, shutdown system and fire 
protection systems ensure that the probability of loss of containment 
in the GCS is low. If hydrocarbons are released, these same systems 
will minimize the consequences by isolating the source, ventilating 
the area, and by suppressing any fire that may occur. 
6.2.1 Points which Merit Consideration. 
The following points merit further consideration by Conoco. These 
should be seen against the background of the conclusions stated above. 
Consideration should be given to fitting an override on 15 PSL 1510 so 
that blowdown valve 15 XV 1001 can be opened should there be no 
alternative means of venting the first stage pipeline compressor. (See 
detailed comment in section D3.3.1 of Appendix D3.) 
The effect of a premature opening of 15 PDCV 1062, the pipeline 
compressor recycle valve, should be investigated. (See detailed 
comment in section D4.3 of Appendix D4.) 
Protection against overpressure could be increased by ensuring that 
both valves in a pair of pressure safety valves are on line. 
Consideration should be given to reviewing Conoco's existing practice 
of having one of these valves locked on, and the other locked off, at 
all times. (See detailed comment in section D4.3 of Appendix D4.) 
6.3 Further Work 
It was unfortunate that the lack of time prevented a HAZOP study of 
the GCS from being carried out. This popular method was therefore 
omitted from the study. It would be useful to compare HAZOP with 
FMEA. 
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Essentially the methods are similar save that HAZOP is carried out by 
a team. FMEA is however the more generally applicable method and can 
be used to study any system. 
A formal methodology for the FMEA of chemical processes should be 
written. Other than MIL-STD-1629A [3] which was written for the 
analysis of defence projects, no formal methodology exists. The 
Department of Energy should undertake to sponsor this work and to test 
the method on several offshore processes. 
This study investigated the application of different methods of hazard 
analysis at the project design stage. Hazard analysis has an 
important role at every stage in a project, both during its design and 
its operation. It would be useful therefore to carry out similar 
studies to investigate the applicability of alternative methods of 
analysis at other stages in offshore projects. A study which 
investigated hazard analysis of existing offshore processes would be 
most useful. 
"Expert Systems" are computer systems which are designed to process 
information and assist decision making. For example, the Department 
of Machine Intelligence of the University of Edinburgh has developed a 
system for BP. which predicts the cause of a process fault condition 
and thus helps to minimize platform maintenance work. The growth of 
"expert systems" will make a significant contribution to the accuracy 
of computer models of offshore processes. It should then be possible 
to investigate the effect of failures by simulating the required 
process conditions. 
Although Conoco have a computer which simulates the Murchison Platform 
processes, lack of time precluded its use in this study. It would be 
valuable to use the simulator to study the effects of instrument and 
valve failures on the GCS. The results of the analyses I have carried 
out could be verified by Conoco in this way. 
Chapter 6 	 91 
6.4 References 
1 Offshore Safety Report by the Burgoyne Committee, Cmmd.7671, HMSO, 
March 1980. 
2 "Safety and offshore oil.", Committee on Assessment of Safety of 
OCS Activities, Marine Board, Assembly of Engineering, National 
Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1981. 
3 "Procedures for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality 
analysis.", Dept. of Defense USA, MIL-STD-1629A, November 1980. 
Chapter 6 	 92 
Appendix Al LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
API 	American Petroleum Institute 
ASH Gas Detector 
BNOC 	British National Oil Corporation (now Britoil) 
BP British Petroleum Plc. 
CCA 	Cause Consequence Analysis 
DNV 	Det Norske Veritas 
ESS 	Emergency Shutdown System 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
FDD 	Functional Dependency Diagram 
FDT Fractional Dead Time 
FMEA 	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FSV Flow Safety Valve 
FTA 	Fault Tree Analysis 
FTET Fault Tree Event Tree Analysis 
GCS 	Gas Compression System 
HAZOP 	Hazard and Operability Study 
HCV Hand Control Valve 
ICI. 	Imperial Chemical Industries 
IFAL Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss 
LAn High Level Alarm 
LAHH Extra High Level Alarm 
LAL Low Level Alarm 
LALL Extra Low Level Alarm 
LCV Level Control Valve 
LG Level Gauge 
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LI Level Indicator 
LSH High Level Switch 
LSHH Extra High Level Switch 
LSL Low Level Switch 
LSLL Extra Low Level Switch 
LT Level Transmitter 
MCR 	Main Control Room 
NFPA 	National Fire Protection Association (America) 
NRV Non Return Valve (also called FSV) 
OPEC 	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PAH 	High Pressure Alarm 
PARR Extra High Pressure Alarm 
PAL 	Low Pressure Alarm 
PALL 	Extra Low Pressure Alarm 
PCV Pressure Control Valve 
PDCV 	Differential Pressure Control Valve (Recycle Valve) 
PDIC Differential Pressure Indicator and Controller 
PG 	Pressure Gauge 
P1 Pressure Indicator 
PlC 	Pressure Indicator and Controller 
PSH High Pressure Switch 
PSHH 	Extra High Pressure Switch 
PSL 	Low Pressure Switch 
PSLL 	Extra Low Pressure Switch 
PSV Pressure Safety Valve 
PSX 	Pressure Switch 
PT Pressure Transmitter 
P&ID 	Piping and Instrumentation Diagram 
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SAC 	Safety Analysis Checklist 
SAFE Safety Analysis Function Evaluation Chart 
SAT 	Safety Analysis Table 
TLV 	Threshold Limit Value 
UCL 	Unit Control Logic 
UKOQA United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association 
UV 	Ultraviolet 
XV 	Shutdown Valve 
t. 
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Appendix BI DESCRIPTION OF THE GAS COMPRESSION SYSTEM 




3rd Stage Gas Compression 
2nd Stage Gas Compression 




Pipeline Gas Compression 
NOTE: The material in this appendix is taken from Conoco's Description 
and Control Section of the Murchison Platform Operating Manual. 
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SYSTEM 13 PRODUCED GAS 
REFERENCE '1ATERIAL 
Reference should be made to the following engineering 
documents in Volume D in following the description of 
the Produced Gas System. 
Process Flow Diagram 	 10200EB-00 1J. 
Engineering Flow Diagrams 
First Stage Separator 10200-EA-202 
Second Stage Separator 10200-EA-203 
And Interstage Oil Coolers 
Third Stage Separator 10200-EA-204 
Test/Clean-Up Separatár 10200-EA-205 
Compression - 3rd & 2nd . 	 10200-EA-214 
Stage Separator Gas 
Pipeline Compression - 10200-EA-215 
1st Stage 
Pipeline Compression - 10200-EA-216 
2nd Stage 
Gas Compression Facilities 10200-EA-221 
Cause • Effect Charts. 
Oil ?rcduction -Wellhead 	 UCL 24-10-01 
System 
First Stage Separator ?_id 	 UCL 24-10-02 
Interstage Coolers 
Second Stage Separator 	 CJCL 24- 1-0-03 
Third Stage Separator UCL 24-10-04 
Test/Clean-Up Separator - 	 UCL 24-10-05 
Product Pump - Oil Coolers 
Compression Train 	 UCL 24-13-10 
Vendor f'irnished equipment reference:- 
quipment 	 Requisition 	 Vendor 
Number 





Equipment 	 Requisition 	 Vendor 
Number 
C-1301 1st Stage 
Condensate 
Knock-Out Drum 
C-1302 2nd Stage 
Compressor 
Suction Scrubber 
C-1303 3rd Stage 
Compressor 
Suction Scrubber 
E-1301 1st Stage 
Gas Cooler 
2-1302 2nd Stage 
Gas Cooler 











Metal U. ch e 
INTRODUCTION 
The roduced gas from the Second Stage and Third Stage 
Searators is compressed to the First Stage Seoarazor 
ressure and the combined stream is 	 Orocessed,  
:o the recuired dew =cint. If not available, the 
dew ooint control plant can be by-passed. 
The gas is then further compressed to sales gas 
pipeline pressure in two stages of compression 
described in System 15. 
The compression train consists offour compression 
stages, two for produced gas and two for sales gas, 
on acommon drive shaft driven by a Rolls Royce 
Avon Gas Generator feeding the GEC EASI 33 Power 
Turbine, the rated condition of which is 11723 kw 
output at 6190 rpm. The drive is transmitted through 
a gear to increase the compressor shaft steed to 
11336 rpm. The driver units are collecti7ely known 
as KT-1301. 
The Third Stage Gas Compressor K-1302 compresses 
3rd Stage Separator gas to 2nd Stage Separator 
pressure. 
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The Second Stage Gas Compressor X-1301 compresses 
the combined 3rd and 2nd stage Separators gas to 
the 1st Stage Separator pressure. 
The dutjs of the two compressor stages, listed in 
the Table A131 depend on whether:_ 
Dew point control plant is on stream - Case I 
Dew point control plant is by-passed - Case II 
TABLE A13-1 : PRODUCED GAS COMPRESSORS DUTIES 
L compressor Stage K-1302 	 K-1301 
Case CASE I CASE IT CASE I CASE Ii 
a - e of plow kg/h 17913 12936 	44711 25830 
Suction 
Pressure 	Bar G 6.22 6.22 	16.37 16.22 
Temp. 	°C 48.9 48.9 43.9 43.9 
'!c1. 	Wt. 30.6. 23.73 	27.08 26.02 
ischarge 
?ressure Bar G 13.92 13.28 	1 	43.36 43.21 
Tamp. 	0C 126.7 125.6 127.8 126.1 
The duties for pi-cline 1st and 2nd compressor stages 
are given in System 13. 
4. Overall control of the compression train is by speed 
control which is :egulated by a pressure control 
signal from 13-?IC-107l Located in the second stage 
gas compressor discharge. 
To provide the turndown capability, each stage of 
compression is equipped with a recycle loop 
designed to provide the compressor minimum flow 
requirement. 
The inlet manifo1to each cornpressicn stage is 
provided with a cressure controlled dunp to flare 
(downstream of separator pressure control valves). 
These dps allow oil production tq, continue when 
the compression sstem is not available. 
gg 
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The gas turbine driver, centrifugal compressors, 
associated lube oil and seal oil systems, gas 
interstage cooling and liquid knock-cut systems are 
located in module M6. 
The control centre is in M7 CR. 
5. This System 13 is concerned with description of the 
process side of the 3rd and 2nd stages of separated 
gas compressors. 
For dew point control facilities see System 14. 
For pipeline compression see System 15. 
For description of auxiliary services to the 
compression train, (i.e. lubrication, cooling 
etc.) operation and control,reference should be 
made to the appropriate Vendor's documentation. 
DESCRIPTION 
3rd Stage Gas CcmressiOn 
The gas separated in the 3rd Stage Separator is 
cooled in he 3rd Stage Gas Cooler E-1303 from 
55 °C to 36C by cooling medi 	at 27 CC. The 
cooled gas, containing condensed hydrocarbons 
and water, =asses to the 3rd Stage Compressor 
Suction Scr'bber C-1303. where the condensate 
separates from gas. 
The clean gas flows to the suction of the 3rd Stage 
Gas Compressor K-1302. 
The separated condensate is removed from the 
scrubber on level control with 13-LC-1107 and 
flows to Surge Tanks c-1006 A&B. 
The comresscr suction pressure is controlled by 
10-PlC 1268 which dumps excess gas to the HP flare 
system via control valve 1O-PCV-1268. This valve 
is located downstream of the 3rd Stage Separator 
pressure controller 1O-PIC-1266 and upstream of the 
3rd stage gas compressor emergency isolating valve 
13-XV-1102. In this position the pressure 
controller contros maximum compassor suction 
pressure and, if the compressors are not running, 
dumps all the gas to the HP Flare, thus permitting 
production of oil to continue. 
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The surge control consists of a flow signal from 
orifice plate differential pressure transmitter 
13-FT-1101 and differential nressure across the 
compressor given by difference of 13-PT-1118 at 
compressor discharge and 13PT1114 at suction. 
The surge control logic compares the two signals 
and modulates by-pass valve 13-PDCV-1115 to maintain 
flow through the compressor above the surge point. 
Apart from safety instruments listed in Drg. A13-1 
the following are provided:- 






Temperature 	 13-TR-1122 13-TR-1123 
3-Pen Recorder 
Pressure 	 13-?R-1114 13-PR-i 
Flow 	 i3-FR-l101 
The gas compressed to 18.92 3ar G in the 3rd stage 
gas ccm;ressor joins the stream of gas separated 
in the 2nd Stage Separator and the combined stream 
flows to 2nd stage gas compression line. 
2nd Stage Gas Compression 
1. The combined gas stream flows to the 2nd Stage Gas 
Cooler E-1302 where the gas is cooled from 81.7 C 
to 48.9 °C with cooling medium at 27 0C. 'The cooled 
gas stream, containing condensed hydrocarbons and 
water, passes to the 2nd Stage Compressor Scrubbers 
C-1302 where the condensate separats from gas. 
The clean gas flows to the 2nd Stage Gas Compressor 
K-1301. The separated condensate is removed from 
the scrubber on level control 13-LC-1058, and 
flows to the 3rd Stage Separator. 
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The 2nd stage gas compressor suction pressure is 
controlled by a pressure controller 10-PIC-1218 
which modulates valve 10-PCV-1218. This valve is 
located downstream of 2nd Stage Separator pressure 
controller 10-PIC-1216 and upstream of the 2nd stage 
emergency isolation valve 13-XV1051. In this 
position, the pressure controller controls maximum 
compressor suction pressure and, if the compressors 
are not running, relieves all of the gas to the HP 
Flare, thus permitting production of oil to continue. 
The surge control consists of a flow signal from 
orifice plate differential pressure transmitter 
13-FT-1051 and differential pressure across the 
compressor given by difference of 13-PT-1065 at 
compressor discharge and 13-PT-1061 at suction. 
The surge control logic compãre the two signals 
and modulates by-pass valve 13-PDCV-1063 to maintain 
flow through the compressor above surge point. 
Apart from safety instrumentation listed in Drg. 
A13-1 the following are provided:- 





Temperature l3 - T?-l24 	1.3R-i123 
3-Pen Recorder 
Pressure 13-PR-1061 l3 - p.-C63 
Flow 13-FR-1051 - 
The gas compressed to 45.36 Bar G in the 2nd stage 
gas compressor joins the stream of gas separated 
in the 1st Stage Separator and the combined stream 
flows to 1st Stage Gas Cooler E-1301. it is in this 
combined stream at the inlet to the cooler that 
pressure controller 13-?IC-1071 is located. This 
controller controls the speed of the compressors. 
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The cooled stream discharges into the 1st Stage 
Condensate K.O. Drum C-1301 in which condensate 
is separated from the gas. 
The condensate is returned, on level control 
13-LC-1003, to the 2nd Stage Separator. 
The gas flows to the Dew Point Control Plant. 
The compression system is provided with a number 
of emergency block valves which divide the system 
into 'section', each section with its own HP flare 
vent. 
- 	In the event of a compression system shut down, 
the sections are blocked in and depressurised. 
For more detailed description of depressurisation 
refer to System 60. 
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1- 
THIRD STAGE GAS ( , ()k 11 RESSOR  K-1.302 (UCL 10) 
(20NiR&)1.. 	- 	Al ,ilti 	S.D. 	LUNCTION 
S ENS I. NG E LEMI!:NT SET NOTES • LOCAL CR MA I N CONTW)L ROOM IN M13- 
LOCATION - FUNCTION POINT [ N M7 UCL 
SUCTION LINE D/I' 1 BAR G 13-PDSL-11O1 F-,-j ), 	PERMISSIVE FOR INLET TO E-1303 
ACROSS 13-XV-11021 . f 	O1:'ENING 1.3 -xv-iio; 
C-1303 IJIGIl LEVEL +452 mm 13-LSHU-1104 -LAIIII-1104 YES ) 
STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
BLOCKS IN AND 
) 	i:P fir's SURES 
C-1 3o'3 	hiGh 	LEVEL +366iiun 1.3-LSII- 11.07 - LAII -- 1107 YES 
ALARM ONLY 
(1-1303 	I OW 	LEVEL   ) I-Li I- - I Al Y I 	
l 	1 PENS 13-XV-1106  
I ' dO2iiim 13-LSLL- 1102 -L/LL-1l.02 YES CLOSES 1.3 -XV-1106 CONDENSATE OUTLET 
PRESSURE SAFETY 24 BAR G 13-PSV-1106 . 
ON C-1303 
IS 	 II 
U 	 if 	 : 24 	BAR G 13-PSV-I.107 
SUCTION LOW PRESS. 4.8 BAR 13-PS-LL-1116 -PALL-I.116 YES ) 
STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
'BL0CKSIN AND 
J DEPRESS URES 
SUCTION LOW PRESS. 5.3 BAR 13-PSL-1114 - PAL- li 1.4 YES 
ALARM ONLY 
It 	 " 1.4 BAR 13-PSX-1411 YES SI.OPS SEAL OIL PUME 
CLEAR TO RESTART 
SUCTION hIGH PRESS 10. 5BAR 13-PS If- 1114 -PAH-:L114 YES 
ALARM ONLY 
DTSCII 	HIGH PRESS. 28. 5BAR 13-PSU-1118 -PAIl-i 1.18 YES 
ALARM ONLY 
. 
IS 	 II 	 SI 29 . 2 BAR i3-PSIIII-- .1. :t i -PAIIII-- 	111.9 YES ) STOPS COMPRESSION LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
i3L0CKS IN AND 
) DEPI(ESSURES 
DISCII. 	LOW PRESS. 11.2 	lIAR 13-PSI4r1118 -PAL-- 11i.8 YES 
ALARM ONLY 
10.5 BAR 13-PSLL-106() -PALL-1060 YES SAME AS 13-PSHH-11I9LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
DISCII. 	HIGH TEMP. 1650C 13-i'SII-1117 -TAII-11:17 YES 
55 	 It 	 II 175 °C 13--TSIIU-i1i8 -TAIIII-1118 YES SAME AS 	13-PSIIH-111 LEVEL SD2 SIIUT[)OW[ 




C0I'IRUL - 	 - S.D. 	FUNCTION 
LOCAL CH 4MW CONTROL ROOM IN M13 SENSING ELEMENT SET NOTES 
R UCL, 
FIELD IN M7 
LOCATION - FUNCTION 
SUCTION LINE 0/P 1 BAR G 13-PDSL-1059  PERMISSIVE FOR INLET TO E-1302 
ACROSS 13-XV--10511  OPENING 13 - XV- 1051 
C-1302 HIGH LEVEL +401 mm 13-LSUII-I-054 -LA1I1I--1.054 YES ' 	STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
BLOCKS IN AND 
.J 	I)E P RES S tiRES 
c- I 3 	2 	hiGh 	LEVEL i3 16 	nun 13-LSII-.l.OSti - 1-Ali -- l.  OiE YES ALARM ONLY 
C-1302 LOW LEVEL +138 nun 13-LSL-1058 -LAL-1058 YES RESETS 13-LSLL- 105 
OPENS 13 - XV - 1053 
fl +51 nun 13-LSLL-1052 -LALL-1052 YES C1"OS1S 13-XV-1053 CONDENSATE OUTLET 
PRESSURE SAFETY 30. BAR G 13-PSV-1054 
ON C-1302 
30 BAR G 13-PSV--1055 
U 
SUCTION 111GB PRESS 26.5 BAR 13-PSH- 1061 -PAll -1061 YES ALARM ONLY 
SUCTION LOW PRESS. 9.5 BAR 13-PSL-1061 -PAL-1061 YES ALARM ONLY 
DISC!!. 	HIGH PRESS. 52.5 BAR 13-PSIIII-1066 -PAIHI-1066 YES ) STOPS COMPRESSOR 
LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
BLOCKS IN AND 
.J 	DEPPESSURES 
i):fSciI . 	limit 	PRESS. 50 BAR G 13-PSII-1065 TI'AII - I. 065 YES ALARM ONLY 
LOW PRESS . 25 BAR ii 1. 3-PS L- 106 S - PAl.- II()6 ) Y I:5 ALARM ONLY 
24. 5 BAR I. 3- P 5  iJ,-IUti 4 PA IA. 	064 YES STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
BLOCKS IN AND 
) 	I)EPRESSURES 
PRESSURE SAFETY 55 BAR C 13-PEV-1068 . . ON DISCHARGE LINE 
U 
	 It 
01 	 11 55 BAR C 13-PSV--1069 
o:t:scu. 	111GB TEMP. 165°C 13-TSII-1062 -mli-1.062 YES ALARM ONLY 
U 	 HIt 175°C 13-TSUI1-1063 -TA lul.IO63 YES ) STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 










SECOND STAGE GAS COMPRESS ION K-1301. ( UCL 10) 







V i:i'r Sii;E GAS CO()1,E I - 1301 & 1.1 iSr STAGH CONDENSATE K.O.   DRUM C- 
1301 ( UCE, 10) 
CONTROL - ALARM - S.D. FUNCTION 
LOCAL CR MAIN CONTROL ROOM IN M13 SENSING ELEMENT SET NOTES 
RTU LOCATION - FUNCTIOL POINT FIELD IN M7 UCL  
SUCTION LINE D/P 1 BAR G 13-PDSL-1001 -PDAL - 1001 YES ~ 1) ERMI5s:vF: FOR INT.E'r TO 8-1301 
ACROSS 	I3-XV-- 1002J OPENING 13-xV-1002 
c-1301 	lIt(.;tI 	LEVEL +331 	nuit :13-LSIIIL- 1008 -LAIIII-:1008 YES STOPS COMPRESSOR 
LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
BLOCKS IN AND I DEPRES S URES 
C-1301• HIGH LEVEL +245 mm 13-LSU-1003 -LAII-1003 YES 
. ALARM ONLY 
C1301 LOU LEVEL 	: +85 RUU 13LSL1003 LAL-1003 
YES RESETS 13LSLL-100 T OPENS 13XV1003 
C-1301 LOU LEVEL -17 	HITU 13.-LSLL-1007 -LALL-1007 YES CLOSES 13-XV-1003 
CONDENSATE OUTLET 
' 	 ESS(JRE SAFETY 83 BAR C 13-1 1 (3V- 1.008 - 
ON C-1301 
ii;:sSuRE 	SAF'ETY 83 13JR C 13-PSV-1009 
ON 	c-13o:L. 
COMMON ALARMS TO tJCL 10 13-UA-1302 WHITE 
PROCESS UPSET 
M13 CONTROL ROOM . UCL 10 13-UA-1305 RED 
PROCESS SHUTDOWN 
DRAWING NO. A13 - :i. SHEET 3 
SYSTEM 15 PIPELINE/INJECTION CO?RESSION 
REFERENCE MATERIAL 
1. Reference should be made to the following engineering 
documents in Volume D in following the description 
of the Pipeline/Injection Compression System. 
Process Flow Diagram 	 10200-EB-001 
Engineering Flow Diagrams 
Compression - 3rd & 2nd 
Stage Separator Gas 






Gas Sales Metering 
System 
Gas Inject--on Wellheads 
& Manifold 
Gas Compressor Facilities 
Cause & Effect Charts 
Gas Injeczion Wellheads 
Injection Gas Compressor 
And Welihead 













UCL 24-15- 03E 
UCL 24-13-10 
Gas Sales 2,1etering And 	 tJCL 24-15-12 
Gas Export Pipeline 
2. Vendor furnished eq.1ipment reference:- 
Equipment 	 Requisition 	Vendor 
Number 
V-1301 Gas 	 12076-10200- 	Dresser Clark 
Compression V30 LAC 
Facilities 
Appendix 81 	 107 
Equipment 	Requisition 	Vendor 
Number 




V-lOOl Wellhead 12078-10200-J724 LAC Otis Limited 
Shutdown 
Facilities 
V-1101 Gas Sales 12078-10200-3961 LAC Kent 
Metering 	 Instruments 
C-1301 1st Stage 
Condensate 
Knock Out Drum 
C-1302 2nd Stage 
Compressor 
Suction Scrubber 12078-10200-C21 LAC Burgess- 
Manning 







E-1301 1st Stage 12078-10200-E04 LAC 
Gas Cooler 
E-1302 2nd Stage 12078-10200-E05 LAC 
Gas Cooler 





















1. The System 15 consists of the following component 
entities 
Pipeline gas compressors. 
Sales gas metering. 
C) Injection compressor and gas injection wells. 
2. The two stages of compression to pipeline pressure, 
1st Stage Pipeline Compressor K-1501 and 2nd Stage 
Pipeline Compressor K-1502, are a part of the Gas 
Compression Train, described in System 13. 
The duties of the pipeline compressors, listed in 
Table below, depend on whether:- 
Dew Point Control System is on stream - Case I 
Dew Point Control System is by-passed - Case II 
TABLE A15-1: SALES GAS COMPRESSORS DUTIES 
Compressor Stage K1301 	 K-1302 
[Case CASE I CASE II CASE I CASE II 
Rate of FThw kg/h 33969 	176340 53969 76340 
Suction 
Pressure 	Bar G 39.5 38.07 100.3 91•0 
Temp. 	°C 43.3 148.9 43.3 54.4 
Mal. Wt. 20.7 24.6 20.7 24.6 
Discharge 
Pressure 	'Bar G 101.4 98.1 214.9 214.9 
Temp. 	°C 139.4 138.3 135.6 142.2 
3. The overall contrdl of the compression train is by 
steed contr6l which is regulated by a pressure 
control signal from 13-PC-1071 located in the 2nd 
Stage Gas Compressor discharge. 
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To provide the turn-down capability, the two 
compressors are ecuipped with a recycle loop designed 
to provide the compressors minimum flow requirements. 
At the outlet from, the 2nd Stage Compressor, a 
pressure controlled dump to flare is provided. This 
dump allows smooth operation of the compression 
train to continue when outlet to the sales gas system 
is suddenly reduced. 
The compressors and associated equipment are located 
in MG. 
Control centre is in M7 CR. 
The sales gas Export Metering, V-loll, consists of 
two metering runs each designed for 60% of the total 
design flow. 
The design conditions are:- 
Design 	Normal 
Flow 	kg/h. 	 - 	50333 	- 
Mol. Wt. 	 20.74 
Temp. 	°C 	 76.7 	 66 
?ressure Bar G 	 234 213 
The metering runs are served by two micr-computers, 
one being the back-i= for the other. The micro-
computers compute the flow with accuracy of 0.1% 
from signals of flow, density, temperature and 
pressure. 
The metered gas flows to the Brent collection 
system. Pig Launcher/Receiver Y-lSll.is provided 
to keep the sales pipeline clean. 
The metering facilities are located in MS. 
The micro-computers and control centre are in 
M5CR.  
If the sales pipeline is not available or if the 
Dew Point Control System is by-passed, the 
Injection Gas Compressor K-1503 may be used to 
boost the gas pressure to 379 Bar G for injection 
into the reservoir. 
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The injection compressor is designed for two 
possible modes of operation:-  
Case I 	- dew point control plant on stream. 
Case II - it 	 It " 	by-passed. 
TABLE A15-2 : INJECTION COMPRESSION DUTIES 
Rate of Flow 	kg/h 
CASE I CASE II 
53969 76540 
Suction 









Pressure 	Bar G 380.3 368.3 
Temp. 	°C 82 
The gas injection compressor is a :ecirocating 
type driven by a 2051.3 kw motor. The reciprocating 
compressor and associated equipment are located 
in M6. 
The control centre is in M7 CR. 
Gas from the gs injection compressor feeds two gas 
injection wells. The rate of gas injection to each 
well is controlled by a hand-controlled choke 
valve. 
For description of auxiliaries to the compressors, 
(i.e. lubrication, cooling etc.) cteration and 
control reference should be made to the appropriate 
Vendor's documentation. 
DESCRIPTION 
Pipeline Gas Compression 
L. Produced gas processed in the Dew Pcint Control 
Facilities or gas directly from the 1st Stage 
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Condensate Knock-Out Drum, if the Dew Point 
Control Facilities are being by-passed, is fed 
to the suction of the 1st Stage Pipeline Compressor 
(see also description of System 13). 
The presure controller 13PIC-1071, upstream of the 
first, stage gas cooler, controls the speed of the 
whole compressor train which includes produced gas 
and pipeline gas compressors. 
The 1st Stage Pipeline Compressor suction pressure 
is controlled by 10-PIC-1193 which dumps the excess 
gas to the HP Flare System via control valve 
10-PCV-1193 located downstream of the 1st stage 
separator pressure control valves 10-PCV-1188 and 
10-PCV-1189. In this position, the pressure 
controller, 10-PIC-.1193, controls maximum separator 
pressure and, if the compressors are not running, 
dumps all the gas to the HP Flare, thus permitting 
production of oil to continue. 
The gas flows to the 1st Stage- Pipeline Compressor 
is indicated locally by iS-FI-lOOl and is recorded 
by 15-FR-1001, on three-pen recorder. The other 
two pens on the recorder are 1st Stage Pipeline 
Compressor suction pressure 15-PR-1002 and 1st 
Stage Compressor discharge pressure 15-PR-1007. 
Gas compressed in the 1st Stace Pipeline Compressor 
flows to the Pipeline Compressor Interstage Cooler 
E-1301 where the gas stream is cooled from inle' 
temperature of approximately 139 0C to 43 0C by 
cooling medium at 27°C. 
The gas stream then enters Pipeline Compressor 
Interstage Scrubber C-1501 to separate condensate, 
if any, from the gas. 
Normally there should be no condensate in the 
cooled stream leaving the interstage cooler. 
However, if under unusual ocerating conditions or 
if the Gas Dew Point Control System is by-passed 
and as 	result condensate is formed, it is 
separated in the scrubber, withdrawn on level 
control 15-LC-1055 and dumped to the 2nd Stage 
Separator. 
The gas flows to the 2nd Stage Pipeline Compressor 
K-1502. This flow of gas is indicated locally by 
15-FI-1051 and is recorded on 15-FR-1051, which is 
a three-pen recorder. The other two pens on the 
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recorder are 2nd Stage Pipeline Compressor Suction 
pressure 15-PR-1060 and discharge pressure 15-PR-1065. 
Gas comressed in the 2nd stage pipeline compressor 
flows to the Pipeline Compressor Aftercooler E-1502 
where the gas stream is cooled from approx. 1350C 
to 72°C by cooling medium at 270C. 
The cooled gas then flows either to the Export 
Metering V-l101 and to pipeline or to the Gas 
Injection Compression System. 
At the discharge of the 2nd Stage Pipeline Compressor, 
pressure controller 15-PIC-1072 is provided. This 
controller dumps any procortion of gas that cannot 
be accepted by downstream users due, for instance, 
to sudden decrease in demand for gas by the users, 
to the HP Flare via 15-PCV-1072. 
Since the flow through both compression stages is 
the same, one surge control loop for the two stages 
is provided. This consists of a flow signal from 
15-FT-1001 on suction of the 1st Stage and from the 
pressure differential across the two stages as 
given by the difference of 15-?T-1065 at the 
discharge from the 2nd Stage and 15-PT-1002 at the 
suction to the 1st Stage. 
The surge control logic comtares the flow and 
differential pressure signals and modulates bv-oass 
valve 15-PDCV-1062 to maintain the compressors above 
the surge point. 
Apart from safety instruments listed in Drg. A13-1, 
the following are provided:- 
TABLE A15-3 : PIPELINE GAS P&T RECORDERS 
VARIABLE 	
COMPRESSOR K-lSOl I 
I 	SUCTION 	I DISCHARGE 
2-Pen Recorder 
Temperature 	I 13-TR-1013 I 15-TR-1012 
3-Pen Recorder 
Pressure 	 I 15-PP.-1002 J 15-PR-1007 
Flow 	 I 15-FR-1001 
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PIPELINE GAS COMPRESSION (UCL 10) 
CONTROL - ALARM - S. D. FUNCTION 
SENSING ELEMENT SET . NOTES LOCAL CR MAIN CONTROL ROOM IN M13 
RTU UCL LOCATION - FUNCTIOM POINT FIELD IN M7 
K-1.501 SUCTION 51.2 BAR 15-PSII-1002 -PAlIioO2 YES ALARM ONLY 
J3.7 BAR 15-PSL-1002 -PAL-1002 yj3 ALARM ONLY. 
24.1 BAR. 15-PSLL-1509 -PALL-I 509 YES STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 slw'rDoWw 
BLOCKS IN AND 
) DEPRESSURES 
1.4 BAR 15-PSX-1508 YES STOPS SEAL OIL PUM] 
K-1501 DISCHARGE 29 BAR C 15-PSL-1510 OPENS 15-XV-1001 
75.9 BAR 15-PSL-1007 -PAL-1007 YES ALARM ONLY 
132.5 BAR 15-PSU-1007 -PAIL-1007 YES ALARM ONLY 
135 BAR 15-PSIIH- 1008 -PAIIII-1008 YES ) STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
- BLOCKS IN AND 
) I)EPRESSURES 
165°C 15—TS11-1008 —TAIL—.I.00U YES ALARM ONLY 
175°C 15-TSIIII 	1009 -TAIUI-1009 YES ) STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
J BLOCKS IN AND 
i DEPRESSURES 
C-1501 K.O.DRIJM i-392mm 15—LSITh-1054 —LAIIII-1054 YES STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
BLOCKS IN AND 
IDEPRE8SURES 
+306mm 15-LSU-1055 -LAB- 1.055 YES ALARM ONLY 
+128mm 15-LSL-1055 -LAL-1055 YES RESETS 15-LSLL-105 OPENS 15-XV-1051. 
t-42iniii 15—LSLL-1052 —JA1L-I052 YES CLOSES 15—XV-1051 
L4() BAR 1,5-PSV--.1051 









PIPELINE GAS COMPRESSION (UCL 10) 
U, 
CONTROL— ALARM - S.D. FUNCTION 
SENSING ELEMENT - 
SET MAIN CONTROL ROOM IN M13 NOTES 
FT El, 1) 
CM 
RTU UCL LOCIYJSON - !"UNCTIOI 
Flo — N oll 
:r N 	M7 
171-1502 SUCTION 131 BAR 15—PSH-1060 —PAII-1060 YES ALARM ONLY 
74 BAR C 15—PSL-1060 —PAL— 1.060 YES ALARM ONLY 
60 BAR G 15—PSLL-1059 —PALL--1059 YES STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
BLOCKS IN AND 
J DEPRESSURES 
K-1502 DISCHARGE 225 BAR 15—PSHU-1066 —PAIIIl--1066 YES 
) 
STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
)BLOCKS IN AND 
J I)EPRESSURES 
220 BAR 15—PSII-1065 —PAII-1065 YiS ALARM ONLY 
160 BAR 15—PS11-1.065 —PAL-1.065 YES ALARM ONLY 
105 BAR 15—PSLL-107() —PALL— [070 YES 
) 
STOPS COMPRESSOR LEVEL SD2 SHUTDOWN 
- . BLOCKS IN AND 
J DEPRESS URES 
165 C 15—TSH-1060 —TAH-1060 YES . ALARM ONLY 
175 °C 15—TSItii-1061 —'I'Auu--1061 YES  COMPRESSOR ISTOPS
BLOCKS IN AND 
 DEPRESSURES 
232 BAR 15—PSV--1068 ON DISCHARGE LINE 
232 BAR 15—PSV--1069 U 	 It 	 go 
COMMON ALARMS '10 UCI. 	TO 1 3— hA— 1.002 WIll TE PROCESS UPSET 
M13 CONTROL ROOM UCL 10 13—UA-1005 RED PROCESS SHUTDOWN 
COMPRESSOR K-1502 
VARIABLE SUCTION DISCHARGE 
2-Pen Recorder 
Temperature 15-TR-1066 15-TR-1067 
3-Pen Recorder 
Pressure 15-PR-1060 15-PR-1065 
Flow 15-FR-1051 
The compression system is provided with a numberof 
emergency block valves which divide the system 
into sections, each section with its own HP Flare 
vent. In the event of a compression system shut 
down, the sections are blocked-in and depressurised. 
For more detailed description and operation ref e 
to System 60. 
Gas corrosion inhibitor can be injected into the 
gas stream upstrein of the interstage cooler and 
aftercooler when unacceDtable corosicn rates are 
indicated by corrosion probes installed in the 
downstream systems. 
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Appendix B2 PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAMS 
	
4.1.1 	Glossary of Symbols 
4.1.2 Glossary of Symbols 
4.1.4 	Glossary of Symbols 
1.14.1 Plot Plan Module 6, Mezzanine Level 
1.14.2 Plot Plan Module 6, Floor Level 
4.3.1 	Production Process Flow Diagram 
4.10.1 Produced Gas Process Flow Diagram 
EA-214c 3rd and 2nd Stage Separator Gas 
EA-215b Pipeline Compression 1st Stage 
EA-216c Pipeline Compression 2nd Stage 
EA-217b Gas Dewpoint Control 
EA-218b Injection Gas Compression 
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GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS 4.1.1 
INSTRUMENT FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION INSTRUMENT FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION IcontnuadI 
Coda Function Code 
Function 
AAH ANALYSIS ALARM HIGH 	 ) FSXL FLOW SWITCH EXTRA LOW 
AAHH ANALYSIS ALARM HIGH HIGH FX FLOW STRAIGHTENING VANES 
AAXH ANALYSIS ALARM EXTRA HIGH) FY 
FLOW RELAY (function to be defined outside balloon) 
AC ANALYSIS CONTROLLER 	 I 	
type 	of 	analytic 	to 	be 
HCV HAND CONTROL VALVE 
AE ANALYSIS PRIMARY ELEMENT 	
defined 	outside 	tagging 
HIC HAND INDICATING CONTROLLER 
AR 
balloon, e.g. pH, 02. etc. 
ANALYSIS RECORDER 	 11 	  
HAND SWITCH 
ARC ANALYSIS RECORDER CONTROLLER ) II 
CURRENT INDICATOR 
AT ANALYSIS TRANSMITTER 	 I 
((C TIME SCHEDULE CONTROLLER (blind) 
ASH DETECTOR (type lobe defined outside balloon) 
((JU TIME SCHEDULE SCANNER (multifunction) 
CE CONDUCTIVITY ELEMENT 
KV TIME SCHEDULE VALVE 
DIC DENSITY INDICATOR CONTROLLER 
KY TIME SCHEDULE RELAY 
- DT DENSITY TRANSMITTER LAH LEVEL ALARM HIGH 
El VOLTAGE INDICATOR LAHH LEVEL ALARM HIGH HIGH 
rn FAH FLOW ALARM HIGH LAL LEVEL ALARM LOW 
FAHH FLOW ALARM HIGH HIGH LALL LEVEL ALARM LOW LOW 
)< PAL FLOW ALARM LOW 
LAXH 	. LEVEL ALARM EXTRA HIGH 
FALL FLOW ALARM LOW LOW LAXL LEVEL ALARM EXTRA LOW 
W FAXH FLOW ALARM EXTRA HIGH LC LEVEL CONTROLLER (blind) 
FAXL FLOW ALARM EXTRA LOW LCV LEVEL CONTROL VALVE 
FC FLOW CONTROL VALVE LG LEVEL GLASS 
FE FLOW ELEMENT LI LEVEL INDICATOR 
FFC FLOW RATIO CONTROLLER LIC LEVEL INDICATOR CONTROLLER 
FG FLOW GLASS LR LEVEL RECORDER 
Fl FLOW INDICATOR LS LEVEL SWITCH 
FIC FLOW INDICATOR CONTROLLER 	' LSH LEVEL SWITCH HIGH 
P0 FLOW ORIFICE 	 . LSHH LEVEL SWITCH HIGH HIGH 
P0 FLOW TOTALISER (blind) LSL LEVEL SWITCH LOW 
FOl FLOW TOTALISER INDICATOR LSLL LEVEL SWITCH LOW LOW 
FR FLOW RECORDER LSXH LEVEL SWITCH EXTRA HIGH 
FRC FLOW RECORDER CONTROLLER LSXL LEVEL SWITCH EXTRA LOW 
FSH FLOW SWITCH HIGH 	 . LT LEVEL TRANSMITTER 
FSHH FLOW SWITCH HIGH HIGH LY LEVEL RELAY 
FSL FLOW SWITCH LOW NE CORROSION ELEMENT (type to be defined outside balloon) 
FSLL FLOW SWITCH LOW LOW PAH PRESSURE ALARM HIGH 
FSXH FLOW SWITCH EXTRA HIGH PAHH PRESSURE ALARM HIGH HIGH 
CO 
INSTRUMENT FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION (continued) 
	 INSTRUMENT FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION (continued) 
Cod. Function 
PAL PRESSURE ALARM LOW 
PALL PRESSURE ALARM LOW LOW 
PAXH PRESSURE ALARM EXTRA HIGH 
PAXL PRESSURE ALARM EXTRA LOW 
PCV PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE 
PDA PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL ALARM 
P01 PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL INDICATOR 
PDRC PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL RECORDING CONTROLLER 
PDT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSMITTER 
PE PRESSURE ELEMENT 
P1 PRESSURE INDICATOR 
PlC PRESSURE INDICATOR CONTROLLER 
PR PRESSURE RECORDER 
PRC PRESSURE RECORDER CONTROLLER 
PS PFESSURE SWITCH 
PSE PRESSURE SAFETY ELEMENT 
PSH PRESSURE SWITCH HIGH 
PSHH PRESSURE SWITCH HIGH HIGH 
PSI PRESSURE SWITCH LOW 
PSLL PRESSURE SWITCH LOW LOW 
PSV PRESSURE SAFETY VALVE 
PSXH PRESSURE SWITCH EXTRA HIGH 
PSXL PRESSURE SWITCH EXTRA LOW 
PT PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 
PY PRESSURE RELAY 
TAH TEMPERATURE ALARM HIGH 
TAHH TEMPERATURE ALARM HIGH HIGH 
TAL TEMPERATURE ALARM LOW 
TALL TEMPERATURE ALARM LOW LOW 
TAXH TEMPERATURE ALARM EXTRA HIGH 	
V 
TAXL TEMPERATURE ALARM EXTRA LOW 
TC TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER 
TCV TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE 
TOR TEMPERATURE DIFFERENTIAL RECORDER 
TE TEMPERATURE ELEMENT 
Code Function 
TI TEMPERATURE INDICATOR 
TIC TEMPERATURE INDICATOR CONTROLLER 
TB TEMPERATURE RECORDER 
TRC TEMPERATURE RECORDER CONTROLLER 
TS TEMPERATURE SWITCH 
TSH TEMPERATURE SWITCH HIGH 
TSHH TEMPERATURE SWITCH HIGH HIGH 
TSL TEMPERATURE SWITCH LOW 
TSIL TEMPERATURE SWITCH LOW LOW 
TSXH TEMPERATURE SWITCH EXTRA HIGH 
TSXL TEMPERATURE SWITCH EXTRA LOW 
TI' TEMPERATURE TRANSMITTER 
Wi TEMPERATURE WELL 
TV TEMPERATURE RELAY 
UA MULTIVARIABLE ALARM (group alarm) 
UJU MULTIVARIABLE SCANNER (multifunction) 
USV MULTIVARIABLE SAFETY VALVE 
UY MULTI VARIABLE RELAY 
WI WEIGHT INDICATOR 
WR WEIGHT RECORDER 
XCV MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL VALVE 
XV MISCELLANEOUS VALVE 
XXV EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN VALVE (ESD outside balloon) 
XV MISCELLANEOUS RELAY 
YAH VIBRATION ALARM HIGH 
YAHH VIBRATION ALARM HIGH HIGH 
YAXH VIBRATION ALARM EXTRA HIGH 
VT VIBRATION TRANSMITTER 
YV VIBRATION RELAY 
ZI POSITION INDICATOR 	) • 	normally 	prefixed 	by 	
Initiating 
ZLH POSITION LAMP OPEN 	(variable 	letter, 	e.g. 	FZSH. 	PZSH; 
ZLL POSITION LAMP CLOSED 	I degree of opening to be defined out- 
ZSH POSITION SWITCH OPEN 	) side balloon, e.g. 0%, 5%, 95%. 100%; 
ZSL POSITION SWITCH CLOSED I nose that 0% is fully closed. 100% is 















GATE OnLY! VALVE WITH P0511101dB 
PISTON ORIFICE PLATE 
CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
BULL VALUE 
DOUBLE ACTING PISTON TLOWSIAHT GLASS 
SOLENOID 
INLINEFILTEB 
.1 EOITFRTLVVULVI 0UNDCOSTROLVULUE 
GLOBE VALVE MECHANICAL LINKAGE --4j ILECTEDHVDXUUIIC 
OEIPLEHSTRAITIBR RECIPINGPS1MP 
0. COALIRESSOA 




SURF PUMP T 
ITISVRURFPFT POlLEE 105050 OR OPEN DRAIN (JJ 	: 
UNCLE VALVE 
TTHPERATUNERICLU.UTVR Q 14OU TED 
SPECTACLE  BLIND Q INSTRUMENT EEUIND PANEL TURBINE METER I 	Ii 	SHELL ANDTUBE XCHANGIR 
TRAY VALVE 1 
SPADE AND SPACER (11x) OUUL FUNCTION MAIN PHOCSSS 
RIfl LE TYPE  
BOILER 
TI 0 PILOT LIGHT OTHER LINES •WUV VALVE 
FIUEOCHOEE VALVE *.tZJ VENTURI EI 1 UTTON AND - ELECTRICAL SIGNAL 
FLEXIBLE JOINT ___ 
CON 	 TO M —f PNEUMATIC SIGNAL 
DOUBLE PIPE 
EXCHANGER  
4a  ADJUSTARLi CHOKE VALVE 
. DIUPRFT00000LVI E'4J514 FLEXIBLE 14041 .. )414 PURGE L 	L 
RVOXUULICSIGNUL 
=. FLUTE EXCHANGER - 
PLUG VALVE .....4'J........ OIA.HRUGM CENTRIFUGAL COUPREDJVT H CAPILLARY SIGNAL 
FL 	 ARRESTOR _•__ F LOW STRAIGVPEN ING 
HAL EFLIPR VE -__-RE RUPTURE OISC 
CHECK VALOR -.4- 
 
SILENCER 
-EI-- 51140 TRAP SAMPLE COSNECTIOG 
AIR STARE FILTER URN? H COWL -Iii-- VRI'ICI PLATE 1>0 UOSECONSECTIVN [] 	
CAHACIT? UAM,E'FER 
GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS 41.4 
Item No. Description Supplier Item No. Description 
Supplier 
V1301 Gat compressor package comprising: Dresser Clark C1506A/B Discharge drum and filler 
- Cooper Bessemer 
K1501 Its stage pipeline compressor Dresler Clark G1501A1B Prelube/postlube pump 
Cooper Bessemer 
K 1502 2nd stage pipeline compressor Dresser Clark G1502A/B Cooling water circulation pump 
Cooper Bessemer 
K1301 2nd stage gas compressor Dresser Clark E7102A/B Secondary cooling medium coolers 
Alta-Lavat 
K 1302 3rd stage gas compressor Dresser Clark C1304 
LP overhead seal oil tank Dresser Clark 
KT130I Compressor gas turbine driver Dresser Clark C1503 
HP overhead seal oil tank Dresser Clark 
KGI30I Compressor gearbox Dresser Clark D7501 
Gas corrosion inhibitor storage tank T. Bibby 
E1304 Avon lubeThydraulic oil cooler Dresser Clark C7201 
Portable water pressurizing tank Alfred Allen 
C5305 LP sour oil trap Dresser Clark V8534 Dirivenr package 
Flakt 
C1504 HP sour oil trap Dresser Clark P1301 Battery charger 
G.E.C. 
K1304A/B Enclosure vent fan Dresser Clark E1504A/B 
Lube oil cooler Cooper Bessemer 
V 1503 Gas injection compression comprising: Cooper Bessemer E1505 
Lube oil heater Cooper Bessemer 
K 1503 Injection gas compressor Cooper Bessemer E 1506 
Water cooler Cooper Bessemer 
C1505A/D Suction filter drum 	. Cooper Bessemer K8534 


















SECOND MODULE LIVE. 
Item No. Description Supplier 
C1301 1st stage condensate KO. drum Burgess Manning 
C1302 2nd stage compressor suction scrubber Burgess Manning 
C1303 3rd stage compressor suction scrubber Burgess Manning 
C1501 Pipeline compressor I/S scrubber Burgess Manning 
C2502 Injection compressor suction scrubber Cooper Bessemer 
E1301 1st stage gas cooler Industria Const. Metalche 
E1302 2nd stage gas cooler lndustria Const. Metalche 
E 1303 3rd stage gas cooler Industries Const. Metaiche 
E1501 Pipeline compressor I/S cooler Industria Const. Metalche 
E1502 Pipeline compressor altercooler Industria Const. Metaiche 
E 1503 Injection gas compressor recycle cooler Industria Consr. Metalche 
Seal oil console (pars of V1301) comprising: 
D1301 Degassing tank (men.) Dresser Clark 
D1303 Seal oil reservoir (mcic.) Dresser Clark 
E1306A/B Seal oil cooler Dresser Clark 
E 1310 Seal oil reservoir heater Dresser Clark 
E1311 Degassing tank heater Dresser Clark 
G1303A/B Seal oil pump Dresser Clark 
Y1303A/B Seal oil filter Dresser Clark 
Lube oil console (part of V1301) comprising: 
















C 75 19 




Description 	 Supplier 
Lube oil purifier tank )mezZ.) 
Lube oil cooler Dresser Clark 
Lube oil reservoir heater Dresser Clark 
Lube Oil pump Dresser Clark 
Power turbine emergency rundown pump Dresser Clark 
Compressor emergency L.O. rundown 
pump Dresser Clark 
Oil purifier pump Dresser Clark 
Lube hydraulic pump Dresser Clark 
Seal oil pump Dresser Clark 
Lube oil filter Dresser Clark 
Emergency turbine tube oil filter Dresser Clark 
Gas corrosion inhibitOr injection unit Bran & Luebbe G.B. 
comprising: 
Gas corrosion inhibitor tank T. Bibby 
Gas corrosion inhibitor injection pump Bran & Luebbe G.B. 
Gas corrosion inhibitor infection pump Bran & Luebbe G.B. 
Agitator for 01506 Bran & Luebbe G.B. 
Cooling air cooler Dresser Clark 
Diriverit Ian Flakt Ltd 
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Appendix B3 PHOTOGRAPHIC RECORD 
Drilling Derrick, Crane and Flare Stack 





Main Control Room, Module 13, Control Desk 
Typical Computer Display: Gas Compression System 
Typical Computer Display: Alarms in Gas Compression System 
Inside Unit Control Logic Panel,. Local Control Room, Module 7 
Part of the GCS Control Panel in Local Control Room, Module 7 
K1503, Reciprocating Gas Reinjection Compressor, Module 6 
Mezzanine 
K1301/2, K1501/2, Dresser. Clark Centrifugal Compressor, Module 6 
Mezzanine 
Avon Gas Generator inside Pressurised Housing, Module 6 Mezzanine 
C1401, Hydrocarbon Condensate Glycol Separator, Module 7 
E1501, Pipeline Compression Interstage Cooler, Module 6 
C1301, First Stage Condensate Knockout Drum, Module 6 
C1502, Injection Gas Compressor Scrubber, Module 6 
Typical Pressure Safety Valves 
Typical Shutdown Valve 
Typical Pressure Control Valve 	 . 
Fire & Gas Detection System, Display Panel in Local Control Room, 
Module 7 
Gas Detection System, Local Control Room, Module 7 
Typical Halon System 
Appendix B3 	 130 
1L 
I . Drilling Derrick, Crane and Flare Stack 
2. Drilling Pipe Lay Down Area 
131 
ji . 
• 	 • ______ 
6. Survival Craft 
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A IL 
Main Control Room, Module 13, 
Control Desk 
Typical Computer Display: Gas 
Compression System 
Arrcrrfly r- 	 134 
9. Typical Computer Display: Alarms in 







10. Inside Unit Control Logic Panel, 
Local Control Room, Module 7 
(Relays are in Red) 
135 
11. Part of the 
GCS Control Panel 
in Local Control 
Room, Module 7 
1 
. 1 -- 






12. K1503, Reciprocating Gas Reinjection 





K1301/2 9 K1501/2, Dresser Clark 
Centrifugal Compressor, Module 6 
Mezzanine 
Avon Gas Generator inside Pressurised 
Housing, Module 6 Mezzanine 






C1401, Hydrocarbon Condensate Glycol 
Separator, Module 7 
' w - 
E1501 9 Pipeline Compression Interstage 
Cooler, Module 6 (Pneumatic Control 









17. 01301, First Stage Condensate Knockout 
Drum, Module 6 




Scrubber, Module 6 
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L 22. Fire & Gas Detection System, 
Display Panel in 
Local Control Room, 
Module 7 
21. Typical 
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24. Typical Halon System 
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The project completed 
The Murchison Project was 
completed and the field ready for 
production in September 1980 - 
just five years after a wildcat well 
first struck oil on the location. 
Design, construction, float-out 
and hook-up of all the platform 
facilities took four years, ending 
within weeks of the original target 
date and closer to schedule than 
any previous development in the 
North Sea. 
Murchison is the fifteenth oil 
field onstream in UK waters. 
Initial production will average 
20,000 barrels a day. Once it reaches 
its peak in March 1981 the field 
will he pumping an average of 
120,000 barrels a day through the 
Brent pipeline system into the 
Sullom Voe terminal. 
Murchison lies on the median 
line, 120 miles north-east of the 
Shetland Islands. Just over 80 per 
cent of the field is British, the rest 
Norwegian. Conoco (UK) Limited is 
operator for the 12-partner group 
from the two countries which own 
the field. 
CONSTRUCTION 
Construction of the platforms steel 
jacket and its drilling equipment. 
processing facilities, utility, systems 
and living quarters, was carried out 
at nine separate locations in the 
UK, Holland, France and Norway. 
Especially critical to the 
schedule was the fabrication of the 
platforms main steel jacket 
structure at Ardersier in Scotland. 
Failure to meet the 1979  'weather 
window could have delayed the 
whole project, with damaging 
consequences for costs and 
production targets. 
At one stage, a special crane 
built to handle large sections of the 
massive Murchison structure 
collapsed. The incident threatened 
the tight schedule for completing 
the jacket: but alternative lifting 
facilities were designed, fabricated 
and installed with little damage to 
the timetable. 
Meanwhile construction yards 
in the UK and Europe were 
completing the 14 modules which 
would make up the 'topside 
facilities of the platform. As the 
tow-out date grew near, meticulous 
planning and scheduling was 
essential to ensure there would he 
minimum delay once offshore 
assembly work was ready to start. 
FLOAT-OUT 
In August 1979 the jacket was 
winched on to the 600-foot barge 
that would carry it to the held. 
There were initial delays caused by 
weather. 
The day before scheduled 
tow-out, 17 lives had been lost when 
the most violent August gale ever 
recorded hit south-west England. 
But on 18th August the jacket 
began its 335-mile journey to the 
North Sea block 211/19. 
lbw-out and initial preparation 
work took three days. Then the 
jacket was launched from the 
barge, upended from a horizontal 
floating position. and lowered onto 
target 512-feet beneath the surface 
by flooding its flotation tanks - an 
operation which took a total of five 
hours. 
With a weight of over 25,000 
tonnes and a height of 544 feet, 
it was the biggest structure ever 
launched from a barge in this way. 
OFFSHORE ASSEMBLY 
From a semi -submersible crane 
vessel, operations began - first to 
pile the jacket to the seabed then 
to lift into position on top of the 
structure the platforms deck and 
modules. 
Installation of the 32 jacket 
piles was severely hampered by 
an unusually hostile North Sea. 
Work which should have taken 20 
days to complete actually required 
43. (The same weather patterns 
persisted to the end of 1979, 
extending a 45-day work schedule 
into 117 days.) 
At tlìe time of the launch. 14 of 
the facilities modules from a 
variety of European yards were 
already on barges ready for the 
journey to the field. Most had been 
moved north to Bergen, Norway so 
that they could he positioned more 
quickly The first lift, one of the 
deck sections, was made on 5th 
October 1979. 
By 3rd December 1979 all of the 
other modules had been positioned. 
The last equipment to go on to the 
platform - the flarehoom - was 
lifted into place in May 1980. 
The completed platform stands 
866 feet high and weighs 48,000 
tonnes. 
In July 1980 the laying of the 
10-mile-long, 16-inch pipeline 
which connects Murchison into the 
Brent pipeline system at the E)unlin 
field was completed. 
DRILLING 
The first of the total of 24 wells to 
be drilled from the platform 02 to 
produce oil, 10 for water injection 
and 2 for gas injection) was begun 
on 22nd June 1980 and reached the 
Murchison reservoir within a 
month. Drilling of the second well 
began in July ready for production 
along with the first well by 
September 1980. 
In addition to wells from the 
platform, the three wells which had 
been used originally to discover 
and delineate the field had been 
prepared in advance to boost 
Murchison's initial production rate. 
These wells - two oil producers 
and one for water injection - had 
been fitted with subsea wellheads in 
1978. A system of flowlines, 
incorporating new technology: was 
developed to link these wells to the 
platform. In July 1980 the three 
flowlines, the longest of which 
measures over a mile, were towed 
out for installation from Wick in 
Northern Scotland. The subsea 
wells were due onstream at the 
same time as the platform wells. 
TRAINING 
During the construction and 
hook-up phases of the project, the 
Conoco personnel who will operate 
the platform have been subjected to 
an intensive training programme, 
aimed at achieving a smooth 
start-up and minimising the need 
for costly production delays as 
operators become accustomed to 
new equipment. Vital to this 
programme has been the first oil 
production simulator ever used. 
Developed specially for Murchison, 
this equipment is able to create in 
an onshore classroom the precise 
operating conditions that operators 
will face offshore. 
UNITISATION 
In April 1979,  the 12 participants 
signed a Unitisation and Unit 
Operating Agreement which 
determined the following equity 
interest in the Murchison Field. 
1/K Group: Conoco (UK) 
limited, 2792%; Gulf Oil 
Corporation 2792%: British 
National Oil Corporation 2792%. 
Voru 'egian Group. Statoil 
8.13%: Mobil Exploration Norway 
Inc 2.44%; Conoco Norway Inc 
1.63%: A/S Norske Shell 1.63%; 
Esso Exploration and Production 
Norway Inc 1.63%: Saga Petroleum 
A/S. 0.30%; Amoco Norway Oil 
Company 0.17%: Amerada 
Petroleum Corporation of Norway 
0.17%; Texas Eastern Norwegian 
Inc 0.17%. 
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C1.1 Introduction 
The Mond Fire, Explosion & Toxicity Index has been developed by Dr D. 
J. Lewis formerly of ICI Mond Division. The idea for a points scheme 
to be used in the petrochemical industry originated in Factory Mutual 
Inc. The first index to be published was that developed by the Dow 
Corporation [1], and it is from this method that the Mond Index was 
developed. 
The latest edition of the Technical Manual to the Mond Index is due to 
be published shortly and has been revised by Dr P. Doran and Mr R. 
Greig of ICI Mond Division. 
C1.1.1 Philosophy of the Mond Index 
The difference between the Mond Index and The Dow Index is that the 
Mond Index has been developed to take account of the hazard arising 
from processing toxic materials. The philosophy of the Mond Index is 
to assign points to the aspects of process which contribute to the 
hazard and safety of the plant. The Technical Manual [2] describes 
how the plant is to be studied, and provides the analyst with 
guidelines by which to evaluate the points to be given to each 
relevant factor. 
The Index has been designed to suit the needs of ICI Mond Division, 
who manufacture a wide range of chemicals, and their process plant is 
not enclosed. Dr Lewis has extended the method to cover storage areas 
as well as chemical plants, and the method has been used successfully 
to calculate the plant spacing requirements [3]. 
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C1.2 Index Calculation Procedure 
A set of blank calculation sheets have been included at the end of 
this appendix. The index is divided into sections, and this 
description of the procedure will follow the approach specified in the 
Technical Manual 121. 
The boundaries of the unit to be studied must first be defined, and 
are best identified by the valves which isolate the unit from the 
upstream and downstream processes. All the pipework between the 
isolation valves is considered in the review of the unit. 
C1.2.1 Material Hazards (Sections 1 and 2) 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Index take into account the hazards inherent 
in the use of the most prominent material being processed in the plant 
unit. The calculation of B, the Material Factor, is based on the net 
heat of combustion of the material. 
In Section 2, Special Material Hazards, any special or unusual hazards 
that the material presents are taken into account. Particular 
emphasis is given to the ignition sensitivity of the material, and to 
any special explosive properties inherent in the material. 
C1.2.2 Process Hazards (Sections 3 and 4) 
The hazard potential of the process is dependent on the nature of the 
material that is being used, and on the way in which it is processed. 
Section 3, General Process Hazards, takes account of the hazards that 
arise out of the type of operation being undertaken. Where the 
material is only changing physically, there is less hazard than where 
the material is being caused to react with another substance. 
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Section 4, Special Material Hazards, looks at specific characteristics 
of the process which enhance the degree of hazard. For example, the 
unit operating temperature and pressure are important factors to be 
considered, as are other more unusual hazards like the build up of an 
electrostatic charge in the material, the discharge of which may 
release sufficient energy to ignite a flammable mixture of the 
material. 
C1.2.3 Quantity and Layout Hazards (Sections 5 and 6) 
The degree of hazard resulting from processing a material is dependent 
on the amount of material used in the process. This is taken into 
consideration in Section 5, Quantity Hazards, as this relates to the 
total amount of heat that can be released in an accident, given the 
heat of combustion of the material. 
Certain aspects of the design and layout of a process increase the 
hazard potential of the unit, and these are evaluated in Section 6, 
Layout Hazards. Special attention is given to "domino" or "knock-on" 
effects which are related to the height of the unit, and the plant 
separation distances. For example, the potential effects of the 
collapse of a distillation column are great, as are the effects of a 
running liquid fire which occurs at a high level and spreads downwards 
through the plant. 
C1.2.4 Toxicity Hazards (Section 7) 
Gases are divided into simple asphyxiants and toxic gases. Toxic 
gases represent a higher degree of hazard to personnel compared to 
simple asphyxiants, since smaller quantities of toxic gas are required 
to cause death. These factors are accounted for in Section 7, 
Toxicity Hazards, where not only the amount of material, but also the 
way in which the toxic material acts physically, is evaluated. 
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C1.2.5 Computation of Indices (Section 8) 
Using the values worked out in sections 1 to 7, the following 
numerical indices are calculated: 
Overall Index D 
Fire Load F 
Internal Explosion Index E 
Aerial Explosion Index A 
Unit Toxicity Index U, and 
Overall Risk Rating R. 
Tables II to VII in the Manual 121 are then used to define the 
category into which each index falls. For example, Table C1.2.5 below 
is taken from Table VII and shows the Overall Risk Rating Categories 
which range from mild, if the index is less than 20, to very extreme, 
if the index exceeds 65,000. The choice of the category "very 
extreme" is poor because the extremity has already been reached. 
"Catastrophic" may be a more suitable term which more accurately 
reflects the author"s intention. 
Overall Risk Overall Risk 




500-1,100 High (Group 1) 
1,100-2,500 High (Group 2) 
2,500-12,500 Very High 
12,500-65,000 Extreme 
>65,000 Very Extreme 
Overall Risk Rating Categories 
Table C1.2.5 
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C1.2.6 Process Development by Hazard Factor Review (Section 9) 
If an index is unacceptably high after the indices and the categories 
have been determined, the process may be reviewed in order to identify 
modifications which will reduce the hazard potential of the unit. 
For example, if the hazards attributed to the plant layout are high, 
improving the separation distance between the unit under review and 
its neighbours, may significantly reduce the hazard potential. It 
must be emphasised that the designer should aim at reducing the hazard 
potential in the most rational, cost effective way. The Mond Index is 
not a substitute for competent design, and the numerical effect of a 
modification on the Mond Index should not be the sole reason for 
implementing the change in design. 
Upon completion of the process development and hazard factor review, 
the indices are recalculated and the categories are determined as 
before. Each index is given the subscript 1, to distinguish its new 
value. 
C1.2.7 Offsetting Index Values for Safety and Preventative Measures 
(Section 10) 
Up to this point in the calculation of the indices, measures which 
mitigate the hazard potential of the unit have been disregarded. The 







Material Isolation, and 
Fire Fighting. 
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The degree of hazard or hazard potential of the unit is a function of 
the frequency with which hazards occur, multiplied by their 
consequencies. Therefore, the offsetting factors can be divided into 
two groups: 
—Preventative Measures; 	those which reduce the frequency of 
hazardous occurrences, and 
—Protective Measures; those which mitigate the consequencies once an 
undesired incident has ocurred. 
Preventative Measures 
These measures are considered under three headings: Containment 
Hazards; Process Control; and Safety Attitude. Each results in a 
reduction in the frequency with which accidents occur. 
The more rigorous the design of the process containment system, the 
less likely a loss of containment becomes. In the offshore 
environment, loss of containment results in the release of flammable 
material, which if ignited may lead to a severe fire or an explosion. 
The provision of an adequate process control system is an important 
feature because excursions from normal operating conditions can be 
rectified before the deviations result in extreme conditions. 
Within all industries, the safety record of a company is a reflection 
of the adequacy of the safety policies and the management's attitude 
to safety. Management attitude can also be evaluated by the training 
given to employees, the authority invested in the Safety Officer, and 
by the standard of housekeeping of their plant. 
Protective Measures 
Protective measures limit the amount of damage a hazardous occurrence 
may cause, either by passive resistance or by active intervention. 
Two aspects of passive resistance are considered: Fire Protection; and 
Material Isolation. These factors are interrelated. 
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For example, the material isolation or shutdown system restricts the 
amount of fuel available, thus shortening the duration of a fire which 
results from a loss of containment. This also reduces the degree of 
fire resistance required to protect the structure of the plant. 
However, the type of fire protection required is also determined by 
the nature of the fire that is likely to occur. For example, whilst 
an intumescent coating may provide sufficient protection against a 
pool fire, it would be little use against a jet fire impinginging on 
the painted surface. 
Finally in Section 10, account is taken of the Fire Fighting measures 
on the plant, which include the provision of hand held fire 
extinguishers, and fixed fire fighting installations. 
C1.2.8 Final Offset Indices Calculation (Section 11) 
The Overall Index is offset by each of the hazard reduction factors 
calculated in Section 10. 	Because of the grouping of these factors, 
the reduction in the other indices may be calculated by applying the 
appropriate offsetting factors. 	The Offset Overall Risk Rating is 
then calculated. 	All the indices have the subscript 2 to distinguish 
them from the indices determined previously. 
It is stated that the Offset Overall Risk Category, which is given by 
Table VII, represents 
"the hazard potential of the unit in the condition as studied 
with all the safety systems and other preventative measures 
operational in the designed mode" [4] 
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C1.3 Accuracy of the Index 
The indices have no dimension and although they reflect the hazard 
potential of the process that is studied, they do not quantify the 
individual hazard frequency or consequence. 
Dr Lewis has indicated that he considers the index to be accurate to 
plus or minus 20 percent [2]. 
C1.4 References 
"Fire and explosion index, hazard classification guide." Dow 
Corporate Safety and Loss Prevention, May 1976. 
"Technical Manual for the Mond Fire, Explosion & Toxicity Index." 
ICI Mond Division, June 1979. 
Lewis, D. J. "The application of the Mond Fire, Explosion & 
Toxicity Index to plant layout and spacing distances.", Loss 
Prevention, Vol. 13, p  20-26, 1980. 
Lewis, D. J. "The Mond Fire, Explosion & Toxicity Index - a 
development of the Dow Index.", The Appraisal and Measurement of 
Fire Safety, University of Edinburgh, June 1980. 
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C1.5 Mond Index Calculation Sheets 
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PLANT UNIT DATE 
MATERIALS & PROCESS 
MATERIALS 
CATALYSTS SOLVENTS 
INTERMEDIATES/BY PRODUCTS I PRdDUCTS 
REACTIONS 
1. MATERIAL FACTOR 
MATERIAL OR COMBINATION:— 	I 
FACTOR DETERMINED BY:— 
COMBUSTION / DECOMPOSITION / REACTION / EXPLOSION PRESSURE 
GIVING 
I FACTOR 	B 	= 
REMARKS 
2. SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS Suggested t::°' Reduced Value Developme Required 
OXIDIZING MATERIALS 0to20 
= M 
REACTS WITH WATER TO PRODUCE ACOMBUSTIBLEGAS 0 to 30  
MIXING AND DISPERSION CHARACTERISTICS -60 to 60 
SUBJECT TO SPONTANEOUS HEATING 30 to 250 
SUBJECT TO RAPID SPONTANEOUS POLYMERIZATION 25 to 75 
IGNITION SENSITIVITY .75 to 150 
SUBJECT TO EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION 125  
SUBJECT TO GASEOUS DETONATION 150 
CONDENSED PHASE PROPERTIES 200 to 1500 
OTHER 0 t 150 
ADD PERCENTAGES A-J FOR SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARD (S.M.H.) TOTAL 
3. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS 
=P 
A. 	HANDLING AND PHYSICAL CHANGES ONLY 10 toSO 
B 	SINGLE CONTINUOUS REACTIONS 25 to 50 
SINGLE BATCH REACTIONS 35 to 110 
MULTIPLICITY OF REACTIONS IN SAME EQUIPMENT_j 0 t 100 
MATERIAL TRANSFER 0 to 75 
TRANSPORTABLE CONTAINERS lOto 100 
(ADD PERCENTAGES A-F FOR GENERAL PROCESS (G.P.) TOTAL 
4. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS 
. 155 
LOW PRESSURE (BELOW 15 PSIA) 0 to 100 
HIGH PRESSURE 	 - 0to160+ 
LOWTEMPERATURE:1.(CARBONSTEEL + 10°C to .100C) 15  
2.(CARBON STEEL BELOW -100 C) 30 to 100 
3.OTHER MATERIALS 0 t 100  
HIGH TEMPERATURE 	1.FLAMMABILITY 0 to 85  
2.CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 0 to 25 
ADD A-D AND CARRY FORWARD TO SHEET 2 ______ 
A - 0 TOTAL CARRIED FORWARD  
E - CORROSION AND EROSION 0 to 150 + 
F — JOINT AND PACKING LEAKAGES 0to60  
G - VIBRATION. LOAD CYCLING ETC. 0 to 50 
H— PROCESSES OR REACTIONS DIFFICULT TO CONTROt, 20 to 300 
I - OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE 0 t 150 
J - GREATER THAN AVERAGE EXPLOSION HAZARD 40 to 100 
K - DUST OR MIST HAZARD 0 to 70 
L - HIGH STRENGTH OXIDANTS 0 to 630 
M - PROCESS IGNITION SENSITIVITY 0 to 75  
N ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS 0 to 200 
ADD PERCENTAGES A—N FOR SPEC AL PROCESS HAZARDS TOTAL 
5. QUANTITY HAZARDS 
MATERIAL TOTAL:— 	M3 
(DENSITY= 	 ) 	TONNES=K 
QUANTITY FACTOR Ito 1000 
Elk 
=Q 	I 
• Chemical 	 FIRE, EXPLOSION ICI 	
Imperial 
Industries  
Limited 	 B = 	AND TOXICITY INDE: 
M = 	 Sheet No.2 	(6/8( 
REF No. 
PROCESS TEMPERATURE IN °K 
% FACTOR % FACTOR 	 Reduced 	DEVELOPMENT 4. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (CONTINUED) 	 SUGGESTED USED 	 Value REQUIRED 
Mond 
1090 	Division 
6. LAYOUT HAZARDS 
UNIT LAYOUT DETAILS:— 
HEIGHT 	 = 
NORMAL WORKING AREA = 
= H (IN METRES) 
= NON SO METRES) 
STRUCTURE DESIGN 0 to 200 
DOMINO EFFECT 0to250 
BELOWGROUND 0 t 150 
SURFACE DRAINAGE 0 t 100_—  
OTHER 0 t 250 
ADD PERCENTAGES A-E FOR LAYOUT HAZARDS TOTAL 
7. TOXICITY HAZARDS 
TLV VALUE 0 to300  
MATERIAL FORM 0to200 
SHORT EXPOSURE RISK -25 to 100 
SKIN ABSORPTION 0 t 150 
PHYSICAL FACTORS 0to50 
ADD PERCENTAGES A—E FOR TOXICITY HAZARDS TOTAL 
8. INDICES COMPUTATION 
DOW/ICI OVERALL INDEX D = B x (i + 	+ 	
+ 	L
1 Ob ) 	 100 	
00)= 
OVERALL DEGREE OF HAZARD = 
FIRE LOAD 	
F = B x K 
x 20,500 BTU/SQ FT = 
N 


















INDICES COMPUTATION (contd.) 
INTERNAL UNIT EXPLOSION INDEX E = 1 + M +P+ S = 
100 
RISK OF PROCESS EXPLOSION = 
AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX A=Bx(1+) xQxHxExt x(I+p) 
1 	
1000 	300 
= 	 RISK OF AERIAL EXPLOSION = 
UNIT TOXICITY INDEX LJ=_LxE 	= 
100  
CATEGORY OF UNIT TOXICITY 	 = 
OVERALL RISK RATING R=D(1+JFXUXEXA)ORR=QxU 
io3 
= 	 OVERALL RISK CATEGORY = 
PROCESS DEVELOPMENT BY HAZARD FACTOR REVIEW 
DOW/ICI OVERALL INDEX REDUCTION TO D1 = 
FIRE LOAD REDUCTION TO F1 = 
INTERNAL UNIT EXPLOSION INDEX REDUCTION TO E1 = 
AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX REDUCTION TO Al = 
UNIT TOXICITY INDEX REDUCTION TO U1 = 









AND TOXICITY INDEX 
Sheet 4 
F REF. No. 
OPU 4573 
10. OFFSETTING INDEX VALUES FOR SAFETY AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES. 
A. CONTAINMENT HAZARDS 	 Factors Used 
Pressure Vessels 
Non-Pressure Vertical Storage Tanks 
Transfer Pipelines a) Design Stresses  
b) Joints and Packings  
Additional Containment and Bunds  
Leakage Detection and Response  
Disposal of Released Material  
PRODUCT TOTAL OF CONTAINMENT FACTORS k1 = 
B. PROCESS CONTROL 
Alarm Systems  
Emergency Power Supplies  
Process Cooling Systems  
Inert Gas Systems  
Hazard Study Activities  
6. Safety Shut Down Systems  
Computer Control  
Explosion and Incorrect Reaction Protection  
Operating Instructions  
Plant Supervision  
PRODUCT TOTAL OF PROCESS CONTROL FACTORS k2 = 
C. SAFETY ATTITUDE 
Management Involvement  
Safety Training  
Maintenance and Safety Proceedures 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF SAFETY ATTITUDE FACTORS k3 = 
D. FIRE PROTECTION 
Structural Fire Protection  
Fire walls, Barriers Etc.  
Equipment Fire Protection  
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE PROTECTION FACTORS k4 = 
E. MATERIAL ISOLATION 	 Factors Used 
Valve Syste 
Ventilation 







Industries k1=  CITY INDE Limited 	 k2= 	
Sheet No. 5 	 (6/80) k3=  
Mond 	 k4=  Ref No. 
OPU 4674 	Division k5= 
F. FIRE FIGHTING 
Fire Alarms  
Hand Fire Extinguishers  
Water Supply  
4 Water Spray or Monitor Systems  
Foam and Inerting Installations  
Fire Brigade Attendance  
Site Co-operation in Fire Fighting  
Smoke Ventilators  
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE FIGHTING FACTORS k6= 
FINAL OFFSET INDICES CALCULATION 
OFFSET DOW/ICI OVERALL INDEX D2 = D1 x k1 x k2 x k3 x k4 x k5 x k6 
D2=  
OFFSET FIRE LOAD F2= F1 xk1 xk4xk5= 
OFFSET INTERNAL UNIT EXPLOSION INDEX E2 = E1 x k2 x k3 = 
OFFSET AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX A2 =.A1 x kj x k5 x k6 = 
OFFSET UNIT TOXICITY INDEX U2 = U1 x k1 x k2 x k3 x k5 = 
OFFSET OVERALL RISK RATING R2= D2 (1JF2xU2xE2xA2) OR R2QxU2 
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C2.1 Introduction 
The Recommended Practice for the Analysis, Design, Installation and 
Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems on Offshore Production 
Platforms [1] has been developed by the American Petroleum Institute 
and is generally abbreviated API RP 14c. This appendix has been 
written to aquaint the reader to whom API RP 14c is unfamilar, with 
the principles and procedures it establishes. Where I feel the RP is 
in error or should be amended, my own comments are indicated like 
this: [COMMENT:...]. 
C2.1.1 Summary of API RP 14c. 
The RP states that 
"This RP represents a standardised method to design, install and 
test surface safety systems on offshore production platforms and 
is intended for use by design engineers and operating personnel. 
Recognised system analysis methods are used to develop 
requirements for a safety system and procedures are included to 
document the safety system and verify conformance with the RP." 
"Through good design, maintenance and operating practices and by 
applying the RP, an operationally safe platform is obtained." 
[1] 
C2.1.2 Scope of the RP 
The RP illustrates how systems analysis methods can be used to 
determine safety requirements to protect any process component and 
includes documentation procedures which provide a method of verifying 
the integrity of the safety systems. Advice on the maintenance and 
testing of safety devices is contained in Appendix D of the RP. 
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C2.2 Safety Device Symbols and Identification 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in the RP, set out a standarised form of symbols 
and component identification. It should be noted that the symbols and 
abbreviations used for the Murchison Platform differ from those 
defined in the RP. 
C2.3 Safety Analysis and System Design 
The purpose of the surface safety system is to protect: 
the personnel 
the environment, and 
the facility 
from threats to safety caused by the production process. 
The purpose of the safety analysis is to identify undesirable events 
which constitute a threat to safety, and to prescibe measures that: 
attempt to prevent undesirable events occuring and 
minimise the consequences of events when they occur. 
The RP establishes not only the basis for the design of safety 
systems, but also sets out the principles whereby new types of plant 
may be analysed and correctly protected. However, it is recognised 
that housekeeping, management and maintenance procedures are important 
if the integrity of the safety system is to be maintained during the 
operational life of the platform. 
[COMMENT: In my opinion the measures outlined in Appendix D, (Testing 
and Reporting Procedures), are not sufficient to assure the continued 
integrity of the safety system. 
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The reliability of a device is dependent on how often it is tested. 
The BY avoids advising the user about this,. It could for example 
state that the interval between tests should be that which optimises 
the fractional dead time of the device.] 
C2.3.1 Safety Flow Chart 
Figure C2.3.1 at the end of this appendix, shows how undesirable 
events affect the safety of personnel, the environment and the 
production facility. 
Figure C2.3.2 shows the information taken from Figure C2.3.1 presented 
in the form of a Fault Tree, and depicts more simply how undesirable 
events are related, and how a fire on a platform may occur. It was 
drawn by myself. 
The objective of BY 14c is to ensure that the safety systems reduce 
the frequency with which hydrocarbons are released from the 
containment system, and that when such releases occur, the adverse 
consequences are minimised. 
The objective is achieved by: 
attempting to prevent the occurrence of undesirable events that 
could lead to a release of hydrocarbons 
limiting the quantity of hydrocarbons which can escape by 
shutting in the process 
recovering liquids into a drainage system and using the 
ventilation system to remove flammable gases 
reducing the probability of hydrocarbons being ignited, 
shutting in the process in the event of a fire, and 
preventing undesirable events which have consequential effects 
on other components which could lead to hydrocarbons being 
released. (Knock-on effects). 
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C2.3.2 Modes of Safety System Operation 
The safety system is to be designed to operate automatically, whether 
triggered by an operator or by a safety device. The emergency support 
systems, gas detection systems and the like must give continous 
protection. 
C2.3.3 Premises for Basic Analysis and Design 
The RP assumes sound engineering design of the process facilities, and 
the RP aims to provide two levelsof protection which are independent 
of and in addition to the normal control devices. In order to avoid 
common mode failure of the primary and secondary protective devices, 
the devices are required to be functionally different from one 
another. 
The protection should be that which gives the highest order of 
protection against the undesirable event, and each process component 
must first be examined independently of the rest of the system in 
order to determine the safety devices that the RP requires. Once the 
safety devices have been determined, the component may then be placed 
in any configuration and be assumed to be adequately protected. 
The area of the analysis is from the wellhead to the downstream 
platform discharge point. 
It is a premise that the combination of fully protected process 
components does not pose any additional threat to safety. 
The RP sets out a standard method of safety analysis for offshore 
platforms that when fully implemented will result in a safe process 
facility, whose safety system is fully documented and therefore able 
to be verified. 
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[COMMENT: Firstly, no one method of safety analysis is able to assure 
the safety of a platform, since safety is the result of a complex 
relationship between men and machines. The RP does not place enough 
stress on the importance of the human aspects of safety. 
The assumption that the combination of fully protected components 
poses no additional threat to safety is unsound. The degree of threat 
is dependent on the number of components in the process system and is 
also dependent on the plant layout.] 
C2.4 Protection Concepts and Safety Analysis 
The focus of the safety system is on attempting to prevent 
hydrocarbons being released, but when a release occurs, the focus is 
on stopping the flow and minimising the consequences. The RP states 
"The method initially considers each component independently from 
• the rest of the process, and may recommend devices that are not 
required after larger segments of the process are considered." 
C2.4.1 Protection Concepts 
a. Undesirable Events 
The safety analysis investigates the occurence of eight different 
undesirable events, some of which are interdependent. These are: 







direct ignition source, and 
excess combustible vapours in firing chamber. 
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the worst case deviations from These undesirable events represent 
normal operating conditions. 
Protective Shut-In Action 
When abnormal conditions, which may lead to the occurrence of 
undesirable events, are detected by either operatives or by safety 
devices, the flow should be diverted, or the primary sources of energy 
(wells, compressors and pumps) should be shut down. Shutting down the 
primary energy sources avoids cascading shutdown which may adversly 
effect some components and should be avoided except where this is the 
express design intention. 
Where the inlet to a section of the process is shut-in, the primary 
source supplying this section should be simultaneously shut-in. 
Ignition Preventing Measures 
The RP identifies four groups of measures that should be used to 
prevent ignition of flammable material when a release of hydrocarbons 





The RP recommends that the ventilation system be able to disperse 
releases of flammable gas from an enclosed area to the atmosphere 
safely. 
[COMNENT:The RP suggests that it is possible to ensure that the lower 
flammability limit is not reached if the ventilation rate is adequate. 
In reality this objective cannot be achieved. The function of the 
ventilation system is to reduce the volume of the flammable envelope 
at the point of leakage, thereby reducing the probability of ignition. 
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Thereafter, the function of the ventilation System is to remove 
flammable gas and vapour from the volume in which the material has 
been released, and dispose of it safely.] 
Areas should be classified in accordance with API RP 500b 
"Classification of Areas for Electrical Installations at Drilling Rigs 
and Production Facilities on Land and on Marine Fixed and Mobile 
Platforms" [2] and electrical systems should be designed and installed 
as recommended. 
Although RP 14c makes no specific recommendations about plant layout, 
it does state that fired components should be isolated from the rest 
of the process as per Appendix A (fired components). It also 
recommends that plant be laid out in accordance with API RP 2g 
"Production Facilities on Offshore Structures" [3]. 
[COMNENT:The RP does not attach sufficient importance to plant layout. 
This may have resulted from the incorrect concept that the arrangement 
of properly protected components does not alter the degree of threat 
to safety.] 
d. Emergency Support Systems 
The purpose of the emergency support system is to minimise the effects 
of releases of hydrocarbons. The system is divided into various 
subsystems all of which initiate or are part of the platform shutdown 
system. They are: 
Gas Detection System 
Containment System (drainage system) 
Fire Detection System 
Emergency Shutdown System, and 
Wellhead Sub-Surface Safety Valves. 
The emergency shutdown system (4) above, consists of manually operated 
devices positioned at strategic places which when intiated result in 
platform shutdown. 
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e. Other Support Systems 
Appendix C of the RP, contains specifications for the flare system and 
the pneumatic supply system. It specifies that the shutdown system 
should shut the platform down in 45 seconds at the maximum, whether 
triggered by a process instrument, by the fire and gas detection 
system, or by the Emergency Support System. 
C2.4.2 Safety Analysis 
Safety Analysis Tables 
The safety analysis tables (SAT) list the required safety devices for 
each process component. 	These tables are contained in RP 14c's 
Appendix A. 	Each SAT lists the undesirable events, the causes, the 
abnormal conditions that may be detected and the primary and secondary 
protection required. Tables A.4.1 and A.8.1 from the RP, show the 
SAT's for pressure vessels and compressors, and are included at the 
end of this appendix. 
The undesirable events were determined from a detailed study of 
component failures. In some cases where one device does not provide 
the necessary level of protection, the SAT specifies the installation 
of two devices. 
Where a SAT does not exist for a component, a correct understanding of 
the SAT logic together with a study of the component failure modes 
should allow the user to draw up his own SAT. 
Safety Analysis Checklist 
The safety analysis checklist (SAC) is a list of equivalent protection 
which permits the exclusion of specific devices under certain 
conditions because either there function is not required, or their 
function is performed by another device. 
/ 
Appendix C2 	 168 
Table BI from the RP, contains the SAC for each process component, and 
is included at the end of this appendix. 
c. Safety Analysis Function Evaluation Chart. 
The safety analysis function evaluation chart (SAFE) is used to show 
the shutdown devices which are initiated by the safety system. Where 
a device has been omitted, the device is listed on the SAFE along with 
the SAC reference number which justifies its omission. 
The SAFE may then be used to determine the logic of the shutdown 
system, or it may be used to check the logic of a proposed or existing 
system. 
A typical SAFE for part of the Gas Compression System is shown in 
Table C2.4.2, at the end of this appendix. 
C2.4.3 Analysis and Design Procedure Summary 
The aim of the analysis is to define the requirements of the safety 
system needed to protect the platform and limit the threat to safety. 
The procedure was developed from the RP by myself. 
Procedure 
describe the process 
draw flow schematics 
list operating' parameters 
examine each process component steps 5 to 8 
list devices required by SAT 
justify omission of devices using SAC 
list all required devices on SAFE 
show function of each safety device on SAFE 
for new facility, show all devices to be installed on flow 
schematic 
for existing facility, compare SAFE with existing flow 
schematic 
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C2.5 Recommended Changes 
The following changes are suggested in my own comments on API RP 14c 
in this appendix. The number preceding the recommended change refers 
to the paragraph In which a detailed comment was made. 
C2.3 	The Testing and Reporting Procedures laid down in Appendix D, 
should be reviewed and altered so as to achieve the objective 
of assuring the continued integrity of the safety system. 
Appendix D should specify the principles upon which the 
device test and maintenance frequency öre based. 
C2.3.4 The premise that the combination of fully protected 
components pose no additional threat to safety should be 
reviewed. 
More stress should be laid on the importance of plant layout 
and management procedures in 
contro]JlLng 
 the level of threat 
to which personnel are exposed. (see also comment in 
paragraph C2.4.2c) 
C2.4.2c The paragraph on Ventilation should be reworded so as to 
clarify the purpose of the ventilation system, being to move 
flammable gas and vapour to atmosphere in a.safe manner. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
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TABLE B  
COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS ChECK LIST (SAC) 
.\.l FLUWLINF. SEGMENT. 
a. High Pressure Sensor (PSIL). 
PSH installed. 
Flowline segment has a maximum allowable 
working prossur' greater than maximum shut 
in pressure and is protected by a PSI1 on a 
ml no segment. 
h. Low Pressure Sensor (PSL). 
PSL installed. 
Flowline segment is between the well and the 
first choking device and is less than 10 feet in 
length. 
c. Pressure Safety Valve (PSV). 
PSV installed. 
Flowline segment has maximum allowable 
working pressure greater than the maximum 
shut in pressure. 
Two SDVs with independent PSHs are installed 
on an installation with adequate flowine 
volume upstream of any block valves to allow 
sufficient time for the SDVs to close before 
exceeding the maximum allowable working 
pressure.  
Flowlinè segment is protected by a PSV on 
upstream segment. 
d. Flow Safety Valve (FSV). 
FSV installed. 
Flowline segment is protected by FSV in final 
flowline segment. 
A.2 WELLHEAD INJECTION LINES. 
a. High Pressure Sensor (PSIL). 
PSU installed. 
Line and equipment are protected by an 
Upstream PS!!. 
b. Low Pressure Sensor (I'SL.) 
PSL installed. 
Line and equipment are protected by an 
upstream P5k. 
C. Pressure Safety \'.tivt. (l'SV). 
I. 	I'SV installed. 
2. Line and equipment have a maximum alloy-
able working pressure greater than the maxi -
mum pressure that can be imposed by the 
injection source. 
Line and equipment are protected by an 
upstream PSV. 
(I. Check Valve (FSV). 
1. FSV installed. 
A.3 HEADERS. 
a. High Pressure Sensor (I'SH). 
PSilinstafled. 
All incoming fluwlines are equipped with a 
PSH set less than the maximum allowable 
working pressure of the header. 
Header is protected by downstream PSI1 
whichcannot be isolated from the header. 
b. Low Pressure Sensor (PSL). 
l'SL installed. 
All incoming flowlines are equipped with a 
PSI,. 
Header is for flare, relief, vent or other 
atmospheric service. 
c. Pressure Safety Valve (PS'). 
1. 	PSV installed. 
2. Header has a maximum allowable working 
pressure greater than the maximum shut in 
pressure of any connected well. 
3. 	l'ressure relief protection is providec on all 
incoming flowlines on wells having a maxi-
mum shut in pressure greater than the 
maximum allowable working pressure of the 
header. 
I leader is protected by downstream PSV 
which cannot be isolated from the header. 
Header is for flare, relief, vent, or other 
atiriospheric service and has no valving in the 
outlet n1ring. 
I irpi it ource is a well(s) having a pressure 
greater than the flax imnum allowable working 
pressure of the header and is cciii i pjred with two 
SSVs controlled by independent PSlls. Other 
Input sources having a pressure greater than 
the maximum allowable working pressure of 
the header are protected by PSVs. 
A.4 PRESSURE VESSELS. 
a. High Pressure Sensor (I'SH). 
PSH installed. 
Input is from a pump or compressor that 
cannot develop pressure greater than the 
maximum allowable working pressure of the 
vessel. 
Input source is not a wellhead flowline(s), 
production header or pipeline and each input 
source is protected by a PSI! that protects the 
vessel. 
Cas outlet is connected by adequately sized 
piping without block or regulating valves to 
downstream equipment protected by a PSU 
which also protects the upstream vessel. 
\'essel is final scrubber in a flare relief orvent 
system which operates at atmospheric pressure 
amid is designed to withstand maximum built up 
hack pressure. 
Vessel operates at atmospheric pressure and 
has an adequate vent system. 
b. I.ow Pressure Sensor (l'SL). 
l'SL installed. 
Minimum operaiiimg pressure is atmospheric 
pressure when in service. 
Each input source is protected by a E'SL and 
Uteri ,  are no pressure control devices or 
restrictions l>etveen the PSIAs) and the vessel. 
Vessel is a small trap or scrubber, is not a 
process component and adequate protection is 
pravded by downstream I'SL or design 
function (e.g. gas scrubber for pneumatic 
safety systems). 
Gas outlet is connected by adequately sized 
piping, without block or regulating valves, to 
downstream equipment protected by a PSL 
which also protects the upstream vessel. 
c. Pressure Safety Valve (PS\'). 
PSV installed. 
Each input source is protected by a PS  set no 
higher than the maximum allowable working 
pressure of the vessel and a PS  is installed on 
the vessel for fire exposure and thermal expan-
sion. 
;. 	Fitch input source is protected by a PS ,set no 
higher than the maximum allowable working 
pressure of the vessel, of which at least erie PSV 
cannot be isolated from the vessel. 
4. I'SVs on downstream equipment can satisfy 
relief requirement of the vessel and cannot be 
isolated [rum the vessel. 
d. High Level Sensor (LSH). 
LSII installed. 
Equipment downstream of gas outlet can 
safely handle maximum liquid carry-over and 
the vessel does not discharge to flare. 
'vessel function does not require handling 
separated fluid phases. 








COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS CHECKLIST (SAC) 
(continued) 
C. 1MW Level Sensor (LSL). 
LSL installed to protect each liquid outlet. 
Vessel does not have an immersed heating 
element and liquid level is not automatically 
maintained in the vessel. 
Vessel does not have an immersed heating 
element and equipment downstream of liquid 
outlet(s) can safely handle maximum gas rates 
that can be discharged through the liquid 
outlet(s). Restrictions in the discharge line(s) 
may be used to limit the gas flow rate. 
f. Check Valve (FSV). 
FSV installed on each outlet. 
The maximum volume of hydrocarbons that 
could backflosv from downstream equipment is 
insignificant. 
A control device in the line will effectively 
minimize backflow. 
g. High Temperature Sensor (TSH). 
High temperature sensors are applicable only to 
vessels havinga heat source. 
TSH installed. 
(Deleted in Second Edition.) 
Heat source is incapable of causing excess 
temperature. 
A.5 ATMOSPHERIC VESSELS. 
a. Vent. 
1. 	Vent installed. 
b. Pressure-Vacuum Sensor (PSV). 
PSV installed. 
Vessel has second independent vent capable of 
handling maximum gas volume. 
Component is a pressure vessel operating in 
atmospheric service anti is equipped with an 
adequately sized vent. 
c. High Level Sensor (LSII). 
I. 	LSU installed. 
Fill ooerations are continuously attended. 
Overflow is diverted or contained by other 
process components. 
d. Low Level Sensor (LSL). 
LSL installed. 
Adequate containment system is provided. 
e. High Temperature Sensor (TSH). 
High temperature sensors are applicable only to 
vessels having a heat source. 
TSH installed. 
(Deleted in Second Edition.) 
Heat source is incapable of causing excess 
temperature. 
A.6 FIRED COMPONENTS. 
a. High Temperature Sensor (Media .or Process 
Fluid) (TSH). 
TSH installed. 
Component is a steam generator protected by a 
PSH and LSL. 
b. High Temperature Sensor (Stack) (TSH). 
TSH installed. 
Component is isolated and does not handle 
combustible media or process fluids other than 
fuel. 
c. (Deletedin Second Edition.) 
d. Low Pressure Sensor (Air Supply) (PSL.) 
1. 	PSL installed.  
Component is equipped with a natural draft 
burner. 
Forced draft burner is equipped with another 
type of low air supply sensor. 
Highe. 	igh I'ressure Sensor (f"uel Supply) (I'S!!). 
	
1. 	PSII installed. 
f. Low Pressure Sensor (Fuel Supply) (PSI..). 
PSI, installed. 
Component is equipped with a natural draft 
burner. 
g. Flame Failure Sensor (BSL). 
1. 	BSI, installed. 
h. Low Flow Sensor (Heated Media) (F'SL). 
FSL installed. 
Component is not a closed heat transfer type in 
which a temperature degradable media flows 
through tubes located in the firing chamber. 
I. Motor Interlock (Forced Draft Fan Motor). 
Motor Interlock installed. 
Component is equipped with a natural draft 
burner. 
j. Flame Arrestor (Air Intake). 
Flame Arrestor installed. 
Component is equipped with a forced draft 
burner. 
Component is located in an isolated area and 
not, handling combustible media or process 
fluids other than fuel. 
k. Stack Arrestor. 
Stack Arrestor installed. 
Component is equipped with a forced draft 
burner. 
Component is isolated so process fluids will not 
contact stack emissions. 
I. Pressure Safety Valve ('T'ube) (l'SV). 
I. 	PSV installed. 
2. Component is not a tube type heater. 
A.7 PUMPS. 
High Pressure Sensor(PSFI) -Pipeline Pumps. 
1. 	PSI! installed. 
111gb Pressure Sensor (PSI!) - Other Pumps. 
PSilinstalled. 
Maximum putiip discharge pressure does not 
exceed 70 percent of the maximum allowable 
working pressure of discharge piping. 
Pump is manually operated and continuously 
attended. 
Small . low volume, injection pumps, e.g. 
chemical injection. 
Pump discharges to an atrnospheric.veSSel. 
Low Pressure Sensor (PSL) - Pipeline Pumps. 
}'SL installed. 
Pump does not handle hydrocarbons. 
d. Low Pressure Sensor (PSL) - Other Pumps. 
PSL installed. 
Pump is manually operated and continuously 
attended. 
Adequate containment is provided. 
Small, low volume, injection pumps, e.g. 
chemical injection. 




A aerictin Petroleum li!Liuti - 
TABLE Bi 
COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS CHECKLIST (SAC) 
(continued) 
Pressure Safety Valves (1'SV) - Pipeline 
Pumps. 
PS\' installed. 
Pump is kinetic energy type and incapable of 
generating a head greater than the niaxrmum 
allowable working pressure of the dr.;eharge 
piping. 
f. Pressure Safety Valves (PSV) - Other Puiiips. 
PSV installed. 
Maximum pump discharge pressure is less 
than the maximum allowable working pres-
sure of discharge piping. 
Pump has internal pressure relief capability. 
Pump is glycol powered glycol pump, and the 
wetglycol low pressure discharge piping is 
rated higher than the maximum discharge 
pressure. 
Pump is glycol powered glycol pump, and the 
wet glycol low pres sure discharge piping is 
protected by a FSV on a downstream cornp( 
nent which cannot be isolated from the pump. 
g. Check Valve (FSV) - All Pumps. 
1. Cheek Valve installed. 
A.8 COMPRESSORS. 
a. High Pressure Sensor (PSI!) - Suction. 
PSH installed. 
Each input source is protected by a PSU that 
will also protect the compressor. 
b. High Pressure Sensor (PSI-E) - Discharge. 
1. 	PSI! installed. 
c. Low Pressure Sensor (PSI,) - Suction. 
I'SL installed. 
Each input source is protected by a PSI, that 
will also protect the compressor. 
d. Low Pressure Sensor (PSL) - Discharge. 
1. 	I'SL installed. 
e. Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) - Suction. 
I. 	I'SV installed. 
2. Each input source is protected by a PSV that 
will also protect the compressor. 
f. Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) - Discharge. 
1. 	PSV installed. 
g. Check Valve (F'SV) - Discharge. 
1. 	FSV installed. 
A.9 PIPELINES. 
a. High Pressure Sensor (PSU). 
PSH installed. 
Delivering pipeline protected by PSI1 located 
on upstream component. 
Each input source is protected by a PSIE that 
also protects a departing or bi-directional 
i peline. 
i he pipeline is protected by a PSH located on a 
parallel component. 
b. Low Pressure Sensor (PSI,). 
PSL installed. 
Delivering pipeline protected by I'SL located 
on upstream component. 
J. Each input source is protected by a PSL that 
also protects a departing or hi-directional 
pipeline.  
4. 	the pipeline is protected by a PSI, located on a 
parallel component. 
C. Pressure Safety Valve (PSV). 
1. 	PSV installed.  
Pipeline has a maximum allowable operating 
pressure greater than the maximum pressure 
of any input source. 
Each input source having a pressure greater 
than the maxiniurn allowable operatin pres-
sure of the pipeline is protected by a PS'v set no 
higher than the maximumllowableoperating 
pressure of the pipeline and the PSV cannot be 
isolated (ruin the pipeline. 
The pipeline ciocs not receive input from the 
olat form process. 
Input source is a well(s) having a pressure 
greater than the maximum allowable operat-
ing pressure of the pipeline and is equipped 
with two SSVs controlled by independent 
PSI-Is. Other input sources having a pressure 
greater than the maximum allowable operat-
ing pressure of the pipeline are protected by 
PS\s. 
J. Cheek Valve (FSV). 
I. 	FSV installed. 
Departing pipeline is equtppe(l with a SDV 
contr(,lled by a PSL. 
Each input source is protected by a FSV 
located so that no significant length of pipeline 
is unprotected from back flow. 
I'i pd tue is used for b i-d reetiorial flow. 
A.IO IIKA I' EXCHANGERS. 
111gb }'re'ure Sensor  
I. 	PSI! installed. 
2. 	Input source to heat e xchanger section cannot 
tic ve up p resat ire greater than the rn a xi in tim 
allowable working pressure of the heat ex-
changer section. 
:t. 	Each input source is iirutctel by a P511 that 
also protects the heat exchanger sccliorr. 
4. A PSII is installed on atiownstrcarii component 
and cannot he isolated from the h(.-at exchanger 
section by block or regulating valves. 
Low P resslIre Sensor (L'St.). 
PSI, installed. 
M ioirrlurli operating pressure' is atmospheric 
'ressure when in service. 
I'SL installed on another component will 
provide necessary protection and the PSI, 
cannot be isolated from the heat exchanger 
section. 
C . Pressure Safety Valve (PS'). 
I. 	PSV installed. 
2. 	Each input source is protected by a !'Sv set no 
higher than the maxitnuin allowable working 
pressure of the heat exchanger section and a 
I'SV is installed on the heat exchanger scetior 
for fire exposure and thermal relief. 
:t. 	Each in,uit source is protected by a PSV set no 
higher than the nia i mu nit allowable working 
pressure of the heat exchanger section and 
cannot be isolated from the heat exchanger 
Section. 
PS\s on downstream equipment can satisfy 
relief requirement of the heat exchanger 
section and cannot be isolated from the heat 
exchanger section. 
Input sources to the heat exchanger section 
cannot develop pressure greater than the 
maximum allowable working Iurl'sseure of the 







London W1A 1BT 














REF.LOGICDIAG. 	 _____________  






LOCATION 	MURCHISON 	ITEM No: 
CONTRACT No. EECM 1398  	0 (jJ 
42 7,7 „y"-"D' 	 i#.."$57J /-61A' 	
c-r 	-2fl--uj 
2' Q 
',c 	)Er1 	 - 
	
REV.DATE  	BY 	CHKD.APPD. 
0 
PROCESS COMPONENT 	DEVICE ALTERNATIVE PROTECTION 
ITEM N 	SERVICE • 	 I 0 	
SAC REF 	ALTERN DEVICE 	\ 





















' ” ' -' " _: _:: _-' " " ' -. ..' ,.' _: ' " 
cl 







1 5i r,2A/2 
13i 1j6I . • 
( X 
2 
—.-.-- —.—. —--....- 
x 
x 
4:611-1-r 10,6,611 At?J )( x s' . fi 
% )1 .x )( , 	Y )' ) )( ) X X 
2 
/ x ( 'C )( ' ;( / , )< .X )i x X X X 
s 
,J7j 62 . 
.% I , . • S il , X X )e )( )( )(X x x 
x c < .. .. . ,. < , x x . x o 
5fé415 a.". 
,4)pie,1 




e- - I' 	/#V' /4 77,$ 4 1 P6 .J 	5E( i . / d O 4' -- 179 Ll 
. 398-00-5 . 
L 




C3.2.2 System Configuration and Modes of Operation 
C3.2.3 Indenture Levels 
C3.2.4 Functional Dependency Diagrams 
C3.3 Record of Analysis 
C3.3.1 Preliminary Details 
C3.3.2 Identification of Component 
C3.3.3 Failure Modes and Causes 
C3.3.4 Operating Mode and System Configuration 
C3.3.5 Failure Effects 
C3.3.6 Failure Detection Method 
C3.3.7 Compensating Provisions 
C3.3.8 Severity Class 
C3.3.9 Remarks 
C3.4 FMEA Report 
C3.5 FMEA Procedure 
C3.6 References 
Figure C3.2.4 Level Control System Functional Dependency Diagram 
Table C3.3 FMEA Worksheet of Level Control System 
Appendix C3 	 180 
C3.1 Introduction 
There are considerable differences of opinion as to what constitutes 
FMEA. The document recently issued by the United States Department of 
Defense [1] is the most definitive description yet published. 
FMEA is a component orientated technique of analysis and has been 
widely used in the Nuclear Industry 121. The French Nuclear Safety 
Authorities favour FMEA over FTA as in FMEA all component failures are 
investigated. 
Hoyle [3] in his notes for Conoco, includes FTA in a list of FMEA 
techniques as well as stating that FMEA can be used to study a system 
from the top down as easily as from the bottom up. In most cases a 
bottom up approach is adopted, that is from component level to system 
level. 
C3.2 Approach 
The major principles of FMEA are: 
to examine every component in every operating mode 
to identify all failure modes, and 
to identify the effects of each failure on the system. 
Normally a hardware approach is adopted in which every component, 
instrument, vessel and pipe is examined. However, if the design is 
still In its early stages where much of the detailed work has still to 
be completed, an FNEA can be carried out by investigating functional 
failures. That is, the effect of subsystem failures (a stage of 
compression say) on the whole system, are investigated. 
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A functional FMEA is often used as part of a Risk Analysis study, 
whilst a hardware FMEA is generally the basis of a Reliability 
Analysis of a system 141. 
C3.2.1 Objectives 
The objectives of a FMEA are: 
to Identify design weaknesses which may render the system 
inoperable or unsafe 
to identify failures which the process control system does not 
mitigate, and 
to recommend design changes which result from the FMEA. 
These are general objectives which apply in any Instance. 	It is 
advisable for the analyst to formulate specific objectives so as to 
define the boundaries of the study. 
In carrying out the FMEA of the GCS, the following specific objective 
was formulated: 
"The objective of the FMEA• of the GCS Is to Identify the fail to 
danger modes of the process control and shutdown system and to 
study the effects of such failures on the capability to shutdown 
the process without loss of containment, or where a release of 
hydrocarbons has occurred, to study the capability of the 
process control and shutdown system to minimise the release." 
C3.2.2 System Configuration and Modes of Operation 
Having developed and thought out the objective of the study, the 
analyst must become conversant with the system to be appraised. 
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Should the analysis take place during the early design stages, very 
little documentation may be available. The analyst must devote 
sufficient time to gaining an understanding of the system before 
beginning the analysis. 
When a chemical process is being studied, the source of information is 
generally the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and the 
design specification. It will be helpful for the analyst to work 
alongside a Design Engineer as this speeds up assimilation of the 
pertinent facts about the process. If the analyst is a design 
engineer who has worked on the project, he will be able to begin the 
analysis immediately after defining the boundaries of the study. 
As a thorough understanding of the process is gained, the system 
configurations and operating modes of different parts of the system 
will be identified. In FMEA "operating modes" refers to components 
which may be: 
operating 
in standby, or 
redundant. 
"System configuration" refers to the manner in which the entire 
process is operated, for example startup, normal operation and 
shutdown would be regarded as three separate system configurations. 
C3.2.3 Indenture Levels 
In every system a number of hierarchical or indenture levels can be 
identified. The objective of the study will help to determine at 
which indenture level it is most appropriate to begin the FNEA. The 
causes of failures at the commencement level are identified by 
considering how the failure arises in the lower, more detailed levels. 
Appendix C3 	 183 
The effects of failures are then studied by considering each higher 
level in turn. This causes the analyst to identify the way in which 
accidents are caused and propagated and allows the best means of 
mitigating the failure to be assessed. 





Instrument Subsystem, and 
Instrument. 
C3.2.4 Functional Dependency Diagrams 
Once the indenture level from which the'study is to begin has been 
decided, the analyst may find it helpful to draw functional dependency 
diagrams of the part of the process being studied. A functional 
dependency diagram (FDD) shows how various components are related to 
one another in the system. Figure C3.2.4 at the end of this appendix 
shows the FDD for a typical level control system. 
The P&IDs can be regarded as FDDs but drawing these diagrams for the 
process is a useful aid to understanding the system. This is 
particularly true when a process is being analysed at a high indenture 
level. FDDs can also be used to define the different system 
configurations and to show the function that an instrument may have in 
each configuration. Many instruments on the GCS provide the operator 
with a warning of a process deviation which could lead to an 
undesirable event. They do not however initiate the shutdown system. 
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C3.3 Record of Analysis 
In order to illustrate how the FMEA is recorded, the FMEA for part of 
the level control system shown in Figure C3.2.4 is developed. This is 
contained in Table C3.3 at the end of this appendix, and the layout of 
the table meets the specifications laid down in MIL—STD-1629A [1]. 
The information to included in different parts of the table is 
discussed below in paragraphs C3.3.1 to C3.3.9. 
C3.3.1 Preliminary Details 
The preliminary details of the study are filled in at the top of every 
worksheet, and a unique worksheet number assigned to it. This helps 
to ensure that every sheet can be identified, as many sheets will be 
completed when a full analysis is carried out. The details include 
the part of the system being analysed, the indenture level, the 
drawings used, and a statement of the mission or function of the 
components. The date and the name of the analyst are also recorded. 
C3.3.2 Identification of Component (Columns 1 to 3) 
The identification number of the device and details of its function 
are entered in the first three columns of the work sheet. Referring 
to Figure C3.2.4 and to Table C3.3, device 13 LT 1107 is a level 
transmitter whose function is to provide a signal to the level 
controller, the high and low level switches and the level indicator. 
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C3.3.3 Failure Modes and Causes (Column 4) 
At this point, the ways in which the component can fail are 
identified. 	The failures that are studied are defined by the 
objective of the study. 	If the FMEA forms the basis of a reliability 
analysis, then every possible failure mode must be identified. In the 
study of the GCS only fail to danger modes were investigated in order 
to restrict the amount of work. 
The failure modes can be identified by considering the effects of: 
premature operation 
failure to operate at the prescribed time 
intermittent operation 
failure to cease operating at the prescribed time 
failure during operation 
degraded output, and 
other unique failure conditions. 
The failure modes that are to be identified are determined by the 
objective of the study and the indenture level at which the analysis 
is to be started. If the study is begun at a high level, 
consideration is given to functional failures. At low indenture 
levels, more specific ha rdware failures can be identified like stuck 
valves or leaking gaskets. 
C3.3.4 Operating Mode and System Configuration (Column 5) 
The operating mode in which the system is being analysed is stated. 
It is important to examine the effect of failures in every system 
configuration and operating mode as the effect of failures is 
dependent on these conditions. 
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For example, when the level in the vessel is high enough, the low 
level switch (Figure C3.2.4) closes and the shutdown system permits 
the shutdown valve on the liquid outlet to open. If the low level 
switch is iniscalibrated or, if due to a fault in the level transmitter 
it receives a high signal, the shutdown valve on the liquid outlet 
will open before the level in the vessel reaches the designed level. 
If the same fault condition arises during normal operations, the 
effect of failure will only be noticed should the level in the vessel 
drop: the alarm would be delayed and might not give the operator 
sufficient time to rectify the situation. However, if the level 
switch receives a correct signal from the level transmitter but fails 
to open when the level falls, no warning will be given. This fault 
would be observed by the absence of the low level alarm when the 
process was shutdown. 
Similarly, where components are placed on standby, their failure will 
only be discovered when they are called upon to operate. If they fail 
when they are operating, the standby components should perform the 
function required. 
The study of the GCS investigated the effect of failures to danger in 
the normal operating and shutdown conditions. 
C3.3.5 Failure Effects (Columns 6 to 8) 
The effects of each failure mode are investigated by considering their 
effect on the succeeding higher indenture levels of the system. These 
are entered in the columns: LOCAL EFFECTS, NEXT HIGHER LEVEL and END 
EFFECTS. The end effect is the result of the failure on the whole 
system. For example the safe failure of a device in the shutdown 
system will initiate shutdown. The failure to danger mode may then be 
defined by identifying those failures which delay or prevent shutdown. 
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The extent of the effect of a component failure depends on the 
component's function. Referring to Figure C3.2.4 again, the failure 
of the level transmitter affects all the components in the level 
control and alarm loop. A FDD is a useful tool in identifying the 
extent of failure effects. 
C3.3.6 Failure Detection Method (Column 9) 
The ways in which the failure can be identified are noted in the 
column with this heading. 	Often, the failure will be identified by 
its effect on another component. 	The presence of a device that is 
dedicated to warning the operator of the failure is noted here. 	For 
example, a gas detector fitted in an enclosed area will warn the 
operator that there is a leak of hydrocarbons from the process. 
Often at low indenture levels, there are no dedicated warning devices 
and the operator must rely on other indications to detect the failure 
which is being studied by the analyst, and these should also be noted. 
These indications fall into three general categories: 
they occur when the system is operating normally 
they occur when the system has malfunctioned, or 
indications that are incorrect. 
On the Murchison Platform, a selection of diverse alarm and trip 
systems are provided to shutdown the process. For example, should the 
level transmitter fail, so that the low level alarm does not give the 
operator sufficient warning that the level in the vessel is falling, 
an extra low level switch fitted to the vessel will close the shutdown 
valve on the liquid outlet line. The failure of the level transmitter 
could also be detected by comparing the output of the level indicator 
with the level gauge attached to the vessel. 
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C3.3.7 Compensating Provisions (Column 10) 
The means of mitigating the failure are recorded under the heading 
COMPENSATING PROVISIONS. Design provisions at any indenture level 
which allow the system to continue operating, or which shutdown the 
system in a safe manner, or which provide a duplicate system to 
operate in standby, are taken into account. 
It is also important to investigate the action that the operator can 
take to restrict the effect of the failure, given the information at 
his disposal. The effect of action taken in response to abnormal 
indications, and also the effect of incorrect action on the system, 
should be determined. 
During normal operation In the example shown in Table C3.3, the 
operator may note that the level in the vessel is falling by 
inspecting the level indicator. However, he may not have sufficient 
time to rectify the situation between the low level alarm sounding and 
the extra low level switch tripping. 
C3.3.8 Severity Class (Column 11) 
In order to help decide which failures are more critical than others, 
the severity of the failure effects are put into classes. In the 
offshore environment the following classes apply: 
Category I. 	CATASTROPHIC. A failure which may cause multiple 
deaths, or loss of the platform's structural integrity which 
necessitates abandoning the platform. 
Category II. 	CRITICAL. 	A failure which may cause a single 
fatality, severe injury, major plant damage or which may result 
in greater than 7 days lost oil production. 
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Category III. MARGINAL. A failure which may cause minor 
injury, minor plant damage, or which results in a subsystem 
being unavailable and restricts oil production. 
Category IV. 	MINOR. 	A failure not serious enough to cause 
injury or plant damage but which will result in unscheduled 
maintenance and repair. 
C3.3.9 Remarks (Column 12) 
Any pertinent remarks are recorded in the final column to aid the 
review of the FMEA by another analyst or engineer. 
C3.4 FMEA Report 
Alter the FMEA has been completed, a report which summarizes the 
findings of the analysis is written. The analyst's findings are 
normally submitted to an engineer for his comments. This is an 
important step in the study as the engineer may find that the 
analyst's findings result from a misunderstanding of the system. 
Clearly, if the analyst works alongside an enginer, this is less 
likely to occur. 
Once the review of the findings is complete, the recommendations for 
changes in the design and operating procedures are submitted to senior 
management for their approval. 
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C3.5 FMEA Procedure 
A procedure which I have developed from MIL-STD-1629A [11 is given 
below. In essence it is a summary of this appendix, setting out in a 
logical form the basic rules of FMEA. 
STEP No. 
1 	Define the system to be analysed by describing 
1.1 	For each operational mode 
1.1.1 Statement of the primary and secondary objectives 
1.1.2 A description of the function of each part of the system 
1.1.3 Draw functional or reliability block diagrams to illustrate the 
function of each part of the system 
1.1.4 Define what constitutes a failure 
2 	Examine each hardware item in turn 
2.1 For each indenture level starting at the most detailed level 
2.1.1 Draw a reliability block diagram to illustrate the function of 
the component being considered 
2.2 Complete the FMEA Worksheet 
2.2.1 Record the component's unique identification number 
2.2.2 Identify all possible failure modes by considering tke effects 
of 
Premature operation 
Failure to operate at the prescribed time 
Intermittent operation 
Failure to cease operation at the prescribed time 
Loss of output or failure during operation 
Degraded output 
Other unique failure conditions 
2.2.3 State the operating mode in which the component is being 
considered 
2.2.4 Identify the effects of each failure on the system by 
considering 
Effect at a local level (in the same indenture level) 
Effect at the next higher indenture level 
Effect on the whole system (End Effects) 
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2.2.5 Identify the means of detecting the failure by considering 
a) dedicated warning devices 
b) other indications 	1) when the system is operating 
normally 
when the system has malfunctioned 
that are incorrect because of the 
failure of an indicating device 
c) record the means of isolating the failure 
2.2.6 Identify and evaluate the compensating provisions which mitigate 
the effect of the failure 
a) consider the design provisions at any indenture level which 
may be 
1) Redundant components which permit continued operation 
Safety shutdown or relief devices 
Alternative modes of operation (eg. standby systems) 
b) consider the action the operator may take 
identify the best course of action given the information 
he has available 
investigate the effect of incorrect action in response 
to abnormal indications 
2.2.7 Classify the severity of the effects of each failure 
Category I. 	CATASTROPHIC. 	A failure which may cause 
multiple deaths, or loss of the platform's structural 
integrity necessitating abandoning the platform. 
Category II. 	CRITICAL. A failure which may cause a single 
fatality , severe injury, major plant damage, or which 
results in lost oil production 
Category III - Marginal - A failure which may cause minor 
injury, minor plant damage, or which results in a subsystem 
being unavailable and restricts oil production 
Category IV - Minor - A failure not serious enough to cause 
injury or plant damage, but which will result in unscheduled 
maintenance or repair 
2.2.8 Note any pertinent remarks, particularly design improvements to 
be recommended in the FMEA Report. Information should be given 
about Category I or II failure modes and the appropriate action 
to be taken to reduce the probability of their occurrence. 
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C4.1 Introduction 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) was first used by the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories to study the Minutemen Launch Control System in 1961. it 
has subsequently been widely applied in the aerospace and nuclear 
industries. 
During the early 70's several authors published papers which discussed 
the application of FTA to complex chemical process plant [1 to 61. 
However, the main emphasis of the work has been to develop computer 
programs to aid the analyst construct and evaluate fault trees. 
Useful reviews of computer methods in FTA have been published by Cross 
[7], and Arendt and Fussell [8]. 
C4.1.1 Definition 
The following definition appeared in a paper by Powers and Tompkins 
"A fault tree is a logic diagram which identifies the event 
sequences which could lead to a specified failure event." [1] 
The specified failure event when FTA is used to study hazards may be 
fire, explosion, loss of life or a deviation from the normal process 
operating conditions. 
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C4.1.2 Logic Gates 
A fault tree is a logic diagram where the relationship of events, and 
sequences of events, is defined by logic gates. 
Table C4.1.2, taken from Fussell's paper [9], shows the different type 




Coexistence of all inputs required 
to produce output. 
OR Gates 
Output will exist if at least one 
input is present. 
INHIBIT Gates 
Input produces the output directly 
when the conditional input is 
satisfied. 
DELAY Gate 
Output occurs after specified time 
delay has elapsed. 
Fault Tree Gate Symbols 
Table C4.1.2 
Other authors list different symbols, for example, Hinimelbla 	[101. 
The symbols in Table C4.1.2 are the most commonly used and widely 
accepted ones. 
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C4.1.3 Event Symbols 
Table C4.1.3 shows the symbols used to represent the events described 
in a fault tree. Again, the list is not extensive, but shows the most 





A fault event usually resulting from 
the combination of more basic events 
acting through logic gates. 
CIRCLE 
A basic component fault, assumed to 
be an independent event. 
DIAMOND 
A fault event which has not been 
developed to its cause. 
TRIANGLE 
A connecting or transfer symbol 
UPSIDE DOWN TRIANGLE 
A similarity transfer. The input is 
similar but not identical to the 
like identified input. 
fli 	HOUSE An event that is normally expected to occur. 
Fault Tree Event Symbols 
Table C4.1.3 
Throughout the analysis of the Gas Compression System on the Murchison 
Platform I have used the set of symbols listed in tables C4.1.2 and 
C4.1.3. 
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C4.1.4 Quantification of Fault Trees 
Because fault trees are logic diagrams, boolean algebra can be used to 
construct a mathematical model of the tree. 	It is for this reason 
that FTA is used to study the reliability of systems. 	Failure rate 
data can be obtained from a variety of sources but the two most common 
sources of information are: 
The System Reliability Service Data Bank, and 
maintenance and repair records. 
The information is generally given in the form of failure rates. 	It 
Is important to be able to convert a failure rate into a probability 
of being in the failed state, if a fault tree is to be resolved 
mathematically. 
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At an AND gate where all inputs occur simultaneously before the output 
is generated, the probabilities are multiplied. The general equation 
is in the form 
P0 	ii 	 (1) 
where Po is the probability of the output 
Pi is the probability of each input 
n is the number of inputs. 
The presence of a failure rate of a device can be resolved to a 
probability of being in a failed state if the interval between tests 
is known so that the fractional dead time (FDT) of the device can be 
calculated from equation 2. 
 -At 
EDT = 	1 - e 	 (2) 
where ?. = failure rate in (failures/year) 
t = test intervat 	year) 
At an OR gate, only one of the inputs needs to occur for the output 
event to exist. The probability of the output occurring is given by 
(1- P 1 ) (1- P) .......... (1 - P) 	
(3) 
This is the general formula but where the values are very small, then 
the error resulting from using equation 4 is insignificant. 
P u 	# 	Pj2 ........+P 	 (4) 
Many people quantifying a fault tree for the first time do not pay 
sufficient attention to the dimensions of the data used to calculate 
the probability or frequency of the top event. The result is that the 
frequencies are multiplied together and dimensions mixed and the top 
event is therefore incorrectly calculated. 
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C4.2 Procedure 
Although many papers have been published on the development of 
computerized fault tree construction and evaluation, there are few 
articles which set out practical rules for FTA. The best is a paper 
by Lawley [11] and many of the ideas presented here have been 
developed from it. 
Although the procedure advised varies from author to author, five 
basic steps can be identified: 
system definition 
fault tree construction 
validation 
qualitative evaluation, and 
quantitative evaluation. 
Throughout this section the text will be illustrated by an example of 
a fault tree for gas blowby in a pressure vessel. 
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Gas blowby occurs when the liquid level in a vessel has dropped and 
allows high pressure gas into the liquid outlet line. 
C4.2.1 System Definition 
Before the fault tree can be constructed, the analyst must acquire a 
detailed understanding of the process which he is to study. 
The piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) represent in a 
diagrammatic form the interrelationship of the components which make 
up the process. The design specification contains useful information 
which shoiild also be studied. 
It is useful for the analyst to write a description of the process and 
to have this reviewed by a design engineer. This shows up the areas 
where the analyst has not fully grasped how the system works. 
Once a sufficient understanding of the process has been gained, the 
analyst must define the boundaries of the study, the causes which will 
not be considered, and any assumptions that are to be made. It is 
normal practice to construct the fault tree for undesirable events 
that occur during normal operations, but it may be necessary to 
construct fault trees for other modes of operation such as startup and 
shutdown. 
Figure C4.2.1 at the end of this appendix shows the P&ID for part of 
the GCS. It illustrates the level control devices fitted to a 
compression suction drum whose function is to knock out any liquid in 
the gas, before it is compressed by the compressor. 
A functional dependency diagram (FDD) often helps the analyst to 
understand the component interactions and Figure C4.2.1a shows part of 
the FDD of the level control system. From the FDD it can be seen that 
any fault in the level transmitter (LT) or its impulse lines will 
affect all the other components in the control system. 
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If the LT gives a high output, the low level alarm will be delayed and 
the controller will cause the level control valve to be too far open 
so that the liquid level in the vessel will fall. 
C4.2.2 Choose the Top Event 
The choice of the top event is determined by the objective of the 
study. Often the analyst will divide the tree into sub-trees. Each 
sub-tree will have its own top event. For example in the tree shown 
below in Figure C4.2.2 the top event, an uncontrolled fire, can only 
occur when there is a release of hydrocarbons, an ignition source and 
a failure of the fire protection systems to control the fire. 
UNCONTROLLED 
AND 
TION I RELEASE OF 	FIRE PROTECTION 
RCE 	HYDROCARBONS SYSTEMS FAIL 
Figure C4.2.2 
The analyst will then construct fault trees, each examining one of the 
contributory events. This approach can be extended further by drawing 
sub-trees for the common elements of the process. Figure C4.2.1 at 
the end of this appendix shows the instrumentation on a compressor 
suction drum which is the same for all these vessels installed on the 
Murchison Platform. The tree, which models failure of the level 
control system, is the same for all similar vessels. 
The proper identification of common subsystems will considerably 
reduce the time taken to carry out the analysis. 
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C4.2.3 Construct the Tree 
After the top event of the tree to be constructed has been defined, 
the sequence of events which cause the top event must be identified 
and related to one another by logic gates. 
Lawley 1111 recommends that the analyst should think in small steps 
and concentrate on events that lead to the top event. He emphasizes 
that at this stage protective systems and action that the operator may 
take to rectify the situation should be ignored. 
My own experience suggests that there Is merit in this approach but 
that it Is helpful to identify the points at which the protection 
systems and operator intervention can occur. They should however be 
developed once the event paths which result in the top event have been 
defined. 
Figure C4.2.3 shows the fault tree for Gas Blowby in the compressor 
suction scrubber illustrated in Figure C4.2.1. Gas blowby will occur 
if the liquid level in the compressor suction drum falls, so that high 
pressure gas enters the liquid outlet pipe and flows to the downstream 
vessel. The downstream vessel may be subjected to a pressure which is 
above its working pressure as the vessel operates at a lower pressure 
than the suction scrubber. In this example, the fault tree for the 
"level continues to fall" was developed before the sub—tree for the 
"shutdown valve does not close" was constructed. The fault tree for 
"level continues to fall" is illustrated in Figure C4.2.3a. The top 
event will always occur if the level control valve (LCV) is open too 
far. This will be caused if one of the following conditions is met: 
the level transmitter gives a high output 
the level controller misdirects the valve 
impulse line to the valve positioner is blocked 
the valve positioner is stuck, or 
the valve is stuck. 
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A low level alarm (LAL) is fitted to the vessel so that the operator 
is warned that the level is falling. However, if the cause of the 
level falling is that the level transmitter is giving a high output, 
the alarm will be delayed. At this point the analyst makes an 
assumption about the amount of time the operator requires to take 
corrective action. In my opinion, the operator does not have 
sufficient time and so the construction of the tree in Figure C4.2.3a 
reflects this. "High signal from LT" results in the level continuing 
to fall. 
If the cause of the LCV being open too far results from a fault in the 
level control loop, the operator may have the opportunity to 
intervene. He may fail to intervene either because he does not 
respond or because the level alarm has failed and he is not warned. 
The tree for "low level alarm fails" has still to be developed, but 
because of our assumption about the effect of the IT on the LAL, this 
cause of failure would be excluded from the undeveloped tree. 
The function of the shutdown valve, situated on the liquid outlet of 
the compressor suction drum, is to isolate the vessel from the 
downstream process units. If the liquid level falls to an extra low 
level during normal operations, the extra low level switch (LSLL) will 
signal the unit control logic (UCL) to close the shutdown valve. An 
alarm (LALL) is linked to the LSLL and sounds when the switch is 
opened. 
If gas blowby is to occur, the level must continue to fall and the 
shutdown valve must remain open. The tree for "shutdown valve not 
closed" is shown in Figure C4.2.3. 	This tree is similar to the tree 
for "LCV open too far". 	If the LSLL fails, then the operator will 
have sufficient warning of the level falling to Intervene. 	Of course 
the alarm may be failed for another reason so that there is no 
operator intervention, but this event has not been developed. 
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Lawley [11] suggests that the tree is mor,  
horizontally, with the top event on the far left 
and developed from left to right. 	This goes 
convention of constructing the tree from the top 
the top—down approach is the better of the two. 
incurred if the tree is to be laid out neatly. 
used, the time taken to draw the diagrams can be 
easily constructed 
hand side of the page 
against the normal 
down. In my opinion 
However, more time is 
If squared paper is 
shortened. 
Some trees are presented with the events enumerated and only the 
reference number entered in the event symbol. This makes the diagram 
difficult to read and understand and in my opinion should be avoided. 
It negates the advantage of FTA, which is that system interactions and 
failure mechanisms are presented in a diagrammatic format which can be 
readily understood. 
C4.2.4 Verify the Tree 
A fault tree should be verified by a senior engineer who has an 
intimate knowledge of the system that has been modelled. It is easy 
for the analyst to misunderstand or overlook an important aspect of 
the process. 
The time taken to verify the tree will be shortened if the analyst 
documents the assumptions he has made as he was constructing the tree. 
Most inadequacies in the fault tree will be related to these 
assumptions particularly when they have to do with temporal aspects. 
For example, the assumption made in Figure C4.2.3a is that should the 
LT cause the LAL to be delayed, the operator has not enough time to 
intervene. An engineer checking the tree and its assumptions may 
clarify the situation enabling the analyst to construct a more 
accurate model. 
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C4.2.5 Qualitative Evaluation 
The purpose of the qualitative evaluation is to determine the failure 
modes that result in the occurrence of the top event. A failure mode 
is known as a minimal cut set. 
For example, in Figures C4.2.3 and C4.2.3a, each basic event has been 
assigned a letter. If events G (Level Transmitted miscalibrated 
giving a high signal) and T (Internal fault in the extra low level 
switch) occur simultaneously, gas blowby results. G and T comprise a 
minimal cut set. 
In the tree shown in Figure C4.2.3 there are eighteen basic events and 
two undeveloped events. These generate a total of 154 minimal cut 
sets. 
Because of the large number of minimal cut sets generated by tree 
structures, computers are normally used to resolve large trees. 
Details of the different computer codes which shorten the time taken 
to carry out FTA can be found in references 7 and 8. 
Problems occur when a number of different events specified in a tree 
have a common cause. For example, the blockage of the impulse lines 
of the level transmitter and of the extra low level switch could 
result from the build up of residue in the lines. This common cause 
is extremely unlikely to occur during the interval between maintenance 
work. The analyst should therefore examine the tree, and reconstruct 
it to reflect the effect of common cause failures. 
Another common problem which must be overcome during the qualitative 
evaluation is where events are mutually exclusive. 	In large trees 
there will be events that conflict. 	For example, the level control 
valve cannot be too far closed and too far open at the same time. The 
analyst must discover these mutually exclusive events and discount the 
minimal cut sets where both events appear. 
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Once the cut sets have been determined, the effect of design 
modifications can be investigated by studying their effect on the 
tree. 	As a general rule, the greater the number of events in a 
minimal cut set, the lower the probability of the top event. 	The 
analyst's aim therefore will be to recommend design changes which 
generate AND gates at the highest levels in the tree. This reduces 
the probability of the top event. 
C4.2.6 Quantitative Evaluation 
A quantitative evaluation of the tree requires the analyst to apply a 
probability of occurrence to each basic event. The probability of the 
top event may then be calculated and the most probable minimal cut 
sets or failure modes determined. 
Data can be obtained from a variety of sources which include data 
banks and company maintenance records. Careless application of data 
particularly of data taken from a different context, from the nuclear 
industry for example, has caused most design engineers to regard 
quantified FTA with scepticism. Their view is summarized by Pilz [12] 
who states 
"Quantitative risk analysis in hydrocarbon processing industry 
plants is impossible." 
Much of this hostility arises when the analyst fails to communicate 
the assumptions he has made and fails to carry out a sensitivity 
analysis to determine the level of uncertainty of the top event 
probability. 
During the design stages most problems can be identified and resolved 
by qualitative analysis. As the quality and accuracy of failure rate 
data improves more reliance can be justifiably placed on quantified 
fault trees. 
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The mathematical techniques required to resolve fault trees are well 
developed and computer programs are available to help resolve the 
probabilities of the minimal cut sets and the top event. 
The advantage of quantifying a fault tree is that it aids 
cost—effective improvement of the design since the effect of design 
modification can be studied. 
C4.2.7 FTA Report 
The analyst presents his findings and recommendations in the form of a 
report which should include the FTA, a short written description of 
the tree, the assumptions that have been made and a list of the most 
likely failure modes. 
The report should discuss the need for any design changes and 
illustrate their effects on the tree. The comments of the engineer 
who has verified the analysis should be included as this strengthens 
the integrity of the analysis. 
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D1.1 Introduction 
This appendix describes the results of the application of the Mond 
Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index to the Gas Compression System (GCS) 
on the Murchison Platform. 
The calculation of the Mond Index was carried out in accordance with 
the procedure described in Appendix Cl. 
D1.1.1 Application of the Mond Index to Offshore Processes 
The Mond Index was not developed with a view to being applied to 
offshore processes. In certain respects it overestimates the risk and 
if it is to be widely applied some modifications will have to be made. 
It retains, however, its ability to highlight emphases in design and 
reveal the methods used to mitigate the risk. 
The study of the GCS revealed that the inherent risk in the system is 
severe but this was to be expected. When the measures that mitigate 
the risk are taken into account, the GCS risk rating falls into the 
lowest category. This reflects the emphasis on safety and other 
protection systems installed on the platform to reduce the risk to 
personnel and to the installation. 
D1.2 Calculation Procedure 
The area studied was Module 6 which contains the Dresser Clark 
centrifugal compressor skid containing compressors K1301/2 and 
KI50I/2, and the Coope c Bessemer reinjection compressor, K1503. The 
calculation of the Mond Index was based on the characteristics of the 
reinjection compressor as this machine compresses gas to the highest 
pressure in the module. 
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Throughout this section reference should be made to sheets contained 
in section D1.5 of this appendix. These calculation sheets show the 
values assigned to each factor and also the values of the indices that 
were calculated. 
D1.2.1 Material Factor (Section - 1) 
The material factor B is calculated in terms of the net heat of 




where z}Ic is the heat of combustion in kg cal/gm mole, and 
M is the molecular weight of the key material. 
In order to simplify the calculation of B the gas was assumed to be a 
mixture of 76% methane and 24% ethane. Table D1.2.1 shows the data 
used to calculate the material factor. 
Hc kcals/gm mole 
Molecular Weight 







372.81 	 - 
30.06 
14% (.other gases 10%) 
In order to account for discrepancies due to the assumption of 24% 
ethane, the actual molecular weight of the injection gas (20.74) was 
used. 






D1.2.2 Special Material Hazards (Section 2) 
In subsection C, Mixing and Dispersion Characteristics, the technical 
manual recommends that a factor of —20 be used when the key material 
is methane. However, the Mond Index assumes that gases which are 
lighter than air will disperse vertically and more rapidly than dense 
gases. As the module is enclosed, this assumption is invalid. A 
factor of 0 was used. 
Table 1 of the technical manual lists the values to be used to take 
account of Ignition Sensitivity (subsection F). 	A factor of —5 is 
given for pure methane, and a factor of 0 for propane. 	The latter 
factor was used because the presence of propane will make the gas more 
sensitive. 
D1.2.3 General Process Hazards (Section 3) 
No figure is given in the guide to account for the risk arising from 
compressing gas under the heading Handling and Physical Changes Only 
(subsection A). However, a factor of 30 was used, which is midway 
between the highest and lowest values, to represent the hazards 
inherent in compressing gas. 
The factor P, which represents the general process hazards has the 
value 30. 
D1.2.4 Special Process Hazards (Section 4) 
The total value of 270 for S is made up of several factors. 
A factor of 130 was assigned to subsection B, High Pressure, and was 
derived from Figure 3 in the technical manual. 
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The discharge pressure of the reinjection compressor is 380 Bar g, and 
the factor is read off from the graph. 
Under the heading Joints and Packing Leakages, subsection F, a factor 
of 20 is used to take account of the small leaks of gas Into the 
crankcase of the reciprocating compressor, and into the seal and lube 
oil systems of the centrifugal compressors. There will also be leaks 
at the many flange joints and valve seals throughout the module. 
Rotating and reciprocating machinery induce vibrations into the 
surrounding pipework. There is a chance that vibration will cause a 
joint to fail and result in gas being released into the module. 
Subsection G, Vibration and Load Cycling, is assigned a value of 20 to 
take account of this hazard. 
A release of 1 cubic metre of gas at 380 Bar g from the discharge of 
the reinjection compressor, is sufficient to give a flammable 
atmosphere at the lower limit throughout Module 6. A factor of 40 is 
assigned to subsection J, Greater than Average Explosion Hazard. 
Electrostatic Hazards are considered in subsection N. Where gas 
escapes at high velocity from the containment system the build up of a 
static electrical charge often results. The discharge may release 
sufficient energy to ignite a flammable mixture of the escaping gas. 
The risks associated with a gas are lower than with a liquid, hence a 
factor of 50 was adopted. 
D1.2.5 Quantity Hazards (Section 5) 
The average density of the gas flowing through the compression module 
Is approximately 128 kg/m3 and the volume of material is assumed to be 
10 cubic metres. The factor Q, which represents the quantity hazards 
was read off Figure 4 In the technical manual, and has a value of 9. 
Although the GCS processes a large quantity of gas, the quantity of 
gas in the system at anyone time is small but the flowrate is high. 
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D1.2.6 Layout Hazards (Section 6) 
Since all the compressors are situated in the mezzanine level of 
Module 6, the height was taken to be the height of the mezzanine 
level, 6.4 metres. The normal working area is 448 square metres. A 
factor of 200 is assigned to subsection A, Structure Design, because 
the plant is enclosed. 
No guidance is given in the technical manual as to how to assess 
domino effects for enclosed structures. Clearly, there is a risk to 
the lower level of Module 6 which houses the compressor suction drums, 
heat exchangers and the lube and seal oil systems. The adjacent 
modules are also at risk, including Module 10, the Drilling Power 
Module. 	If drilling power is lost, the blowout preventor and kelly 
valves must isolate the well being drilled or worked over. 	I adopted 
a factor of 150 to account for the hazard of domino effects. 
The condensate knockout vessels, heat exchangers and the lube and seal 
oil systems are situated below the compressors in Module 6. A factor 
of 100 is assigned to subsection C, Below ground to account for the 
hazard that this feature introduces. 
The GCS control room is situated on the lower level of Module 7. 	In 
subsection E, Other, I have used a factor of 50 to account for the 
proximity of the control room to the compressors. 
D1.2.7 Toxicity Hazards (Section 7) 
The mixture of gas compressed in the GCS does not contain any hydrogen 
sulphide, and is a simple asphyxiant. A factor of 0 was used for the 
threshold limit value (TLV) factor in subsection A. 
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At the level causing asphyxiation, the gas cannot be seen nor can it 
be smelt. In subsection B, Material Form, a factor of 200 has been 
adopted. 
The unique working environment, long hours and overwork reduce the 
body's resistance to toxic materials. It is not unknown for men to 
work continuously for over 36 hours, though this is by no means 
typical. A factor of 20 was assigned to subsection E, Physical 
Factors. 
The factor T, which represents the Toxicity Hazards, has a value of 
220. 
D1.2.8 Indices Computation (Section 8) 
The computation of the various indices is shown on sheets D1.5.2 and 
D1.5.3 at the end of this appendix. The classification of the 
numerical values into categories is done by referring to Tables II to 
VII in the technical manual. 
The Overall Index is 264.7 and falls into the category "Highly 
Catastrophic" for the Overall Degree of Hazard. This does not take 
into account any of the safety and preventative measures which reduce 
the degree of hazard. 
R, the Overall Risk Rating, has a value of 1933 and falls into the 
"High (Group 2)" Overall Risk Category. The apparent reduction is due 
- 	to the weighting given to the fire load which was found to be light. 
The Aerial Explosion Index is not relevant as the process is enclosed. 
It was calculated because it is part of the procedure but this aspect 
of the Mond Index requires modification if the Index is to be applied 
to offshore processes. 
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D1.2.9 Process Development by Hazard Factor Review (Section 9) 
A review of the process was not carried out as the system was to be 
analysed in greater detail at a later date. 
The values of the indices are the same as those in section 8. 
D1.2.10 Offsetting Index Values for Safety and Preventative Measures 
(Section 10) 
Under the following six sub—sections, measures which attempt to 
prevent the occurrence of a hazardous incident, and measures which 
reduce the consequences of hazardous incidents are taken into account. 
a. Containment Hazards 
The design and quality control of the pressure vessels warrents a 
factor of 0.8 to be applied under the factor, "Pressure Vessels". The 
same factor is used to account for the design stresses in the transfer 
pipelines. Three factors (0.9, 0.95 and 0.97) take account of the 
welded pipework, the type of flanges used, and of the seal oil system 
protecting the compressors, and are entered under "Joints and 
Packings". 
A factor of 0.8 is assigned to "Leakage Detection and Response" 
because the gas detection system in Module 6 will initiate shutdown if 
two detectors detect a concentration of flammable gas corresponding to 
60% of the lower flammability limit. The shutdown system dumps the 
gas to the flare system, therefore, 0.9 is assigned to "Disposal of 
Released Material". 
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b. Process Control 
A factor of 0.9 is assigned to "Alarm Systems" as the GCS is fitted 
with a wide range of alarms. The same value is credited to "Emergency 
Power Supplies". Two diesel generators provide emergency power if the 
Rolls Royce Olympus Gas Turbines fail. A battery room provides power 
for the essential systems for 48 hours should the diesel generators 
fail. 
Inert gas is supplied to all parts of the process and is used to purge 
the vessels prior the startup. Under the heading "Inert Gas Systems", 
a value of 0.95 is given. 
A number of hazard studies were carried out during the design of the 
platform. 0.97 is assigned to "Hazard Study Activities" 
The shutdown system on the Murchison Platform has been designed to a 
rigorous specification and the relay logic has been carefully checked. 
Vibration monitors, installed on the key compressor bearings, initiate 
shutdown if the vibration levels become too high. Under the heading 
"Safety Shutdown Systems", a factor of 0.80 is applied. Although the 
process is monitored by a computer in the main control room (MCR) in 
Module 13, the process is not controlled by the computer. The 
operators in the MCR can however initiate shutdown, therefore, a 
factor of 0.95 is assigned to "Computer Control". The "Operating 
Instructions " for the GCS are adequate but complex due to the nature 
of the process. A value of 0.97 is given to this factor. 
The plant supervision on the Murchison Platform is good. All process 
operators are in constant contact with the MCR via hand held radios, 
the tannoy and "talk back" system. 0.97 is given to "Plant 
Supervision". 
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Safety Attitude 
Conoco (UK) Ltd have a good safety record and the protection of their 
employees is a key aspect of their safety policy. The company's 
attitude is reflected in the attitudes and standards on the platform. 
"Management Involvement" scores 0.95. 
All personnel employed by Conoco, or by a contractor must attend the 
safety briefing on the first day of their first visit to the platform. 
This briefing is given by the Safety Officer and covers various 
aspects of the platform safety practices, and personal survival in the 
event of having to abandon the installation. In addition, Conoco hold 
short training courses for their staff. A value of 0.90 is given to 
"Safety Training". 
On my visit to the platform I observed that the "permit to work" 
system was strictly enforced. The housekeeping on the platform was of 
a high standard and the Safety Officer has the authority to apply the 
standards he thinks fit. 	Under "Maintenance and Safety Procedures" 
three factors (0.9, 0.97 and 0.95) are given. 	The last value takes 
account of the preventative maintenance programme implemented by 
Conoco. 
Fire Protection 
Water deluge systems help to protect the structure of the platform if 
a fire occurs and this warrents a factor of 0.9 being assigned under 
"Structural Fire Protection". The fire wall surrounding the module is 
.rated "A60" in accordance with the Mobil hydrocarbon fire curve [2]. 
Under the heading "Fire Walls, Barriers Etc" 0.95 is assigned. 
Since the pressure vessels in the GCS . are protected by a water 
drenching system a factor of 0.98 is applied and a factor of 0.85 
takes account of the provision of fire resistant electrical cables 
under the collective heading "Equipment Fire Protection". 
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Material Isolation 
In the opinion of the authors of the Mond Index, the provision of the 
automatic shutdown system reduces the risk by 20%. A factor of 0.8 is 
assigned to "Valve Systems". 
In the event of gas being released into Module 6, the ventilation 
system, which can be controlled remotely, will continue to ventilate 
the area as it has been designed to handle flammable gases. Under the 
heading "Ventilation" a value of 0.9 is given. 
Fire Fighting 
The break glass call points which are a part of the "Fire Alarms" will 
activate the shutdown system when broken. 0.9 is given for this 
feature. 
Hand Held and trolley mounted fire extinguishers containing various 
fire fighting substances, are provided throughout the Module. These 
positions are well marked so that the operatives can obtain an 
extinguisher quickly. Factors of 0.95 and 0.9, are assigned to "Hand 
Fire Extinguishers". 
Four diesel driven centrifugal pumps supply water to the firewater 
ring main. "Water Supply" scores 0.85. No value was assigned to 
"Water Spray or Monitor Systems" as this had already been accounted 
for in subsection D, Fire Protection. The protection of the Module by 
BTM (Halon 1301) causes 0.85 to be assigned to "Foam and Inerting 
Installations". 
Under the headings "Fire Brigade Attendance" and "Site Cooperation in 
Fire Fighting", 0.9 has been assigned to each because all the members 
of the fire team have completed the basic fire fighting course at the 
Petroleum Industries Training Board School of Montrose. 
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D1.2.11 Final Offset Indices Calculation (Section 11) 
The Offset Overall Index D 2 is calculated to be 6.8 and is categorized 
"mild". Likewise, the Offset Overall Risk Rating becomes 7.51, its 
category "mild". 
D1.3 Discussion of Results 
The inherent risk in the GCS is drastically reduced by the provision 
of safety systems on the Murchison Platform. The Overall Index 
changes from 265 to 7 after the safety and preventative measures are 
taken into account. The category changes from "highly catastrophic" 
to "mild". Clearly, the safe operation of the GCS is dependent on the 
reliable operation of the safety systems. 
The calculation of the Overall Index shows that Special Process 
Hazards and Layout Hazards make significant contributions to the risk 
in the GCS. Their contribution to this is discussed below. 
D1.3.1 Effect of Special Process Hazards 
The value of 270 for S, Special Process Hazards, is made up of several 
factors, but the principal factor, 130, results from the high 
operating pressure of the reinjection compressor. There is a greater 
than average explosion hazard because flammable gas is being processed 
in an enclosed volume. Should a leak occur, there is a chance that 
the discharge of an electrostatic charge would have sufficient energy 
to ignite the escaping gas. A leak may be ignited by another source 
of ignition, but these have been minimized by the installation of 
flameproof electrical equipment. 
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The factors in this section reflect the source of the risk. 	It is 
clear that it would be difficult to reduce the risk since this would 
affect the function of the GCS. For example, the pressure cannot be 
reduced as the gas must be compressed to a sufficient pressure to 
ensure that it can be reinjected into the reservoir. 
D1.3.2 Effect of Layout Hazards 
The value of 500 for L, Layout Hazards, makes the largest contribution 
to the risk in the GCS. 	Its effect on the Index is to increase it by 
5 times the material factor B. 	If L was equal to zero, D would fall 
to 123 and the category fall from highly catastrophic to very extreme, 
which does not appear much of a change. 
It was to be expected that the Mond Index would severely penalise 
offshore processes as the Index was developed for onshore plant where 
the safe spacing of pro :esses is not restricted. The constraint on 
plant spacing in offshore design results in a high layout hazard 
potential which cannot be reduced by increased separation and 
therefore is mitigated by the safety systems. 
Before the Mond Index could be widely used to evaluate offshore 
processes, the factors and guidance related to Layout Hazards would 
have to be reviewed and made more applicable. 
D1.3.3 Insensitivity of Index to Toxicity Hazards 
The Index is insensitive to changes in the value given to Toxicity 
Hazards, T. Although the value for T of 220 appears significant, if T 
were equal to zero, D would fall to 249, a drop of only 16 points. 
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D1.3.4 Significance of the Other Indices 
The shutdown system isolates the GCS from the other processes with 
which it interfaces. The failure of the shutdown system such that the 
flow of gas to Module 6 did not cease is extremely improbable. The 
fire load category is therefore "light" as the quantity of flammable 
material is restricted. 
The risk of an aerial explosion is described as "very high". This 
result must be interpreted with caution as Lewis's model is based on 
experience in land based open processes. It would be more helpful to 
construct a model to estimate the risk of an explosion in the Module. 
There is a significant risk of having an explosion in the Module and 
the knock—on effects are dependent on the way in which the explosion 
pressures are relieved. This development would have to take place 
before the Index could be widely used in offshore design. 
A factor could also be provided to take account of the provision of 
explosion venting as this would offset the explosion risk in addition 
to the safe venting of flammable gases by the ventilation system. 
The Overall Risk Category is classified as high (Group 2). This 
apparent fall compared to the category for D, highly catastrophic, 
results from the light fire load. The Overall Risk Rating, R, is used 
to evaluate the plant separation distances required. A light fire 
load means that the plant separation distances can be reduced as the 
Overall Risk Category is reduced. However, the comments made about 
the relevance of the Aerial Explosion Index preclude the use of R. 
Greater importance should therefore be given to the value of D, the 
overall index. 
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D1.3.5 Safety and Preventative Measures 
The offsetting measures act in one of two ways, either they reduce the 
frequency of occurrence of hazardous incidents, or they reduce the 
consequences when an incident occurs. Each of the six aspects 
considered by the Mond Index significantly reduces the hazard 
potential of the GCS. 
Although the inherent risk is high, the emphasis Conoco have placed on 
the design and installation of safety systems has ensured that the 
actual risk is low. 
D1.4 References 
1 "Technical Manual for the Mond Fire, Explosion & Toxicity Index." 
ICI Mond Division, June 1979. 
2 "Warren,J.H. & Corona,A.A., "This method tests fire protective 
coatings." Hydrocarbon Processing, January 1975. 
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D1.5 Mond Index Calculation Sheets 








AND TOXICITY INDEX 
Sheet No.1 
IVRJI IU - 
Ref No. Division M 6/01 
OPU. 1089 
LOCATION M6 MEZZ. Dresser Clark,Bessemer 	Compressors 	WORKS/DEPT. NAME J. Lygate 
PLANT Compressor House MT 	K 1301/2 	K 1501/2 K. 1503 DATE May 1981 
MATERIALS & PROCESS 
MATERIALS Gas for re-injection 76% CEi 
CATALYSTS I SOLVENTS None None 
INTERMEDIATES/BY PRODUCTS I PRdOUCTS 
None I None 
REACTIONS 
None 
1. MATERIAL FACTOR 	 fl% CHi. 	14% C2H6 
MATERIAL OR COMBINATION:-  
10% C3H8-3- 
FACTOR DETERMINED BY:- 
COMBUSTION / DECOMPOSITION / REACTION / EXPLOSION PRESSURE 
GIVING 
See Appendix 1 	 FACTOR B 	= 	Ei- 
REMARKS 







A. 	OXIDIZING MATERIALS 0 t 20 0 
= M 
. REACTS WITH WATER TO PRODUCE ACOMBUSTIBLEGAS 0 to 30 0 
C. 	MIXING AND DISPERSION CHARACTERISTICS -60 to 60 0 
0. 	SUBJECT TO SPONTANEOUS HEATING 30 to 250 0 
E. 	SUBJECT TO RAPID SPONTANEOUS POLYMERIZATION 25 to 75 0 
F. 	IGNITION SENSITIVITY .75t0150 0 
G. 	SUBJECT TO EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION 125 0 
H. 	SUBJECT TO GASEOUS DETONATION 150 0 - 
I. 	CONDENSED PHASE PROPERTIES 200tä 1500 
J. 	OTHER 0 t 150 p 
ADD PERCENTAGES A-.J FOR SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARD (S.M.H.) TOTAL 'o 
3. GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS 
= 
A. 	HANDLING AND PHYSICAL CHANGES ONLY 10 to5O 30 
B 	SINGLE CONTINUOUS REACTIONS 26 to 50 
SINGLE BATCH REACTIONS 35 to 110 
MULTIPLICITY OF REACTIONS IN SAME EQUIPMENT 0 to 100 
MATERIAL TRANSFER 0to75 p 
TRANSPORTABLE CONTAINERS 10 to 100 
(ADD PERCENTAGES A-F FOR GENERAL PROCESS (G.P.) TOTAL 30 
4. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS 
= P 
233  
LOW PRESSURE (BELOW 15 PSIA) 0 t 100 0 
HIGH PRESSURE 0 t 160+ 130 
LOWTEMPERATURE:1.(CARBONSTEEL + 100C to .100C) 15 0 
2.(CARBON STEEL BELOW .100 C) 30 to 100 0 
3.OTHER MATERIALS 0 t 100 0 
0. 	HIGH TEMPERATURE 	1.FLAMMABILITY 0 t 85 0 
2.CONSTRUCTIONMATERIALS 0to25 0 
ADD A•D AND CARRY FORWARD TO SHEET 2 
M, 
%FACTOR I %FACTOR 
4. SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (CONTINUED) 	ISUGGESTEDI USED 
Mond 
Division 
Imperial 	 FIRE, EXPLOSION 
Chemical 
Industries  
Limited 	 B = 1 21 . 8 
AND TOXICITY INDE 
M=i 0 
P = 130 
PROCESS TEMPERATURE IN °K 
403 	1 ='Rd.ced Value 
Sheet No.2 	(618C 




A— 0 TOTAL CARRIED FORWARD  130 
E— CORROSION AND EROSION 0 t 150+ 0 
F - JOINT AND PACKING LEAKAGES 0 to 60 20 
G - VIBRATION, LOAD CYCLING ETC. 0 to 50 30 
H - PROCESSES OR REACTIONS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL, 20 to 300 0 
I - OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE Ow 150 0 
J - GREATER THAN AVERAGE EXPLOSION HAZARD 40 to 100 40 
K -r DUST OR MIST HAZARD 0 to 70 0 
L - HIGH STRENGTH OXIDANTS 0 to 630 0 
M - PROCESS IGNITION SENSITIVITY 0 to 75 
N ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS 	 . 0 to 200 50 
ADD PERCENTAGES A—N FOR SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDSTOTAL 270 = s 
5. QUANTITY HAZARDS 
MATERIAL TOTAL:— 	 [ 	10 	 M 3 
.DENSITY = 	128 kg/m 3 I 1.28 	 TONNES= K 
(AVE) 
QUANTITY FACTOR 11 to1000I 9 I 	=Q 
6. LAYOUT HAZARDS 
UNIT LAYOUT DETAILS:— 
HEIGHT 	 = 
NORMAL WORKING AREA = 
6.4 	= H (IN METRES) 
448 = NON SOMETRES)  
STRUCTURE DESIGN 0to200 200 
DOMINO EFFECT 0to250 150 
BELOW GROUND OtolSO 100 
SURFACE DRAINAGE OtolOO 0 
OTHER 0to250 50 
ADD PERCENTAGES A-E FOR LAYOUT HAZARDS TOTAL 	- 500 
7. TOXICITY HAZARDS 
TLV VALUE  0to300 
MATERIAL FORM 0 to 200 200 
SHORT EXPOSURE RISK -25 to 100 0 
SKIN ABSORPTION 0 t 150 
PHYSICAL FACTORS 0to50 20 
ADD PERCENTAGES A—E FOR TOXICITY HAZARDS TOTAL 	- - 	220 	= T 
8. INDICES COMPUTATION 
S+Q+L T\ 
DOW/ICI OVERALL INDEX D = B X (i + 	+ 	+ 	100 	
400)i 
264.7 
OVERALL DEGREE OF HAZARD = 	 Highly catastrophic 
FIRE LOAD 	 F = B x 
K 
N X 20,500 BTU/SO.FT = 	
[ 	
1277 











AND TOXICITY INDEX 
Sheet 3 	(6/ 
EF. No. 
DPti.1091 	r M 6/03 
INDICES COMPUTATION (contd.) 
M + P + S _I 
INTERNAL UNIT EXPLOSION INDEX E = 1 + 100 	
4.0 	I 
RISK OF PROCESS EXPLOSION = 	 High 




883.9 	 RISK OF AERIAL EXPLOSION = 
	
Very High =  
UNIT TOXICITY INDEX U=_LxE 	= 	 8.8 
100 	 I 
CATEGORY OF UNIT TOXICITY 	
= High 
OVERALL RISK RATING R = D (1+4FxUxE x A) OR R = Q x U 
1 
= 1933 OVERALL RISK CATEGORY = High (Group 2) 
PROCESS DEVELOPMENT BY HAZARD FACTOR REVIEW 
No review 	carried out . 
DOW/ICI OVERALL INDEX REDUCTION TO D1 = 264.7 
FIRE LOAD REDUCTION TO 	- F1 1277 
INTERNAL UNIT EXPLOSION INDEX REDUCTION TO E1 = 




UNIT TOXICITY INDEX REDUCTION TO U1 = 









AND TOXICITY INDEX 
DPU 4573 
Sheet 4 	(6/8 
REF. No. 
M 6/04 
10. OFFSETTING INDEX VALUES FOR SAFETY AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES. 
A. CONTAINMENT HAZARDS 	 Factors Used 
Pressure Vessels 	 0.8 
Non-Pressure Vertical Storage Tanks 	 - 
Transfer Pipelines a) Design Stresses 	 0.8 
b) Joints and Packings 	 0.9 x 0.95 2 
Additional Containment and Bunds 	 - - 
Leakage Detection and Response 	 0 . 
Disposal of Released Material 	 0.9 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF - CONTAINMENT FACTORS k1 = 
B. PROCESS CONTROL 
Alarm Systems 0.9 
Emergency Power Supplies n q 
Process Cooling Systems - 
4. Inert Gas Systems 0.95 
Hazard Study Activities 97 
Safety Shut Down Systems 0.80 
Computer Control 0.95 
Explosion and Incorrect Reaction Protection - 
Operating Instructions 0.9 
Plant Supervision 0.97 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF PROCESS CONTROL FACTORS k2 = 
C. SAFETY ATTITUDE 
1-Management Involvement 0.95 
Safety Training 0.90 
Maintenance and Safety Proceedures 0.9 x 0.97 x 0.9 !  
PRODUCT TOTAL OF SAFETY ATTITUDE FACTORS k3 = 
D. FIRE PROTECTION 
1-Structural Fire Protection 	 0.9. 
Fire walls, Barriers Etc. 	 0.95 
Equipment Fire Protection 	 n gc . 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE PROTECTION FACTORS k4 = 
E. MATERIAL ISOLATION 	 Factors Used 
Valve Systems 	 0.8 
Ventilation n - 









Chemical 	 FIRE, EXPLOSION 
Industries ki= 	•' AND TOXICITY INDE) 
Limited 	 k2= j 0.53 
L0.71
- 	 Sheet No. 5 	 (6/80) k3=    
Mond 	 k4= 	0.69 	 I Ref No.  
OPU 	
M 6/05 k5= 10.72 	 I Division  
F. FIRE FIGHTING 
1-Fire Alarms 0.9 
Hand Fire Extinguishers 0.95 x 0.9 
Water Supply 0.85 
Water Spray or Monitor Systems - 
Foam and Inerting Installations 0.7  
Fire Brigade Attendance 0.9 
Site Co-operation in Fire Fighting 0.9 
I_8- Smoke Ventilators - 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE FIGHTING FACTORS k6 = 
	 0.37 
11. FINAL OFFSET INDICES CALCULATION 
OFFSET DOW/ICI OVERALL INDEX D2 = D1 x k1 x k2 x k3 x k4 x k5 x k6 
D2= 	6.77 
OFFSET FIRE LOAD F2= F1 xk1 xk4xk5= 
OFFSET INTERNAL UNIT EXPLOSION INDEX E2 = E1 x k2 x k3 = 
OFFSET AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX A2 = Al x k1 x k5 x k6 = 
OFFSET UNIT TOXICITY INDEX U2 = U1 x k1 x k2 x k3 x k5 = 
OFFSET OVERALL RISK RATING R2 = D2 0 + IF2 
x U2 x E2 x A2 ) 
1O 








12. HAZARD FEATURES REQUIRING OFFSETTING BY PROCESS DEVELOPMENT AND 
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D2.1 Introduction 
API RP 14c, the Recommended Practice for the Design, Installation and 
Testing of Basic Surface Safety System on Offshore Production 
Platforms was written to provide engineers with a guide to the minimum 
standard of safety instrumentation required to ensure an acceptable 
level of safety on offshore platforms. 
The code of practice specifies the instruments required on each plant 
component and each instrument's function in the shutdown system. The 
engineer decides if any of the instruments may be omitted because the 
component is adequately protected by a similar instrument on another 
component. 
D2.1.1 Analysis Approach 
An analysis limited to the instrumentation directly fitted to the gas 
compression system (GCS) was undertaken. Several subsystems however 
were not investigated, the most important being the centrifugal 
compressor lube and seal oil systems. The dewpoint control system, 
other than the hydrocarbon glycol separator, C1401, was not 
investigated. 
The study was limited to the pipework and components downstream of the 
shutdown valves on the gas outlet lines from the first, second and 
third stage oil gas separators, and upstream of the shutdown valves on 
the outlets to the fuel gas system, the sales gas metering system, and 
the reinjection wellheads. 
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D2.1.2 Layout of Appendix D2 
This appendix has been written on the assumption that the reader is 
familiar with APII BY 14c and the GCS. Appendix C2 contains a 
detailed description of the BY. 	Details of the GCS are contained in 
Appendix BI. 	The piping and instrumentation diagram (P&IDs) are 
situated in Appendix B2. 
The results of the analysis are documented in section D2.2 and the 
safety analysis tables (SATs) which I have constructed, are contained 
in section D2.4. The BY requires that safety function evaluation 
charts (SAFEs) be drawn up for the process. Matthew Hall, the main 
contractor, carried out an analysis and documented it in Cause and 
Effects tables. 	These tables are equivalent to the SAFEs required by 
the BY. 	Section D2.5 contains the SAFE charts relevant to this 
analysis. 
D2.2 Results of Application 
This appendix presents the results of the application of API BY 14c to 
the gas compression system on the Murchison Platform. The analysis 
was restricted to the main process components and did not consider the 
protection required by the compressor ancillary equipment such as the 
lube and seal oil systems. The five stages of the compression system 
were studied, firstly at component level using the approach specified 
by the code. By combining the SATs for pressure vessels, compressors 
and heat exchangers, the process was then reviewed at a systems level. 
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D2.2.1 General Comments 
The GCS safety systems have been designed in accordance with API RP 
14c. The Cause and Effects Charts show the Interaction of the 
instruments on the shutdown logic. These charts are equivalent to the 
Safety Analysis Function Evaluation charts (SAFEs) which would be 
drawn up when conducting an analysis using this method. In order 
therefore not to duplicate work which has already been carried out the 
SAFE charts are gathered in section D2.5 of this appendix. 
D2.2.2 Third Stage Gas Compression System 
Gas flows from the third stage oil/gas separator, C1003, through heat 
exchanger E1303 then to C1303, the compressor suction scrubber. 	From 
C1303, the liquids flow to the surge tank C1006. 	The gas.is 
compressed by third stage gas compressor K1302, to 19.3 Bar g, and 
flows to the second stage compression system where it is mixed with 
gas from the second stage oil/gas separator, C1002. 
SAT Tables PV1, COMP1 and GCSI situated in section D2.4 of this 
appendix, show that this section complies with RP 14c. 
It will be noted that there are no instruments on 'E1303 it being 
protected by Instruments on C1003 and C1303. 
Pressure safety valves 13PSV 1054/5 fitted to C1302, protect the 
discharge line of K1302. They are Interlocked so as to prevent both 
valves being closed at the same time, and are set to lift at 30 Bar g. 
Although these relief valves are not fitted to the discharge line 
itself, they cannot be isolated from 1(1302 and therefore their actual 
position on C1302 In no way reduces the protection they would have 
afforded if they were fitted nearer the discharge point of the 
compressor. 
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Additional overpressure protection is provided by extra high pressure 
switch 13 PSHH 1119, which initiates a process system shutdown which 
will open shutdown valve 13 XV 1103, which dumps the gas to the flare 
system when the pressure reaches 29.2 Bar g in the compressor 
discharge line. Before this takes place however, the operators in M7 
and in the main control room will have had the opportunity to take 
corrective action when 13 PAR 1118 alarms at a pressure of 28.5 Bar g. 
Although the surge control system also reduces the likelihood of 
overpressure, API RP 14c discounts the contribution made to safety by 
control systems. 
The protection against overpressure is diverse and provides In my 
opinion a higher degree of protection than that which is recommended 
in RP 14c. 
This section therefore complies with API RP 14c. 
D2.2.3 Second Stage Compression System 
Gas from the K1302 and C1002 flows through heat exchanger E1302 to the 
compressor suction scrubber C1302. The liquid flows to the third 
stage oil/gas separator, C1003, and the gas is compressed to 45.5 Bar 
g by second stage gas compressor K1301. 
Tables PV2, COMP2 and GCS2, show that this part of the process 
complies with the RP. Devices on the discharge line of K1302 and on 
C1002 protect C1302 from overpressure and leaks. 
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D2.2.4 First Stage Gas Compression System 
Gas from K1301 and ClOOl (the first stage oil/gas separator) flows 
through heat exchanger E1301 and then to the first stage condensate 
knockout drum C1301, where the liquid flows to C1002 and the gas flows 
to the hydrocarbon glycol separator C1401. The arrangement of the 
shutdown valves is such that gas may bypass the dewpoint control 
system and flow directly to the first stage pipeline compressor, 
K1501. This is the most complex part of the gas compression system as 
the gas from C1301 takes any of three routes: 
gas is fed to the fuel gas system 
gas is fed to K1501 
gas is fed to C1401, then to a) and b) above. 
The fuel gas system was not studied. The hydrocarbon glycol separator 
was studied separately and the result listed in Table PV4. Tables 
PV3a and PV3b show the SAT for C1301. In the first, the gas is fed 
directly to K1501, and in the second it is fed to C1401 and then to 
K1501. 
First Stage Condensate Knockout Drum 
Table PV3a shows that C1301 meets the standard of the RP. 
Hydrocarbon Glycol Separator 
A strict application of the RP suggests that C1401 should be fitted 
with a high pressure switch to protect C1401 from overpressure should 
liquid overflow from C1301. 	The primary protection against overflow 
is an extra high level switch fitted to C1301. 	Secondary protection 
is provided by an extra high level switch which is already fitted to 
C1401. 
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In all modes of operation, C1401 is protected from overpressure by 
devices on the pressure sources, ClOOl, C1004 and K1301. Given that 
high level alarms are fitted to C1301 and C1401 in addition to the 
required devices, C1401 is adequately protected and complies with the 
requirements of RP 14c. 
c. First Stage Pipeline Compressor 
In a similar way to K1302, the discharge line of K1501 is protected by 
relief valves 15 PSV 1051/2 fitted to C1501. Flow safety valve 60/511 
provides protection against backflow from the reinjection system. 
Should a leak develop, the backf low within the system is not likely to 
be significant. 
A low pressure switch is not fitted to the discharge line. 15 PSLL 
1059 on the pipeline compression scrubber C1501 provides adequate 
protection as the device cannot be isolated from the compressor 
discharge. 
D2.2.5 Second Stage Pipeline Compression System 
Gas from K1501 flows through heat exchanger E1501 and through C1501 
(the suction scrubber) to K1502 (the second stage pipeline compressor) 
where it is compressed to 214.4 Bar g. The liquids from C1501 flow to 
C1002. After flowing through heat exchanger E1502 the gas is either 
piped to shore or is fed to the gas reinjection compressor K1503. 
Tables PV5, COMP4 and GCS4 show that this section of the process is 
adequately protected and meets the standard set by RP 14c. 
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D2.2.6 Gas Reinjection Compression System 
Gas from E1502 is fed to the suction scrubber C1502, the liquids are 
fed to C1002 and the gas is compressed to 351.6 Bar g by K1503 the 
Cooper Bessemer Reciprocating Compressor before being fed to the gas 
reinjection wellheads. Heat exchanger E1503 is fitted in the recycle 
line in order to prevent high temperatures when recycling gas. 
Tables PV6, COMP5 and GCS5 show that the reinjection compression 
system meets the requirements of RP 14c. 
D2.3 Discussion of Analysis 
The analysis has shown that there are several aspects of API RP 14c 
which are open to interpretation and require to to be clarified. The 
RP is a combination of a design guide and a checklist. It is possible 
that. the authors' intention was to allow the designer scope to use his 
professional judgment. However, the RP should in my opinion be 
clarified in the areas which I discuss in the following sections. 
The Murchison Platform Gas Compression System in my opinion complies 
with API RP 14c. There are however instances where the protection 
required by the RP is provided in a different way to that recommended 
by the code. The designers' use of alternative protection strategies 
have in my judgment exceeded the minimum standard set out in API RP 
14c. This is particularly true of the standard of secondary 
protection provided throughout the GCS. 
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D2.3.1 Definition of Components 
The Murchison GCS can be divided into 5 separate stages, being: 
Third stage gas compression system 
Second stage gas compression system 
First stage pipelines compression system 
Second stage pipelines compression system 
Reinjection compressor. 
The centrifugal compressor supplied by Dresser Clark consists of four 
stages of compression (a to d above) driven by a common shaft 
connected to the Avon Gas Turbine. 
The RP does not make it clear how this unit should be treated since it 
is effectively four process components but one physical unit. Matthew 
Hall, in their analyses, have considered the two stages of pipeline 
compression as one unit, since the source of gas for the second stage 
is from the first stage pipeline compressor, K1501. In my opinion 
Matthew Hall's application of the RP in this way is justified and has 
resulted in a standard of protection at least equal to that laid down 
by the RP. 
This aspect of the RP's application requires clarification. 	In my 
opinion, where the operating parameters within each section of a 
multiple process unit are substantially different, each section should 
be studied separately. 
D2.3.2 Extent of Protection 
The RP does not state the maximum number of components that one device 
may be deemed to protect. Clearly, the greater the coverage of the 
device, the greater the reliance placed upon it. 
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The effect of the device failing will be greater than the failure of 
an instrument that protects only one process component. 
For example, extra high pressure switch 13 PSHH 1119, protects the 
discharge line of the third stage compressor against overpressure. If 
the pressure in the discharge line rises too much, the switch 
initiates a shutdown. This device is deemed to protect a number of 
other components, and its failure could result in E1302, C1302 and the 
suction line of K1301 being subjected to high pressure. 
Because of the safety strategy adopted by the designers of the GCS, 
many other devices in the control and shutdown systems give warning of 
abnormal conditions as they develop. These warnings provide the 
operator with the opportunity to take action to rectify the situation. 
Some devices initiate shutdown, causing the process gas to be vented 
to the flare system. The failure of any single device in the GCS will 
have a very limited effect on the system. 
D2.3.3 Protection against Liquid Overflow 
The primary protection against liquid overflow is provided by a high 
level switch fitted to the component, which initiates shutdown if the 
level rises to much. It is recommended that a high pressure switch 
and high level switch be fitted to the downstream component to provide 
secondary protection. 
The second recommendation is not appropriate to the GCS. 	If liquid 
overflows from C1303, the third stage gas compressor will-be severely 
damaged. A slug of liquid is likely to cause several compressor 
blades to break, and the broken blades themselves will cause further 
mechanical damage. It is possible that a broken blade will puncture 
the compressor casing and cause gas to be released into the module. 
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The designers of the GCS, have fitted high level alarms which operate 
independently of the high level switch. These alarms are fitted to 
all the vessels in the system and give the operator the opportunity to 
rectify the situation should the liquid level rise. 
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D2.4 Safety Analysis Tables 
Table PV1 	C1303 
Table CONP1 1(1302 
Table GCS1 E1303, C1303, K1302 
Table PV2 C1302 
Table CONP2 1(1301 
Table GCS2 E1302, C1302, K1301 
Table PV3a C1301 (dewpoint control system bypassed) 
Table PV3b C1301 
Table COMP3 1(1501 
Table GCS3 E1301, C1301, K1501 
Table PV4 C1401 
Table PV5 C1501 
Table COMP4 K1502 
Table GCS4 E1501, C1501, 1(1502 
Table PV6 C1502 
Table COMP5 1(1503 
Table GCS5 E1502, C1502, E1503, 1(1503 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: PRESSURE VESSELS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table PV1 	 Third Stage Gas Compression Scrubber C1303 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure PSH * A4a3 P511 on C1003 
PSV 13 PSV 1106/7 
LEAK PSL * A4b3 PSL on C1003 
FSV * A4f2 
Yes 
Overflow LSH 13 LSHH 1104 * 
LSH 13 LSHH 1054 * 
P511 13 	P51111 1119 
Gas Blowby LSH 13 LSLL 1102 * 
PSH PSU on C1006 * 
PSV PSV on C1006 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
Appendix D2 	 250 
SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: COMPRESSORS Appendix D2.4 
Table COMP1 Third Stage Gas Compressor K1302 
DEVIATION PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 
(suction) PSH * A8a2 PSH on C1003 
PSV * A8e2 13 PSV 1106/7 
(discharge) PSU 13 PSHH 1119 
PSV 13 PSV 1054/5 on C1302 
LEAK 
(suction) PSL 13 PSLL 1116 
ASH Yes 
ESS Yes 
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COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table GCSI 	Third Stage Gas Compression System 
DEVIATION PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure PSU * A4a3 PSH on C1003 
PSV 13 PSV 1106/7 
(suction) PSU * A8a2 PSH on CI003 
PSV * A8e2 13 PSV 1106/7 
(discharge) PSH 13 PSHH 1119 
PSV 13 PSV 1054/5 on C1302 
LEAK PSL * 	A4b3 	PSL on C1003 
FSV * A4f2 
ESS 	Yes 
(suction) PSL 13 PSLL 1116 
ASH Yes 
ESS 	Yes 




Overflow 	LSH 	 13 LSHH 1104 * 
LSH 	13 LSIIH 1054 
* 
PSH 	13 PSHH 1119 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 	 * 	
13 LSLL 1102 
PSH PSH on C1006 
* 
PSV 	PSV on C1006 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: PRESSURE VESSELS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table PV2 	 Second Stage Gas Compression Scrubber C1302 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 	PSH 	 * 	A4a3 PSH on C1002 
13 P51111 1119 
PSV 	13 PSV 1054/5 
LEAK 	 PSL 	 * 	A4b3 PSL on C1002 
13 PSLL 1060 
FSV * 	A4f2 
ESS Yes 
Overflow 	LSH 13 LS}IH 1054 
* 
LSH 13 LSHH 1008 * 
PSH 13 PSHH 1066 
Gas Blowby 	LS}1 13 LSLL 1052 
* 
P511 PSU on C1003 
* 
PSV PSV on C1003 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: COMPRESSORS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table COMP2 	Second Stage Gas Compressor K1301 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
* 	A8a2 	P511 on C1002 
13 PS}LR 1119 
PSV 	 * 	A8e2 	13 PSV 1054/5 
(discharge) 	PSFI 	 13 PSHH 1066 
PSV 	13 PSV 1068/9 
LEAK 
(suction) 	PSL 	 * 	A8c2 PSL on C1002 
13 PSLL 1060 
ASH 	 Yes 
ESS 	Yes 
(discharge) 	PSL 	 13 PSLL 1064 
FSV 60/507 
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COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE Appendix D2.4 
Table GCSZ Second Stage Gas Compression System 
DEVIATION PROTECTION 
Primary 	Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure PSH * A4a3 PSH on C1002 
13 PSHH 1119 
PSV 13 PSV 1054/5 
(suction) PSH * A8a2 PSH on CI002 
13 PSHH 1119 
PSV * A8e2 13 PSV 1054/5 
(discharge) PSH 13 PSHH 1066 
PSV 13 PSV 1068/9 
LEAK PSL * A4b3 PSL on C1002 
13 PSLL 1060 
FSV * A4f2 
ESS 	Yes 
(suction) 	PSL 	 * 	A8c2 PSL on C1002 
13 PSLL 1060 
ASH 	 Yes 
ESS 	Yes 
(discharge) 	PSL 	 13 PSLL 1064 
FSV 60/507 
ASH 	 Yes 
ESS 	Yes 
Overflow 	LSH 13 LSHH 1054 
* 
LSH 13 LSHH 1008 * 
PSH 13 PSHII 1066 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 13 LSLL 1052 * 
PSH PSH on CI003 
* 
PSV PSV on C1003 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
Appendix D2 	 255 
SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: PRESSURE VESSELS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table PV3a 	First Stage Condensate Knockout Drum C1301 
(Dewpoint Control System Bypassed) 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 	PSH 	 * 	A4a3 PSH on ClOOl 
PSH on C1004 
13 PSHH 1066 
PSV 13 PSV 1008/9 
LEAK 	 PSL * 	A4b3 	PSL on ClOOl 
PSL on C1004 
13 PSLL 1064 
FSV * 	A4f2 
ESS Yes 
Overflow 	LSFI 13 LSHH 1008 
* 
LSH 15 LSRH 1054 ) 
* ) 	on C1501 
•PSH 15 PSHH 1008 ) 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 13 LSLL 1007 
* 
PSH PSH on C1002 
* 
PSV PSV on C1002 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: PRESSURE VESSELS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table PV3b 	First Stage Condensate Knockout Drum C1301 
(Dewpoint Control System in Operation) 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 	PSH 	 * 	A4a3 	PSFL on ClOOl 
PSH on C1004 
13 P51111 1066 
PSV 	13 PSV 1008/9  
LEAK 	 PSL 	 * 	A4b3 PSL on C100I 
PSL on C1004 
13 PSLL 1064 
FSV 	 * 	A4f2 
ESS 	Yes 
Overflow 	LSH 	 13 LSHH 1008 
LSH 	14 LSHH 1004 	 on C140I 
P511 15 PSH11 1008 on C1501 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 	 13 LSLL 1007 
* 
PSH 	PSH on C1002 * 
PSV PSV on CI002 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
Appendix D2 	 257 
SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: COMPRESSORS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table COMP3 	First Stage Pipeline Compressor K1501 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
• 	 Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 
(suction) 	PSH 	 * 	A8a2 PSH on ClOOl 
PSH on C1004 
13 PSHH 1119 
PSV 	 * 	A8e2 	13 PSV 1008/9 
(discharge) 	PSH 	 15 P5MM 1008 
PSV 	15 PSV 1051/2 	on C1501 
LEAK 
(suction) 	PSL 	 15 PSLL 1509 
ASH Yes 
ESS 	Yes 
(discharge) 	PSL 	 15 PSLL 1059 	 on C1501 
FSV 60/511 
ASH 	 Yes 
ESS 	Yes 
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COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table GCS3 first Stage Pipeline Compression System 
(Dewpoint Control System Bypassed) 
DEVIATION PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. _Device 
Overpressure PSH * A4a3 PSH on CIOO1 
PSU on CI004 
13 PSHH 1066 
PSV 13 PSV 1008/9 
(suction) PSH * A8a2 PSH on ClOOl 
PSH on C1004 
13 PSHH 1119 
PSV * A8e2 13 PSV 1008/9 
(discharge) P511 15 PSHH 1008 
PSV 15 PSV 1051/2 on C150I 
LEAK PSL * A4b3 PSL on C100I 
PSL on C1004 
13 PSLL 1064 
FSV * A4f2 
ESS Yes 
(suction) PSL 15 PSLL 1509 
ASH Yes 
ESS Yes 




Overflow LSH 13 LSHH 1008 * 
LSH 15 LSHH 1054 
* 
P511 15 PSRH 1008 
Gas Blowby LSH 13 LSLL 1007 * 
PSH PSH on C1002 
* 
PSV PSV on C1002 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: PRESSURE VESSELS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table PV4 	 Hydrocarbon Glycol Separator C1401 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 	PSH 	 * 	A4a3 PSH on ClOOl 
PSH on C1004 
13 PSHH 1066 
PSV 	14 PSV 1003/4 
LEAK 	 PSL 	 * 	A4b3 PSL on ClOOl 
PSL on C1004 
13 PSLL 1064 
F SV 
ESS 




* 	A4f 3 
Yes 
14 LSHH 1004 
15 LSRH 1054 ) 
) 	on C1501 
15 PSHH 1008 ) 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 	 * 	14 LSLL 1002 
PSH PSH on C1002 
* 
PSV 	PSV on C1002 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: PRESSURE VESSELS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table PV5 	 Second Stage Pipeline Compression Scrubber C1501 
DEVIATION - 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
-- 	 Device - Ref. Device 
Overpressure 	PSH 	 * 	A4a3 	15 PSIIH 1008 
PSV 	15 PSV 1051/2 
LEAK 	 PSL 	 * 	A4b3 	15 PSLL 1059 
FSV * A4f2 
ESS 	Yes 
Overflow 	LSH 	 15 LSHH 1054 * 
LSH 	15 LSHH 1400 
* 
PSH 	15 PSHH 1066 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 	 * 	
15 LSLL 1052 
PSH PSH on C1002 
* 
PSV 	PSV on C1002 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
Appendix D2 	 261 
SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: COMPRESSORS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table COMP4 	Second Stage Pipeline Compressor K1502 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 
(suction) 	PSH 	 * 	A8a2 	15 PSH}1 1008 
PSV 	 * A8e2 15 PSV 1051/2 
(discharge) 	PSH 	 15 P51111 1066 
PSV 	15 PSV 1068/9 
LEAK 
(suction) 	PSL 	 15 PSLL 1059 
ASH Yes 
ESS 	Yes 
(discharge) 	PSL 	 15 PSLL 1070 
FSV 60/511 
60/527 	 (1) 
ASH 	 Yes 
ESS 	Yes 
Notes (1) FSV 60/527 protects the gas metering system from 
backpressure when K1503 recycle valve is open. 
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COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table GCS4 Second Stage Pipeline Compression System 
DEVIATION PROTECTION 
- Primary Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure PSH * A4a3 15 PSHH 1008 
PSV 15 PSV 1051/2 
(suction) PSH * A8a2 15 P51111 1008 
PSV * A8e2 15 PSV 1051/2 
(discharge) PSH 15 PSHH 1066 
PSV. 15 PSV 1068/9 
LEAK PSL * A4b3 15 PSLL 1059 
FSV * A4f2 
ESS Yes 
(suction) PSL 15 PSLL 1059 
ASH Yes 
ESS Yes 





Overflow 	LSH 	 15 LSHH 1054 
* 
LSH 	15 LSHH 1400 * 
PSH 15 PSHH 1066 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 	 15 LSLL 1052 
* 
PSH 	PSH on C1002 * 
PSV PSV on C1002 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
(2) FSV 60/527 protects the gas metering system from 
backpressure when K1503 recycle valve is open. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: PRESSURE VESSELS 	 Appendix D2.4 
Table PV6 	 Gas Reinjection Compression Scrubber K1503 
DEVIATION 	PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary 	Existing 	SAC 	Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 	PSH 	 * 	A4a3 	15 PSFIH 1066 
PSV 	 A4c3 15 PSV 1101/2 
LEAK 	 PSL 	 * 	A4b3 	15 PSLL 1070 
FSV * A4f3 
ESS 	Yes 




PSH not required 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 	 15 LSL 1401 
* 
PSH 	P511 on C1002 * 
PSV PSV on C1002 
Notes (1) * means instrument on a downstream component. 
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SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE: COMPRESSORS Appendix D2.4 
Table COMP5 Gas Reinjection Compressor K1503 
DEVIATION PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure 
(suction) PSH * A8a2 15 	PSI-J.H 	1066 
PSV * A8e2 15 PSV 	1101/2 
(discharge) PSH 15 PSH 1406 
PSV 15 PSV 	1111/2 
LEAK 
(suction) PSL 15 PSL 1400 
ASH Yes 
ESS Yes 
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COMPOSITE SAFETY ANALYSIS TABLE Appendix D2.4 
Table GCS5 Gas Reinjection Compression System 
DEVIATION PROTECTION 
Primary Secondary Existing SAC Alternative 
Device Ref. Device 
Overpressure PSH * A4a3 15 PSHH 1066 
PSV A4c3 15 PSV 1101/2 
(suction) PSH * A8a2 15 P51*1 1066 
PSV * A8e2 15 PSV 1101/2 
(discharge) PSH 15 PSH 1406 
PSV 15 PSV 1111/2 
LEAK PSL * A4b3 15 PSLL 1070 
FSV * A4f3 
ESS Yes 
(suction) PSL 15 PSL 1400 
ASH Yes 
ESS Yes 




Overflow 	LSH 15 LSH 1400 
* 
LSH not required 
* 
PSH not required 
Gas Blowby 	LSH 15 LSL 1401 
* 
PSH PSH on C1002 
* 
PSV PSV on CI002 
Notes (1).* means instrument on a downstream component. 
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D3.1 Introduction 
An FMEA was carried out for part of the Murchison Gas Compression 
System. The objective of the analysis was to investigate the effect 
of single failures on the ability of the shutdown system to function 
correctly. 
Several subsystems which support the GCS were not studied. These 
include the: 
lube & seal oil systems 
unit control logic (UCL 10 & 11) 
Avon gas generator 
fuel gas system, and 
sales gas metering system. 
The failure of valves and instruments which were not part of the 
shutdown system were not considered. 
D3.1.1 Analysis Approach 
The analysis was carried out in accordance with the procedure 
described in Appendix C3. 
In order to become more familiar with the application of FMEA, an 
analysis of part of the level control system was completed. The 
Murchison GCS contains several subsystems which can be analysed 
separately. These are: 
level control 
surge control, and 
overpressure protection. 
Functional dependency diagrams (FDDs) were drawn for each of these 
subsystems, and the FMEA sheets completed. 
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After these three analyses were completed, I investigated the effect 
of failures of devices which initiate shutdown and the failures of the 
shutdown valves. The intention was to check that the shutdown system 
continued to function correctly in spite of an instrument or valve 
failure. 
Again it should be noted that the relay logic which forms part of the 
system was not analysed. The effect of single relay failures was 
therefore not investigated. 
D3.1.2 Layout of Appendix D3 
This appendix has been written with the assumption that the reader is 
familiar with the GCS and FMEA. Appendix BI contains a detailed 
description of the GCS and Appendix C3 describes how an FMEA is 
carried out. 
Section D3.2 describes the analyses that were carried out and refers 
to the sheets completed in the study which are contained in section 
D3.5. The results of the analysis are discussed in section D3.3. 
D3.2 Results of Analysis 
The examination of the P&IDs of the GCS revealed that the design of 
the following instrumentation loops were the same for each stage of 
the GCS, being: 
level control system 
surge control system, and 
overpressure protection. 
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After each subsystem had been analysed, the maintenance records of the 
GCS were examined to discover failure modes and failure causes that 
had not been taken into account in the first analyses. 
Once revised, these analyses formed the basis for a FMEA of the GCS, 
which was divided into four stages: 
Third Stage Gas Compression System 
Second Stage Gas Compression System 
First Stage Condensate Knockout Drum and 
First Stage Pipeline Compressor, and 
Second Stage Pipeline Compression System. 
D3.2.1 Objective of Analysis 
The objective of the analysis was to identify the fail to danger modes 
of the process control and shutdown system and to study the effects of 
such failures on the capability to shutdown the process without loss 
of containment, or where a release of hydrocarbons has occurred, to 
study the capability of the process control and shutdown system to 
minimise the release. 
The process control and shutdown system In the GCS are independent of 
one another. However,, various process upset alarms are connected to 
the process control system. These alarms give the operator the 
opportunity to intervene and possibly rectify the situation before the 
shutdown system is activated. The failure of devices which initiate 
the shutdown system are of greater consequence and therefore the 
analysis focussed on such failures. 
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D3.2.2 Fail to Danger Modes 
The shutdown system has been designed to fail safe. However although 
an instrument can be designed to fail safe, it can also fail in such a 
way as to lower the standard of protection that the shutdown system 
provides. 
The fail to danger rate is much lower than the fail safe rate. 	It is 
important to identify the fail to danger mode for each instrument, as 
it is these failures which are most likely to impair the function of 
the shutdown system. 
Throughout the analyses, the fail to danger modes have been identified 
and their causes found. The fail safe modes and causes have been 
ignored. 
The system was assumed to be operating notmally when instrument 
failures were investigated. In the case of a shutdown valve, its 
failure was considered during shutdown and during normal operating 
conditions. 
D3.2.3 FNEA of Typical Level Control System 
A detailed and comprehensive FMEA was carried out for the level 
control system fitted to C1303. The system is typical of the 
instruments used to control the level in C1302, C1301 and C1501. 
FDD D3.4.1 shows the functional dependency diagram used to aid the 
analysis, which is set out on sheets FMEA 20 01 to 03 in section D3.5. 
The analysis shows that the failure of the level transmitter affects 
all the devices in the system but that the extra high and the extra 
low level switches continue to protect the vessel against overflow and 
gas blowby respectively. 
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As this was the first analysis to be carried out, the effect of the 
failure of: 
low level switch 
low level alarm 
high level switch, and 
high level alarm 
were investigated. 
The failure of these devices prevents the operator from being warned 
of low or high level liquid in the vessel. 
D3.2.4 FNEA of Typical Surge Control System 
The surge control system for compressor K1302 was studied and the 
results recorded on sheets FMEA 30 01 and 02, in section D3.5. 
FDD D3.4.2 shows the functional dependency diagram drawn to aid the 
analysis of the system. 
The objective of the system is to prevent the compressor from surging, 
which occurs when the volumetric flow of gas falls below a critical 
level, causing a region of low pressure to be formed behind the 
compressor blades. The presence of this low pressure zone results in 
a backflow of gas from the discharge to the compressor. 
Prolonged compressor surge will result in overheating of the thrust 
bearings and possibly mechanical damage. It is also possible that a 
blade will break causing extensive internal damage to the compressor. 
Compressor surge Is controlled by measuring the suction pressure and 
flow rate, and the discharge pressure. These measurements affect the 
controller which opens and closes the recycle valve. 
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This ensures that the volumetric flow rate is sufficient to prevent 
compressor surge. 
Each pressure transmitter is connected to a high and low pressure 
alarm which warns the operator. If the surge control system fails an 
extra high pressure switch on the discharge side of the compressor 
will initiate shutdown. Pressure safety valves on the downstream 
vessel relieve any excess pressure should the shutdown system fail. 
D3.2.5 FMEA of Typical Overpressure Protection Devices 
Sheets FMEA 40 01 and 02 show the FMEA of the devices which protect 
the third stage GCS from overpressure. The analysis shows that the 
failure of an extra high pressure switch or of a pressure safety valve 
is unrevealed. (This is also true of the extra high level switches). 
The design of the GCS is such that should a shutdown device fail, a 
downstream device will initiate shutdown. Pressure safety valves 
provide additional protection against excess pressure. PSVs are 
fitted in pairs and have an interlock device which prevents both 
valves from being locked off simultaneously. This arrangement permits 
the testing and maintenance of the PSVs without any reduction in 
protection. 
Non—return valves (NRV) prevent overpressure from a downstream source 
by stopping backflow of gas. The failure of a NRV to close during 
startup will render the GCS inoperative as each stage cannot be 
brought to the correct operating pressure. The analysis of the 
Maintenance Records showed that this failure had already occurred. 
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D3.2.6 FMEA of Third Stage Gas Compression System 
Once the three subsystem analyses had been completed, each stage of 
the GCS was studied. The first study looked at the third stage GCS 
and the analysis is recorded on sheets FMEA 60 01 to 03 which are 
contained in section D3.5. 
P&ID No EA-214c in Appendix B2 should be consulted for details of this 
stage of the GCS. 
Pressure switch 13 PSX 1411 activates the seal oil pumps when the 
pressure exceeds 1.4 Bar g. 	It operates in conjunction with 15 PSX 
1508. 	If either switch fails to operate during startup the seal oil 
pumps would not be started. It is probable that the startup procedure 
would be halted should this fault condition arise. If startup 
continues then gas will leak past the seals and into the module. The 
compressor may also be damaged. 
D3.2.7 FMEA of Second Stage Gas Compression System 
Sheets FMEA 70 01 to 03 in section D3.5 show the analysis of the 
second stage GCS. P&ID EA-214c In Appendix B2 shows the process 
control and shutdown instruments in this stage. 
D3.2.8 FMEA of First Stage Condensate Knockout Drum and 
First Stage Pipeline Compression System 
The FMEA of this part of the GCS is shown on sheets FMEA 80 01 to 03. 
Refer to P&ID EA 215 B2 In Appendix B2 for details of the instruments 
in this stage. 
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Compressors K1501 and K1502 can be considered to be a single unit 
since gas is fed to them via C1301. In order to control surge in the 
compressors, the flow rate and pressure are monitored on the suction 
side of K1501, and pressure measured on the discharge line of K1502. 
Recycle valve 15 PDCV 1062 controls the flow of gas between the 
discharge of K1502 and the suction of K1501. Recycle gas is fed 
through C1301 then to K1501, via the dewpoint control system if it is 
operating. 
The fail safe mode of 15 PDCV 1062 is "f all open". 	Should this occur 
during normal operations C1301 and C1401 will be exposed to high 
pressure. This is discussed further in section D3.3.1. 
The comment made about 13 PSX 1411 in section D3.2.6 applies to 15 PSX 
1508. 
Low pressure switch 15 PSL 1510 prevents 15 XV 1001 from opening 
prematurely by not venting the control line until the pressure has 
fallen to 29 Bar g. During shutdown if 15 PSL 1510 fails such that 15 
XV 1001 is permitted to open , then K1501 discharge gas is vented to 
the flare system. 	It is difficult to predict the effect on the gas 
compression system or on the flare system. 	It is possible that gas 
would backf low from K1502 to 15 XV 1001 and may cause mechanical 
damage to the compressor. 
D3.2.9 FMEA of Second Stage Pipeline Compression System 
The results of the analysis are documented on sheets FMEA 90 01 to 03 
in section D3.5. P&ID EA-216c in Appendix B2 shows the 
instrumentation on this stage. 
During shutdown, valve 15 XV 1052 allows gas to flow from K1502 to the 
flare system. If this valve fails to open then C1301 will be exposed 
to high pressure as the recycle valve, 15 PDCV 1062 is opened. 
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Pressure control valve 15 PCV 1072 however will limit the pressure in 
the discharge line and could be used by the operator to vent the 
system. Otherwise the pressure in the system will equalise and gas 
will be vented to the cold relief header via 14 XV 1007 fitted to 
C1401 in the dewpoint control system. 
If the dewpoint control system is bypassed, then the pressure may also 
be vented by manually opening a valve on C1301 or C1501 and releasing 
the excess gas into the flare system. 
D3.3 Discussion of Results 
The analysis has shown that an isolated instrument failure does not 
significantly reduce the protection afforded the GCS by the shutdown 
system. The diverse approach to protecting the process which Conoco 
has adopted has helped to ensure the reliable operation of the 
shutdown system. 
An analysis at a higher level was carried out and the results showed 
that a release of gas is minimized by the shutdown system, which is 
activated by the gas detection system. The review of the maintenance 
records showed that small leaks at valves and flanges occur regularly. 
There has been one incident where the failure of a diaphram in 
pressure switch resulted in the instrument cover being blown off and 
gas released. 
In general safe failures, for example an extra high pressure switch 
operating prematurely, result in the system being shutdown. Although 
the reliability of the shutdown system is high , the availability of 
the GCS is restricted by the numerous safe failures which result in 
the system being shutdown. 
The reliable operation of the shutdown system is dependent on the Unit 
Control Logic working correctly. High quality hermetically sealed 
relays have been used, making a relay failure unlikely. 
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However, wires which short or open circuit, or the incorrect wiring of 
relays could have severe effects on the shutdown system. The UCL was 
not studied. 
D3.3.1 Venting of First Stage Pipeline Compressor 
As pointed out in section D3.2.8, 15 PSL 1510 prevents 15 XV 1001 from 
venting the first stage pipeline compressor until the pressure falls 
below 29 Bar g. K1501 is vented by 15 XV 1052 via K1502. 
Consideration should be given to providing an override on 15 XV 1001 
so that the system could be vented via 15 XV 1001 should 15 XV 1052 
fail to open. If the dewpoint control system is bypassed, there is no 
shutdown valve that will depressurize this part of the system. 
The problem of depressurizing the system is complicated by 15 PDCV 
1062 opening during shutdown. However, the pressure safety valves 
throughout the system continue to protect the system from high 
pressure by relieving excess gas into the flare system. 
The likelihood of 15 XV 1052 failing to open is small, and the 
protection is adequate. However the problem in my opinion deserves 
further study. 
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D3.4 Functional Dependency Diagrams 
FDD D30401 Level Control System 
FDD D3.4.2 Surge Control System 
FDD D3.4.3 Overpressure Devices 
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Figure D3.41 	Functional Dependency Diagram 
Level Control System 
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Figure D34.2 	Functional Dependency Diagram 
Surge Control System 
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D3.5 FMEA Analysis Sheets 
FMEA 20 0103 FMEA of Typical Liquid Level Control System 
FMEA 30 01-02 FNEA of Typical Surge Control System 
FMEA 40 01-02 FMEA of Typical Overpressure Protection System 
FMEA 60 01-03 FNEA of Third Stage Gas Compression System 
FMEA 70 01-03 FNEA of Second Stage Gas Compression System 
FMEA 80 01-03 FMEA of First Stage Pipeline Compression System 
FMEA 90 01-03 FMEA of Second Stage Pipeline Compression System 
Appendix D3 	 293 
VP1R 2.0 0/ FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SYSTEM 3 	Sic 	 p,ips,od 
INDENTURE LEVEL fPo'j.1 
REF DRAWING E# - z/4. 
MSS!ON _ o1IRp1. Llault,L.4ve, 
 
DATE- MARCH 192 
SHEET _/ OF 	3 
COMPILED BY- J. LYGATE 





LOCAt IJE)T I-flGHER e io t*.jrnt'r laertt If 	clan Func;or,  Detect,or, rernart 
rnrne.cour AND CAJSES c.. -= CTS icrcj 
Il L.6// /107 1h4/j%4CVA2 rei ç, s 4&42..lI OPS'RRT 	24YC 0PRH1/d 0 
) ADI 	I44I4. #ZoY 'JIY/OW 311eq. lO AALwA  444y 54rg #.6VfF'Cl48lr - oPJRAroe DV'J3 /3 	Vi." "00 4 
11,S4qYE0 #SS' F0e 4P.f.4WT "4 £.(. /44?,441 	SA'i. 
4 13 L.4/ 1/04 .,i.l. 
- eF.447.e-s ops.sy,.'.iç 4si 	£444.4 - - C..lF4R 	/ oPsqya. 0 ..' 	 X.  
I) 1/144 	441.44 	p4011' #J#Y 	 44 Z41104V4 	F4i,l.7 Is AT sio 	4413e 
#8 tr 11ev 4,Q.IID 	 w,  
z) d'0444'04.41.d'D rwgi.' Ds' 
i) 	,,Jrgo.,q.'q.L 	AAWAY 
c,i. 	ID 	OPce 4c.(• . - 0Pge roe , 5 - - 0114541144T.&' IS 4.5.1W ,,o4 4 v.1 	A44 	r44 
der ( 1 444'.E D. 0w'4 .4#..WI. "/'r,.qr 00 
13 .'..4.Vd /104 DOWAI 
4h44/l5. 
IS 4.411 	/1P4 5/14.1 44v.I'L .1/4,Js 	04I.qn# f4,.. 	ro 	0054.4 y./' 0P,42 4' rwq. aNsmame /4 4/er - - 004441ee 	4.'- 13 4.5.4.4' ,/o 4 
4.49511 00 WIJW 	/aJ'D ') AS/I 	F414,40 W45li0?. .4(1'S 	514/411 45142 141,1/475.5 	OMIP' D4',1'4../t. 	05 	Zp.s 
Z) . IS 	4.2i.''1/104 b0Q41 
3) 	t14. 	PAW. 1'. 
'.4&54 	s). 3) 
M.Q.Q#I 	'-1/ fl''..' 
- 0 (.011 r0.4 
.a. 	it ra. 
53 51 	5/07 1..4V4'4.. 14wi,r,r5 5.vus Al fe 	S140jqA.. OP.6e.sv,,.14. d5/(41.I4 7.0 IJLcv' #,o 	se ig.os 	.Pss.a. 13L4..4 ,'eS /3 L.s 	"as 	i 4 
rnr,s. -rP •01184 4,115 	84ec.s.eb. AC- 	.4.44. 	54/j coo 	0PS.41 D?14.4l4 04 13 	V lIDS. 
941k 44.qS,14. ) £44. 4.414 .5.744 .40..l 551401. 
3) 	;dV.E5J.q4 	4u,_r. 
4.e..s 	S,o.J44. 
 4.4/I .EIOLV' C01455 Al. 44.
0P5i.4D4I le /3 4.C./ lieS Z4045 /3 44,41/  flOW /34.S0'.4' 11P4 
- •) IMPII54 -5,11f 	OsgD 4C 	4.54 , 	- /d4"41.5W' 005 .14R.ft(A Ll4f4re5 "cr.e 
3) rn3c.4i.,044o.5,, .444 .44043' 4.c4 	i.' b0..i II. 
3) /1/144.144 	104047 .444' 4ccc c...voe4' 41.-L4. 
.Jo 	.71(4/44 005547/414 5141154 	'V 13 LC#/ '/0? 4..4'40. 	9,sas 04 	43e#44' I's 	40o-. .4 







I1# 2.0 a 1 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS  
SYSTEM 
INDENTURE LEVEL _______________ 
REF. DRAWING £4 - 
MISS!ON 	.jrzo 	L,uIb 2.4vr 
 
DATE_ I.iiRCH 1962 
SHEET tCF_3 








 Number oer(ccor Function I.odE Proviios Ca- 
RrnOIE$ 
AND CIJSES ErFECTS E 	FEC1S 
13 J.0 	1104 4V4 &0l/143 ,1'1(g £, "AA . OPR41/.Iq 
C1JL44 IJ1.3.i/ 	I/DY. ) i/.cW $.QW41 	IZO#V 43 LY 
41 	r. 'EC £I3,t1 	24ii/ - A31J$A 13 LOU /1 LIIL 1/02 4. 
It O;r DP./. b*o7$. 1102 	• 	C.y.4F s.urs 	V33 
a). rI,sc.q4,4a4rD Al. 	..J.FW 	Z(. boai 	V4LV. 
_..__ - 3) I11'.44A 	c4uhr. 	- .. -. ... - 	- AISLS2)33) 01) 
PJ 	4i# 	PAO% Oo i_r. 
13L44 /101. 
----------- 
i3/ 	012 	110 	S,g,44j, PEA1I.V4. 
) LoaJ S404A 	




,, R,.sg. 1134 	0.133441 #aYI4YJ4 	4V7 9 	/2 A4.414' 1304 	..3/.13 
n4L4L,ma4r.eb Al 6#lrW 	h.ç 1>0 54.1 	'•'V.4 
I3,I4 	P104 
#1 4.44' '00? 
LLSL 	,Ie1 LO'.) LE/'& .rc141(es A'424 0Dqt3 	.L41f DP44.QY/A( - 
:.. 	....... 
si'roW. ,ç L"4. bWPA j, 11/ 31041L 	f' 	IS Li .L.44 	441g ,dFF/3,.dr - #3 4,VAL 	1102 1 3 45 	/13*  
II.! T#fl'.V 4,4,cog .4a.*fS 1fl'l#lOOJd 
a) rn44.'833ygb - 04134r0l 10 - 0.13340.4 	.0/ V4.Va 34# 417416 
81J7.41.,1Ai 	F4,147 
- 
,07W.F-V .v.I 	Ic. 0uy.t312 
0P.1'41C4 	F4..oy 0P.6R4p1.s/ • 14.0 -- 	- - - CflPll24 	LI 0#304 4 ' 	4...l 3#4... - 	- - 
h.. ..ea,', 13 .t r 'I.; 	.. 	Coadcw - 
$21 	1 1' 	1101' . A'D.,D 	.0fV44 	
l.1.1 	01. 
IWj/ 	b4'414.V' 
- 	. 	- /h'r.0R11.4 	f4g7 
4.41/.44. 
f,.,.* 	* 	0P....7j OPR7##(( 
144. 	3,j_7 	- 03444130 '3 
.. 	.......... 
- 0P4Q40114 	4T0112 IS 4414 102 4 #1 
- 	- .41 kimmep. 
44'V4A 33003 	04'1/72P.9 - f4#L. 	r. b.wooO 	Q.(. 
12 1344 ..'O V44( 	aI.Iao.b 
- ALStfld. 0,1LS7. 
3 	L1. 	1101 IouJ Li,'i. .I4415 	40PFl47oa #A/LS 	7'l' 	03.44414 OP$447,./4 - 
4L44M. or 	L... 	iQ.D ' 	1.54. p,.uor.R , -. 
OP.333 D4'- /34.414.1102 4 
L.EV4.L. a) 	#1 	 4411hp AtOr 	Ujlj4A0Wb 11344 
#414 C11t.4S 4mlTbo41) 
*141.V4 o.1 4,0/iD 
- e4mos 0.12) A4,00Y 0114.47. 
- 
Roo -v 
13 .aA& 	137 
414006. 
Q 
F11.E4 x 	0 1. FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SYSTEI' i 5 rtu Ligs 
INDENTURE LEVEL 	o1o11A1t. 
REF. DRAWING 	(4214 
MISSiON 	 L,pU,b 
 
DATE-MARCH 1982 
SHEET 3 CF_3 
COMPILED BY-J. LYGATE 
___________FA1L1JE_EFEC1S  
oure Compensutin; Severity 
Identificotor iem/FuritiOflC FA:LURE 	tODES OperotonoI Detection Rmor. tJE1HG-ER 
Nurnt,er Ia( t Furc!ior AND CAUSES EFECT5 E 
Provisions Cor.s 
13 	ASAX 	1102 .4)1A 064 	/1V 1/04 
0;' 	474S OP.(R.Mr/../4. /3 1(V 1104 £V'I.44 	R#.LE3. 
- #14.46 I/OP 4*/b 11 b44. '/0;' 4. 
w,rc.q ' 	4.41/44 	1Ih(5 1114 44414 1.44. . 
13 441. 1,0 V is £4.44. 1/02 	/e. AURILIV6. 
Yb 	.6-. '4 	4&.i a) ,#p.a&*$ 4I4V 6601/t60 £43673 041 
41.DS4. 
L41.W4.. 
I) 	 ' ,,4 •l 
A-4 7,05- opor-Ares  #3 XV 	/10 4 
- /3 £46 I/DY 0F4 444fia 4. &Oy 
pR4dc 
#4/ 	4o.fc. 44421$. 's Nl #104. b/P 4# 
#4 	Alpgw.VA 	Sbvr- 
) 
4. 
LI 4.c1/I/OP 	.t0CS. /o*.J1 	.4/S 	*.4e,1 A&4,&' 




/39/1 	I/Pb 	1;' - - /3 i_46 .''0?' 0P7.4 CA-00 4 4 04r1rWAID 	S /34444/47 
) #170.4344 
5/4443 1444474D. 440/b/V 444e46. 
134/1110/. 1IyP/144 	r//4r 	'.I46V#10P 
..*/Tft4T3 	P'5.( . - 	. 	. sQ/.qea' MI 
	4.42 
Il £4/I I/OP lb 	0PJ,I. 	l'IV 4.444;' 
444404. /4/ 
1) 	
TPUT 	4.I4'$ 	4'4b. j. OUR fl4l1.. 
/3 LALI 	IIO. £313A 	44*.,) *.MM3 0R04/44 
04,.* 	70 	0P.44474 D449lAf. 
OP4RørOQ 45 - 13 446 I/OP 
O PAM* l4 444 4 
ç £* 144 	" ) 4.34.1. 	F4144tI 	. At 114*A/49. 
 
4rn347 a).& s) #3 L4/1 I/Of 
ui rw&i 





1.3 h.44f/1 1104 6-ra, d/ #4,,r,4Y$S/1Y pp41v,r.6j 	,4'.4R/.T. 
OPE#..471.'14 Sn'UTb.*.JiJ  
/3 34.4/ 1/9/ 41./b a(oME 4 
DO.44/4 	DS1.461 1106 CA.'.1824'4P 
,811r1474/. 	ltE- 15441(111/04 	'LCI) 
4.44S' .'IDU'D 3) 1177.14.44 1.1444 	
$4.0G174 #4rw4'64". C4.0&4. 
- - 
 
0Y'/6 	LAF. DP4.R-'A/' S*/TbO*.)/J - 
- L4h I/OP OP4A4YV2 #47?- 4 
I) 
 /1 &144/-JD9*74b D4L4 ' 2b. 
4*441(3 /4744 	doVVbO.3J 
&) /47.1444 0414 2447/660. 
P4/6 	.p 	0;'. 	4 i( p Pgs 4f14/4 41(6 (00*./ -.1 #107 V,t.-11 
- I) 4.411 I/OP 0743.6702 M#.,1- 4 4 hClrAlb 041 /54344460/ 
#41, r4 740. 71.7744 41' 6134 
4442113. -v' ,, 
I) 1/IP0.34' 4.14113 '1044660. 
b611I.V. - -. 4I,4 444 £34744 
I/O 7 	13 	3/1/I V 	4//b 46/2/ 
z) C.0J 14416 	6.340. 
- 
7714. lI61PS.1D 	44 #5 	414,A14. 	A 	4/14/1/b 
a) 0.1/Pot. 4/441 31(47140.. - 	
- 
- resT. .Swç 	60 	4.4'.? 4.M?4473- 
04. 	'/4144, 	£J4'$4 	5..6/4/ 
I-I 	4.l1(.V 	I'/04 £.* 1 4 	//14*' J/P71'4 	0.447 
4414.5 	V. 	0P.?4r.6 0946497,41/6. 07434102 Is 
.,44. 	4ii.c/1 
 ,j 	2/ I/o;' 0742413*
•'/sww 	/C4,L4b - or .9. /2* 	4/4.1 
4/01' .4/4 R4.cb. 41AMI* 
4.96913 4 3) 
.41.76 .0147604 
z) 	7172344 	17237' 
.) 	UCL 	F4I 47 
 






F11.(4 30 P1 FAILURE MODE .' , ND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SYSTEM 3 	STq 	A5 6114PR.t,oil 
NDENTLRE LEVEL co'o.'EJ1. 
REF. DRAWING £4 - 2.14 - e 











FAILURE 	MODES Operational 
ode 





Remarks LOCAL IJEX1 HIGHER EtJD 
AND CAUSES EFFECTS LEVEL E FC1S Mhod 
3 	PT 	1114 Ps*u to 
* 
LOW 	Coy P07 - 0pcR.nrlA'c1 V4L's •1445 ,f 	J g5 p4 I114 	£.l is P41 iiit 4 
lZ4Al2 ,,,rre suç 	Co.irs OPSMS £4LV P*5 0`446 Laj*q4D. $1 POt lilt 	iliçd. $2 PO4L 	O*0 
t2O*TIG$J yy(I . 
' ,, 	"°' '' 
Wi1 	OurPoi oPuwç 20eY44,F V'AAVS il.i Pggse.& *dR40 A(.F •iPOi Ills 	"An a P&4N mf q 1rn, 	,. 	,ysy 	Sgl'I 
- Oi.s's 	hqyg iii bi 	l4RçA4* c'va.o'- £o,.I. ltIf,4r4'4 	adoraoi, , 	PUguv., l) 	Am - - - 
is pai.iq 	•144 (,l.) r4M 	V1 
- 
p10 	our P01 OPJ(R47/W4 kE4 V.44-1,f bie.j.ss *b• F.1 	Z$rif 12 PD. 1.14 	£011 2 	Pal. 	i'it 
Pg4$I9.0 r4lAdl hO.iifL.if. 1,1., 441,5 	AS 1 2 	PSAA ,or.o 
I) P.41113 
!1 	IIIR P454.044 S14*'41. 	'0 Loud 	Our Pui 0P62.9vl4?ç R5(5145 	Y...d4 lç' P.4.4su*e 3004,C 	46, in PA, "i 	LDi.l '3 P4.',/ 	,uq 4 
7.4.,1Irrg 50444 COlIT404 - 	-- 	- 01,4,14 44r6 1Wc*sp*éI.' -'voa1eO 12 PR a'si 	40w 114Y14r54 4.1107bo.. 
Cb.tcM'4E). SYdr4 
PiS*.'4.45 /1i6,1 	Oi,Tpul 0 P4.4.91 il/c - R'4.t6 	&tVj 146o.J&lze $3 PR SIFT 	.,J '3 P4$ "4 4 
*P5'14 	444..Y P.-.4d5 344(4 i..,.,.a.ifb. IS Pb, ,llr 	c.V 13 	P8.4 ,0*0 
13 	l7i0l 	hoW 
- 	4 
10 	Oui r'7 0 P44,rV,pI.j ?,fCY1Je V,44vc d,w P.e.g.,&s 44r 	V.P .3 Pbi#'ir ".4au $3 Psn"4 1 tV's 	s 	7o..' saw 
.4.50. ,, baa,-ia..: lNii.IY4J Allvalm PJAIW 	p4,44 ,, s. 
- . do  
LaADd4 
$3 	PPY 	list a 3,33es5w,,44 
.4 
' Aaw 	0 111 PUT 0PAZ.ATiA14 4. 	c/,; A/.44 10 £JCVCl..4 	Vtt's $0444 	dar IS P2'S 	
IllS 	ADW ii PsW.1Iis 4 
PLESCeLC 4(IAY 344,$ 	Pt. to PbIS OP4#1S 	4475 O.o,J1.4044..4b. is PAW I1l4 g j. Fmv,or4s £tnhio.M1 
Pb,1 
IS 	Pbi l. 	,IiS i, 3.cg.45,.rl4/, ConaIt6s 	.v'S $114 Al 0 urPur. 0 Zt1Y4s( V4(l( 06401 P4f56111E 50&ç4 	IVOY iS P4.1 1114 AL401 I3 	 1,'i/ 	/.'I I 
I4444444 IilD,g.v #ND 	P66II&5 opsils ha,-s ,,i b.s,wa4.c /.vt c..,r.4,,4gD ra pq ills) l4,ri4r 	3W4134I4l/ 
04 444 Ca47L4441 5.4,1.44.4. . 
(j 	P01 	0 1158 b'pf,.4E'lr1IL (41115476 	514444 /1,4 4 0 Ut P V y 0P.54471.i/ç ZCrY4AJC V.vt dca' ?e.%a.'.4s 50Jt .S C 	,Vv 13 	'' 
p p.,Wmt 4 
• P&to*u&, L(LA)' fs.,! )OIC 	70 034./5 	h.9Y.E ,4)l4cW4Zçif4.'4 d..ISOAL$4 3 P4,111,8 ,l'vrnrgS LdilS,,.M 
P.,su.sa,,g 	ID 







F'W4 30 o. 
SYSTEI f° S14 
INDENTURE LEVEL 
REF DRAWING 	6A - 114 - 
t'ISSION_eOkIlROL CONEXESS IP PE 
FAILURE I 1 0i1 AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
DTE_MAR:H 1,962 
SHEET z CF t 
COMPILED BY—J. LYGATE 
lderhfIc3tLon Uem/RriionoI FAiLURE 	NODES Operot,orol 




Rea arks LOCAL 
EFFECTS 
NEXT HGHER 
LEE_ EFFECTh NJ'LJOT Ioerf:Cct(" 
Funcion 
AND CAUSES 
Frovton CLc LS 
ror-er:ourf; 
FhoW 4 141ç.1 	.ypur OP5.AT/'I% $c4 	t/.uVf ç.1 ,yy 13 
P4F/ 11I4 13 rsrn1/9 4 
13 	Fr 	1101 
0?#IS 	'?T( Id l83c4'4ç( 0T.L0LI4b. ,3 Pill. 	lI/i ,.1,1,4IC35lIU1J m,qIrnrrfz çj zi-. 
13f 	1101 &43 
W14 y. 
FY no' /-3 r48J '//g 	pL,ypu 
OPE&4T14/q GYC4E W*V4 *j#1 	 t'( $I8ç 	f6T iS 13 P3Wdl// 4 
4J.JLV4*&.E 	8V 
I) FR 	8,0, 	CZ 	0""  
0P/ 	4TE /3 PA,1ll'r 
I,/,,4r5S-.Id72?D')/ 
R L4Y To 	PD/c 
&cyf D,L(yA 	To 4,o SuPP.Y RcVo.d 	
4V3 /ic.1 	E4$O S.'R4# 	? /SFW4'//#q 13 p3W,1 ,i, I owuvoo.0 	
iI.o 	8804 
s3 	'y 	810$ 3 	/.lY V(V( &ois 
V.A.'$ 	0VL'4 &055b. 
d .*-L4.  D41fCA 	41If 7, V,l,vg Lvuct 
z) 	ñ' 	5.- - 




.E ICAOS C D - 3 
bFazt44 Pgglowf 	$P#- ')  
I s 	 . 'r# 	, 
/ rcs' , PAd 11/4 i3 PM'1/ H'4 
o*Jr,C8. V44E Etsox 50 4ñ. Vil/ V4 	S IUCX 	-- 
P05, neWER.. 5 1uc 'W bss.q4e4.c h'..'s 
IGS 	-vor 
c.'rRO4J4T. 13 P411 ,,l-Z ,11f541s4 g'uri As v.s .s 	c.ob 
VO 13 F&//SF 4OW blA&1 UP. 
-------- 






rdArA 40 0 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
5"STEM 3ao 5i4c.. 
I NDENTURE LEVEL Cpo,iiy 
REF. DRAWING £4- -14 - e 




COMPILED BY_ J. MATE 
FLILIJRE 	EFFECTS Failure 
identifitior Item /Furctonc FLURE 	MODES Operational Compensotin; Severtty 




A1 	CAJSES P E C7S ro n erc.aur.  LE yE:.. E 	FECTS Method 
MOS&OaX j4jr&YY 94.t14VE FtESU 	_ Ni1Ve&izc. opg&srIl/ç ,/,. pssg R,,pm ) 	
'3 PAN 1114 S1 	Z€fl4R4. ,.JlgQS.DeN5O 50 
13 	P5Y 	I101 
OR ,,jc,o1 ,./ •g 	qgtr TO Li 	,3 	P*.4 site 13 	Ps,4,/ 	lilt tW1 	.W( 	/4L,/j IS ,' 
i 	P511 	ii 06, ,s ?ggss.,O1 j) V-*~Ve 610N Cegb C 1303 C.nP34'5- a) i3 	Well .4411 514)rD."d  sowr 	
,sl 	?..1b/5Ib4'ICY. 
- £,.aLbs 	24 au 1 j) V,4Lt4 - 53 	i'S 	,s14 	's 1  PSV •.d C1302. UaJNgVE4ib --r 	I8ACb 
-- -- ..-- . 
- 	 - 13 	14i5 11 . 	 - ..• 
83 	P.4. 	ll/. ..o..a he,.j P.ed- SW AY - ,e.rs_ra bmAe O.d1PY,./4 4 Si(aMA fP 5A68?DO..1?1 4'91 ,(t 	'gg,agae5m' I3PAA 1114 ,JP38J. 1060 '9' OasI 	 .1/ 
RC 	S:.I aI 	' s,., , ya#y 	Ie$a/f ONeR.ar.E .44A2.'I • 	ETU 	40 i3 3D1dCW4A4Z 13 P51114 	..' 14,1145f5 	.e5r 5V.Jroe 	l Is 	83 ?4I. 
FQ.gS.,Z 	P5 Ce...rrs - L.4' 	il 1JC4 /0 - ; P1 1114 	A.., "Alt M& 	.1ev 	.4,r. - 
s) 	/1pR1 1'4' C45Z. 
13 	P1 	,ii'p fteesiias e.'ia..s. ./,j _ )epoT 	- OPKR'lr'll<. 	- II  Jeff  II 1ll4 545 Y 0P51884 	N',,j 3P3Li Il/b 9 
511 	 ?,1114 	' 
- 15 4/3 ly/T4.Q. '1. N' /e:.w FP ) lf:454A185.qi(5 13 PA4 1114 	44754F 
C-.flPmS40. VO laltiaVS Swr taLet Ps 5113 	P11114 	iJs.gb 
tj lMP1160 uAIg 	1655.4110 :3 Pi (1 1 3. a.. b... 	Ps&eizaes s.s 	11aN06,v4A,r1. 
1103 	a.av. P.t 	E.ers eN' 	SMal 	e.. ,r.. 	£E( 	S E1 
is 	PS je 	848(. Ppgs5 v 5*v3 	SCAA Fq,a ye_ E' A/Ve. ./eair #-..r 4 Ifi 	IS PsI 1305 	P15 
- au. 	PO"PS 	.JIVLaI •) 	..,r'u.' 	/u45 - Y, "it  
8aa 	£.ag,bs a) 	,a. 	u.- 	AIAIS RUPPU#4'S 6655 	0/a 	?SIiYPC 	$v.0. 
8.4 	Site 3) Cc554 	.rS.. 
-. 	 -- S V45V 	) P slffal 	Oil. 1.0,90 	Ir I NS 4.ft flozccv.d z A..,.,,-as 3 - 
- 
.-.- - 
Punp 	31DPP613 L,n',lED I4%a5q01- - 10 
- 
4) V,ia.v 	;0121 ADS(D -------- 
Ca,iP.q$CSD5. - 	 - 
83 	Pr 	ties PLC45025 J ~v e4j~r 	C&AM&L hrqlLA 	7o_.l:i.ic.-s.. OP6&47.Wq - 	 - 
re. .ws'r,rrr ,/.t,11 /Ls.J .) 	ho.., 	5.d4 83 Pa 	./g 	£i&i' 83 	PS sliP 
45 
55'S6aR.E .44351/S (Zag 	5..ag- 	CA) IS P44f109 	A4Z( '3 	Pale' 111 Cf 	R4DS 	b...i 	5SVS360 
05/ Kl30Z 	5.48.-- - PS 1,11 ) 4.4* - BY C.ivoss,a14 	pf Ill! 
,u/b PA M Of 	:iN' 	P8 5881 
) is. 	Sçal44. IS P451180 	iRiPi ale 	SOQ4X 3 	Pg 	off If 
- 
- 
P1 	lI/if 	ale c..alra.s. 
PR 	88.3 )4140.1q 
:3 	I'S 454 	1119 s/ iaTfAi( 	iwybowj e,4a_•e b4a'4KA 0 P65418.14 su,ao.,w 	a's' d,.. t640Lf C#MP 56505 ii P454 :5I5 	SSAIiIa 0giCi4if 	,lI?l55iS q SD 	(esaag 	.1117,4 
166/SE . 	PQXSZIIU 5j653 ) ,.Ip,slg 	L,alS 	,6564010 I*fiV,*rSD 	•4 'N' 	41301 ZU6rIDW XjmL, , j 	SIllY - '3 	PS left 	i$iK3 J,I4D0J.1 b.IY4 1b 	os 	lIZy 
S..,: 1CI4 .'.' 	&SSCZ 	6:1.051 1) C.a,i48.y5 	.14K0 0JlY4a'A 6s.a.0Z Aao,S ii is 	
P5'1/ 	.466 S,r..,Fa1? 	j,.-gjarnlS 
o as..1 	..va evgo P"011 1 1 9 65r Fw,e,r ii 	P6:/ 	:0(4/6 C 50/ills 	0 £.JS.ill S.//is4 




c'1E4 40 02 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SYETEtV 	31c 	5rIP4E lAP CoipgepsIo.V. 
UENTURE LEVEL 120,fPoiIK.if. 
REF. DRAWING £4 - 114 - 
SS!ON 0zppff53/gE 	Pg.orr,o' 
 
DATE—MARCH 162 
SHEET z OF_ 





F..LURE 	MODES Operc•tior.ot 





Remar LCL IEX 	H(;,iEF I4 
ANC, 	CAJ5ES EFECT LEE.. EFFECTh M.clhcd 
53 P.% LL 	I066 P&K3Si)L #rn,.ArA 	6,6'Y- f4,45 	70 	bAW409 0 pEa41,, 4 4*'.'rbo.i.I 	v.7 IJPMA. 5 	I44RM OPf4 'Y• 	
'M"- 4 'r4 'A -AXf 	OR 	$1 	L4 lOAD 
I 71 Do..JiI 	if 	?RiAS- .) IflPDADE 	Liii( 	laoA?AD M,,v,4rdb 	DA/ 3dP.4.lP 3 
	Di ZE4PO./ A.1% 4 MIni 	, aibgsji 4cs 	lpvDo.Jh' 
Lo.-s). ,aj 	,, 	vso ) 	.Dü4e7.i 	Fig0 bAM4d 13P/ III1 It 
D.6.04Lç4. 	'w 3) 	.44d 	£iar. 6t4 	'.YEZ 	0 	464'i# 
swurwrly F*A £FffAC re. 
-. 	..- -- -.- -- 
SI KV 	5503 Ai,ro'v4r, ifsfr3 	
KSI0Z 1A3 	r. 	DI4R. ç4 	, 1,153 	#4D1j4 	70 1lU IjAra&4 siOS 	4'r Vfvrab 	i/.3 4 44 ve uc b 	or  
D• 2 	re LboKb A/DY 	OpIAI bib1.VQ.ZC 	do, Lb6rl 4.f. A1l41r0f%Alg0. 'm., Z 	6iç0- 
#4.4& 	£VSTKI7 IiV44db). vswrso w 00 C-AOMb 
?oa,r,eA'Aa 	5r.M- 
3) 	13 1(1 I0$$ DPKSA"7 - 	- - 
.''r 	 10.16 Ar 
V4AVK 
3.) 	£.A4WDl 	YIAi 
FI&V so/sos. ,I.j 	Qyi 4uipSylt rftf mn.s 	06 d.gw 	?ggoa £$4yw5 VAWX 5?Tb.Id. ii PAD' lIlt I s P3D'D'IF. 4 .4'stWAAAD 	ter Av.ia1P 
$U3J84VlOA( li1FD4D 	¼15&3*14 047' 1W 	K IZOA big 10PDAi3. It 	Pit viii 
5VDP 	£300 F40 - 53 	?i 	ISIS 
FDIAP 	OP.EI1 STgar OP. F4 W14D' R30'DdRD' 04W11#? 	Sr4 ,tr 
toO 	 57.. 
 ii PAW IllS 0 3 PsD's/ liFe 4 fr %toi.up
xiip 	374g. 	- ID' 3ab 6fA4 DlVPRf.iSOA. IS Pa Mn 
- .. 	- 	- 	-- .2 	P5 	iuig 
- 3.IL'I DOlJA/ 11700W F30 0A 3144I 	4#5 ASPi?1ID4IY D* Ii Ac.l 1,/p ,5 P3W,' "V 4 (*o'ag 	ZEV4"4of 	N? 
& 	30341. 0fAif3 534 £043013 	tD* 13 	OIL IllS 13 	W /05'4 T 	PPaarQP 
- - - . - 3 	I0S is 	PS 	it, V. 
0 
0 
r,44 1,0 0/ FAILURE MC .'E AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SSTEM 	 4s £o,fP2.555,P41
eleapeAteref IrDEt..TL:RE LEVEL _ _____ 
REF DRAV.'ING 	X4 - 14 e 




COMPILED BY- J. LYGATE 
FAILURE 	EFFECTS iciiure 
IdenWicct,on ,!om/Eurdona F,% LURE 	t.ODES Operational Compensatnç Sev'rity 
LOCAL NEXT H,dER END frrber orticclor,  Function 
Deectior 
Frovisias Ca Re mar 
rorrecu'C Al.rj 	CAJSES EFFECTS LEVEE E 	FEc1s t.ethd 
I) xv 	110 /IiyE i1viI0* AI1.5 	0P/ li)IDOIJ'I 2 	4/1b 	
32 
£741s 	4.4% p*eos,o.' 13Xs.1l,' /10/ OROZro* 5,VU13 4 ?*. 
V'44.,#j SI-llc. S94fA'f 	AIR? 1404. ,crJD 	r woy Ciacs l*#soorg4 	VALVE P"* .,i 4,m o',' 	,.13.v 
,) P**,t.#* 	5r.lo*. OPg./ ),4G'4.4 . 1003 	C4I 	 2 
2) 11o,r I(j.v5 	•4vL3 4'.D24b S 40 
'I 	II 02. s/4L1)E ?*.tM,12 	10 F4/A o 	0 PA/ 2,101 Do 	.( 2 	44db 	3 2 	ç Pz4'd2.J /3 'C -Z 3 Al  /,o2 PP.ecL*roA **9 4 - 
L0oJ flgoIl a003 ) 	V*,,v4 	4?'4cc 3Y413'I 	*4r /*4441P 	4 LoY 	/.1003. 
IVb/04104 V44/- PcIo 0" 445 
-tP C 1 303 z) Po&,v,,,osm 6rogx  
,) l/SUY hOLy'S 	4,A4,WD 
-Il k hi 	SI 0£. v'.IL VS P,inits 	0ib4' - o 	Caseo . oP.' 	
.4r/il4 L,ifg.& 	0 W C1303 , j A 411 I'D V 3i,1 D0J1I 13 	w z 34. 	//01. /54.g,/*"104 4 
- ..,o 	ro 	F..o.o ,) 	Vo,g 	svo 4.id( 
2o.U'b3. lWb04W43 V41164 I,11"/*Yf3 
ireafy 61303 10 z) 	P91 VI .14' 4. 	4 V0C& 	- - 	- - - - 	- 40*4'0. 
4 100 6 . V* . 	
*g 0244/ Il 4.4 .V I/DY 
) 	got 	3,714.1 	1044. 4*4*/Va. 
p44/ SWOrDOWAI Je'10,4 ,fJ dIX3 C1103 	01.1 #3 	4.4/V 1/04 '34.G.j I/DV 4 
- z) Pco,r,.a4& 	S1UO.0 /1 A4..VI/o 
£gr 	#V.'*Ir. 
) ,(*,r v'4i ,cO 	#hy. 	eo.0$00. '3 L.4A I/O V - 	- - 
- -- 
- 134444 	1102 
/3 	j 	-/ /101 £.Sl'SL C.oJ13€4 C6oI1g*L LIQJID OPSAJ 	100 	CoqjZ 	A& OP.E1lOV' 414-j 44O$4 	i,Jl303 13 S3SL #102. /3 4V 	
1106 '24541./IDa 
• 	- -- V4A.l4'. 4454k 	'H' o 0.101 144.4.5 02544153. 
6*0250. 4.O.4'I 	•'4L2* 
- 1303. I)ttsl 	3,rpuV 	PI€ rO 
13441. I/o? f2*v "04 
114 4.f0. #JAIIIOV 4 /.o. r ,V 	755 
- 	- o) 	IS 	LI II.? 	2* 
&qiDa 	7',çl 7a,.#dyrr5e 	6, 
3) 	13 &C 	,,D7 
tf,I4.qI..4R4m'b 	- • - 	
-- 114.44. /197 
1/4*2/-I 	5r0IC 
?os,'#oal.f4. 	S TJLIK , 0444/4% 
1.0 	143 	Va. 0PK&4". 4 o vwt 	AI C/303 /2 AJA.4' 1104  3,-/vr4w,/ I3/.44111 1104 4 ilo 	Oo,P.lr 	%gd.V 
5,64*. oP-.604r5#.. 1611 114V43 Sgrg D, 	/5 444 
,) 	4.0.. 	04 	do 	0,,yO4V II 4.4,1 I/DC 441 3 4.' ,,or 	#444 	VI 
041 	10 	2qA7 	Id 03 4/ /107 .3g41 
-- .o) 	13 	1.? 	//01 	ol . 4.9.., -- 	
-- £210 444 ?3 	l- 
) 	Il 	 ,,oV 1 *4 	01)12*11 - 	- •04 	9./L$ 	C9-* 
) /f'6L44.1241%D 0.4 70 
	LV 54'I /24.1 	4.944 
4.4.ol4b /S 4.4,. 1,014419 &/.94.0 .o4d 
4) 	?o,r'.'5* 	4721'*• - ,, 	e....., 
4.45//0S 4441m 
174/ ,.'Ol *1614/4. 
/3s 4.4 	1102. L.o 	A,.j 	i..5*1t4. ... og 	5V "0 1113 	0 	0o,4 g 41.6 0 04 . 	* 	4 43 	.' lD4. 	
'IOY - /I "A  0,074402 '3 	,*/ ,,o 4 ,o.,b 	04/ 	/2 
41.1.11/i Ir 	4.2.1*4. 	4W I '7P4 &4 	4.,4*3 	•0 	0Y 
34///O, '4..4io.y  
I303 75p/ aC1.J 0 Co.Jr*zt5 	'.JS.Cb Lac. 	/34_-•'fl - jZ LCt/ floP 
.3) 	0o10.,7 	4. 	1.1.' 4.- 	j7 	C0144'I 44. 









07 	 Q 
CD 
404 	 8 
04 
çf64 1, o 0  FAILURE MOViE AND EFFECTS, ANALYSIS 
 
SYSTEM 3RD 5i'4 - Lu (1Q$PlFf5,DAf 
INDErTURE LEVEL 	ppMSl 
REF DRAWING £4- 2/4 
MISSION 
 
D4TE_ MARCH 1962 
SHEET -z OF_i 
COMPILED BY_ J. LYGATE 
FAILURE 	EFFEC1S Eaiure 
Identification Item /Furnctional F..'LURE 	IODES Operational OcteCtion 
Compensating Severity 
LOCAL NEXT KGHER END Number IdertilicOtion Function .Ode frovisior CIas 
emarke 
tr.or1'er,co'ure .S AND 	CJSES EFFECTS LEVEL E FFECTS 
13 iL&i4l 11 ,04 ,  Ii,jid h'I401 L&Wt lilavagrE.' 	SNaIl 41 	l 0P,a1,NC1 5,po-a.I 	Wsr :5dvrDo.J°I br 
'Sy bd,raJb .q ,3 £4N ,,o p'a.s 4 jg 	U,14ZVF.OAAr co 
a, 	1.41164 a) IM PU$4 	
Li./$J 	lSOl.VSb lag. r, my l,J81141b oü gy yes v,/ is 4J 11CC 	W42.I /f 	 /5 hC (I 1101 f4,14D 
iw C 1303 	roe i 	.4ajF4cfs 	P.i4D 13 Ls,viy 1104 
bag,,4#/b. 
...,P11V 	L.o'4 	SNDa.14D. 
 Qpa*Cr.4 	JW. - •g 	3 	a-v I, 	b 
0t1 d.t QPgQ4l . 'faiiy 	/4f'4y4 Td.f 	3S114* 
13 	P34.1. lII( 4,..i Lo..a 	PmzsS- /sl,wgvg SWVMO F4, 	•jc. 	O6& 41w. PO Aa  
ii. 	5115a4144 TO $dvfDp..J,/ 	,/, 13 P4L114 41AI 13 P54.4 1040 4 .4IIA1 	iV4at6b 	Ill 
s-i. you giid 	if 	Pa.wuI ,) 	 /ggD F1 I) 	• 	PA lid/C 416e 	0.V 81 161814? 
sagD,14,1 IW#ViSVFd frIjllSSiJ. s1aJJ 	44 
dEoos.J 4.5 sqcç i)Csauvquy 	f..sab ///4 	4db i$L10. 4'7'b. 
II PI Ia41 a44i*'4 011*4806 ,uo.&- IS P.04.A li/S 	4.6C 	hi;' 
- i) 1/10044. i4*.aVID 	Le..i 
P*05411101 Y*IJ#0. 
)oaIyesv 	40,s 	311OPYX1> 
13 PfiV 	iioe/i Ps.s'ssusi Ee-s 70 	L,.o'r 0P42411m/ç - 
aW4$alE 	/4' i)4Sli'4 4(mLS £46 4 0i14 	VAsi'g 	40a*6D 	04' 
sr;' jPLves P&g461J 	ud .) ri i ss4rfL). - 	
. C.1503 	N'OY IJ PAW l,i. 4i4o#vS ,l'4'dI// 4 6;' lwrt6w.m SYsl6.1 
C dID 3 	4006 /*.V.6 	S ?1l'a6 	400.fb 
F.EO.6V6b WAW IS ft ,,14 */ 1o*14rft S.Sflimd 
24 sag C' . ;) .444V$ 	ID/Jo csSg60 .C44S6 
Z4XPq4 illS 	aug id,l /3 PCi, 109'5 •' 
V#d 440z4'D. ... Ciba 665 T.o 	
14' 	#5 
-- 	- 	- - 	-- -- 
13 	P5d 	1411 Ps.guu&5 là 51461 Si44 4,L5 	To 	0112.4r6 &,'i' P D,a. 	'IflP 445 £.er j4s P4rgv,,d 344, 	Au. Psivpi OPS*406 a 
- 	3 UIJS.mgI.r 	5,4svuD 
OW, toi/ 014 P11415. 	1*I4#0 a) 	11,4o.4 	A/C V6D - 	 . i/sf 	iVot, 1/Cifb 7iosr 64.01$, 3...4'F'D04.) i/ 3-,sCPi6b ?64.m'.b6 . 6rI1 
3aIou..# V4.. 	40 	511y40f#,6 
7 	/5 P5;' '$01 s) I /CPdu.o4 	I.,.1*3 /qis, bjWAAI PALLC.641#6 PONP6. 
J.,..p 	o,..ro....J ii 	dwrxy 
3) Co.114C76 	170' 6A6g02 1454 . 	. 
- AID 	/41i/46r/440`$ 	6-5100aI 
- 	- 
- . 	. i) 0?psf A,l.40 	APICIV 
-,- 	P,o 	A4 1r 
c,asoo, 7. 	- 
/3 P54.1. /01.0 L 	/..i, P465- b,,r,#r.s Si/i/f- F.0laa 	ro 	0PEs.4zA_: 0P.654r,dC /3/4 /D0 	- -- 	- 
54'10s1.( 41pr 13 14(4 /01.0 /3 P44 	ISIS 4 
) rnocA4,a.041$o 554' 16 613e2. AF Z1. 
/01,7,4140 ,d ir i,r 40rgag s..a&ts. - 
- z) 00PO,ax L,*63 De.v9.4b. £..'g'rogj a'.' ,J PS .'i, I) isau.# 
- 5U04 	54.sa.J/P•S 3) c..ur.qors 
. IS PS lall) ;mu. all - 
54& q. ;) 0.,pur hv.6 	6'.r;'. 
- 
/3 	Psi/a'J 	lug N,/ i4 	s- iabr,4f44 Si/aIr- £.O,3 	7 	044.0.76 OP6Q4T,4'4. /XP44'p' /,,q 3.lfD/au.iu/. .a(-;' L)dR4i164a.$b 
Sco 13 148/ II'S 4~ 4 LJid46v4m* 	AA;'6.4 
- 	- .854 	SaaiI?C.d/ Cio..d,J 	16 	61302 •) rn5o44,am.0y.4o - 
4,4.4D 1011f14760 	M'. 7&% r- oas 2.e.74o 13P/l,a  
l'7P0a.6 	&,oL 	/4.044141, . 
......... 
. 1,#.'V4*'0 . - - fIll 'ill) 	604/4 
i'440 PP.4.1 
/3415 ; i) &,ro-ur 	Lj..'.c 	.u.zr. 
'3 Cbif 106416 	 Als 
44502 404.1.4/4 
- 
, 	 iiJ d,.çy 	'i.g,i '#rs- 	s.'oi- .c,u.s 	* 	0P62.r. 0P.4.r,4 13 14.1.1 "/2 
'LIY DDiaji/ 011 $15i.EZ) '3 rs.w ii,; 4 g.i6b 	4i/ 1166 
.1 	s1!a.c,o.u.4 	f.,5 lox P4S4rOR.4 OOW./ 	.6 kiJ6z f4, .i.4'/3 /d,t,*'* 	0.1' l..s 	To-or AS 
Osla 7 54/ IIOCWO 444 15#'f '. 	 '1,45/C, 51.0744, . Iii'1.Jb si re ii.0  IidDiS/Dl 
d_ 4005 /75 I f 1 a-. 4.1 Y44t4 	60.4D - 4.. 54 11/ 14 '1!" 




fIYE4 (.0 03 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SYSTEM 3 Srç 4495 ?o,tPpE/o,j 
INDENTURE LEVEL o/1o//r 




SHEET 3 OF _3 
















Remarks LCCt.L tlf > 	Hr(Eh 
omeiour AtsC 	CJSES 
CO. EFECTS LEV.. EFFECTS 
13 PDCV 1115 ?ggsseg..5 94wLg 4iqs 5/$1 -too 	F4 4'1. uQ(rCoofl poSI'k',,,q 
4 s.ts 	 P,T(4 
Dge,4',ZlilfIlj. r 	PL6.'6'Y X 	CO64. 5.i*4 	R130 ,V,4r45 30 Oi/i 	IR 
v 	fA4.vE X301. sow. i) /IPI $554 	iIiiI OUYP$y is P41/ 1114 fl/so OW b4#14o(b. 
R,VVTbOi.JI. F11E4 O ç4r 
) 13 PV Sill 	4.oi/d0 $l1P&IT is PAW III s A4AL40 Jo Ps 
	IV -f4/.f 010 oJi.0L. - 
- -- . — 3) is PpVliJ$i haW/WO 9#1,T 
- •SPaWII14 
$3 vDic Isis 	p1,I o#rpur 
- 
0 1 PIsI oil 
S) 13 PP,IIIS 	A(14 w 	OSSIPOY 
Nd •Qveur 13f 	510$ F4,AAp 
9)!; FV 1591 	11,41/ Di,IP$r /3 09 1101 	f41slb 
$ 	I) )Y 1101 	0-4TE15 70 
4q,z 	5opp&1. 
-- ;) Vqswg 	Sy&'-v 
-- ie) 	giV1#Al.4 	51LJiJC. 
- . IjI$.V11D4 	*JDYVSAIT.Ib, 
IS XV 1103 v'sqvg a1.00,001$/ $'D. LWeYooi,JW 44s #15 /(130Z 440 	 , 
&WbDWP/ 15fl15 l$W&GAL 1,01 vewris V4 4 sv 460044 
SvovFlV 	4)' ,) V44V1 	4ro0 Zo#4940 H.p &° £r441. A-.wv 4 ird"Leb JWLIOAPVO 	5s'4( y4 t ° 	Sy4jl 
6150 WOo.olA/. 
111I,.i5 44$ Z)Poo,is,IIXQ 	5ro# 11615tfb 	fo 
- - 10 	415 PUWQ• 3) 	op V,9446 14,40 Congo. 
gyg4 ... •- 	•-- 
g.E 	 £5556 
O / So* 1/. 1/ 	4( YQ& STOP 	Bdc,.,f40iJ r411 & 	0 P.e#, .5 rr 1P OF 10,Fw Pee.s.igg c-o,,oio r 	Smap /S P4k' /, 1 IS 
Pok'H 1,/c 4 X.E Eb 	9p SrfAtrvP 




ii pH - £1141. 
IS P115111 FloP 
?PtF.9rid4 fOIlS Ye ?"a i3P4i1I/,5 ,. 	 , , iq if f*a.'a.E 	ggE3s4' 
R5.o4400/ 	04' $3 PJZ I#il 	lsl.,A 1 	V 1103 .I$w1 A/br 	Sr9avs'P. - 
#1 PI Il/I Ia... H s To 
£yab 
p V /454 _13 ,144.i/g 4s.D..Ai 	43 	-o p IvYPoo),./ 
AID 
Z 	 coflo 	3 ° Ar,94,rs 	i45 131(534 1414 l$oVI103 Vavrs . 	4 
P go #1 ,400 ) Vt 	s .5 vs rs 	
1/or /6o.qreP /0 O0J. 11014 I.9O V*-.. 11 440 	1. /').4F#. 
10 	.I*03. 5) ?oo,r,.'6L 	Sr.11t 
DPP4' IS 	PsiJ 	14134 
3) 15 	V 1414 	44'.11 A.Aea, 
13 PR llI4)s.c..s Coogr&ao 	Po.s-goJJ 
IS PR ,iiSJ/oew.,j 
C) 
C) 
tit4 70 0, FAILURE MüJ'E AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
lb 	 1) SYSTEM, 2. 	Sic,j (. 1) 	LOM?&E.SS1D'/ 
INDE;TURE LEVEL 0 o,ippi1 
REF. DRAWIN3 	64 - 2.14 
V. 155 ON 
 
DATE_M.RH 2 
SHEET ' OF 3 
COMPILED BY_ J. LY3ATE 
_____________FAILUREEFEC1S jdénlficotion Ilprn/FurCtIoncjI FI.LURE 	t.ODE5 UperatonoI Detection 
oflrsQtnç Svrity 
Number IOeflI(.ctor; Fur:cr,  Provisons Co.s 
Remo,<s 
- 
At 	CAJSES EVEC1, 
i ,v #051 ,d'aL,e Ps'r,v,lb 4ns to f41L5pPE1V sworbowAl 2 mb AoIb 	? £144is 	4"(S £o.irasos,od 
13X-4' 105/ OF.D5AYa 	odor3 
iclow 	1:R.o01 V4LI5 Sv.#o S6fA'// 	/1,, /0,z,..'.JD 	Jr  ,s 	('/002 I,JD,gAvg 	V4L30 C.S/3 eol P,s'd OV 	,jv 
C. #002. 10 C1302 ) Po.s, r'oo#s 	6r.'o.s. • 0P1l 4Z C.. p002 	45 	2 
3/5,/v V41v A034b . 	V 42 	(...u'4....... 
i1. 	V 	oS2. .fAs#I .. B1p..iS I3XVIOWI 14/), 	OPE#I 5401 DDo4O/ 40/b 	
31 
514455 	44 C.o'yps.'oa,od 13 'z 	/ ,osz 0F4940oD 	dpra 4 
Srssr ,) 	V*,. 	 - 5Y514#7 	day /O4 4 724 	/ 
SOIl 	/OOZ. /.bIa4re 	V'd,.c ,,j 	lots 
- V - 
a) 	Po&,v,o.,n. 	T4)1 
021 
) 	3f20)Y 3/,ILi/5 	f4,L5g4D3JD 
3 Jr V 	'3 VA  Vf Pgarnr3 6lJb50 o.r a C A. oa o;'AAt 
Sf/4/4 LSV4L 	,d IC03ax /3 444' #055 SdVI 004J0/ is S'S 34. 	1053 ,.'d,OS# 4 
- sc,e 	ye ,) 	VOAVK 	STvOa 
JL, SAS t 30J0/bS. l*'b'a414S 	V4V4V.S I.1,V,..f,5 
- - (son & 1304 10 
- 	- - 4012b. 54141b0.i41. 
110/f 	1,(,*,5 	I*o.0 	0.04' is A- 19 vI loss 
) 	,i 	SOPPY 14144. 
IS/La /P.e'/ 5,..'Lftrbo3l/d ,#•/ cw - G'3D2 	s.r I 	0Ip' 1053 
'SLaV 1058 4 
- 	-- - I) VA.-V4 
 
Pes, v,.WS1 	S!U,s IS La.i1 IoS c- 1003 04.5*' 
gaf 	?5.,Jf 
3 A.01PA. '0 S 
#35445 /D3 - 	- . 	- 
/3 Ac V 1058 ASV54. 	C..)75Q#. C&,,L LIQ3)ID 
,) 	Pey,.0/.g& 	4ruos....... --- 
0 jm cAf 	7vo 	cqe 	oa 04.54 "4 4,5054 	ml c/sax 13 4541 /052. 13 4 V l Q53 #14.34.4/052.  
"'t &A. 	#4' I41L b _0''*' (44,4.4 	- - pPA- 	fdrA.  Lao &4C,_ V V,.,.'.s 
---.- C 1302. 	. ,) #j.,i 	9urr.3V 	
p/S TO #3444. 1055 /3 1.3f /053 - 
541*V 	Id 4Sf..'. 131J1053 4 	y 	,4/ 	
r.Vd 
- 
A)_ 12 	4.? #055 	00 - 55400 d'.3 7aaIl,rrf4 	.5.. 
80 	#3 4.0 	#035  
IS £..44. #055 
3.' 4AV 	S 
- 'Q5IY#QOl.f 	S1.S 	- I *iors 140/,0 
VV £#'1100(.44 	VAL - OP.r.t.4"/d4. LsvSL 	..a/ (/303 
'3 A3.W /054 3#.ura,ow,.' 'lAo'?'l /054 4 4/. 	DuoP.,, 	#-g0.V - 
-- 	-. c4..6 g5D 51548 
oPsoSrSS. iw l4'4Y4'3 3S4•d 	00,0 	#34.44 
- 
,) 	 4/0 	0.,IP0v #3 4.44" /034 L4ur 
swWro.0,1 114.1 #052 040.4 	fl 
D.,S 	v. 	5suav 	'4' - 13 1.'/O$3 55415 ... 
s) 	134.1 	'osSos  
- 	- 	- 	V #1 	&c. 	#052 •V V_V__V 
10' d 	OurP#rVV VVVV ,os-c - 	 .. 	 a...'. 
1? s., -- 	- 	- V v 	q_ 	s0#.1o4 
/0/349 - 	-- ._. - - .8. 
L5#1057 	ssa - 	 - 
- 1141,0574.a,*14 
£3 &A. SOIZ. LVJ A.-j 	.av- 's....sosj (a.-.,lb 0'.sars OPfC 4 rWç '3 -' ,05J 	
'r /3 144/au 4Lb '4.-/Io5I04fl 4 Ds'.o.uo 	0..' 	II 
44.u4.0. 	I'. .,gO .3 411933 0444.1014 P..l4'5  ) 	.,,e.,.s 	 l.00.ar 










FcIEA 70 02 
SVSTE i f 	 0, OMpé,3lD ,i 
INDENTURE LEVEL 	Con po'."ii 
REF DRAWING 	 / 1 r  
MISSION  
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
DATE- MRH19E2 
SHEET I OF_3 
COMPILED BY-J. LY3ATE 





LOCAL EX1 HriE E Ujmbr Identi(icol,c.n Fur.cicr . _ 4. 	CAUSES ° 
DeIecion 
Pro visors 3_ ernorks 
r.omCIoWrf FFECTS LEVEE 
Ecc: c7s 
93 LS/IH IC52L W 	W'ç.l jf&4 i.a.v,.v 	ou b 	Op4- a1K. 0 P5R1V,Sl€:1 ay b'v.Qb 01? 13 	4l1 tosy 	.3 4 c4,1 044f 
u'si-'4 6p.I ,c 	L$.I1L .) I pa PI 	 L..j(S 	1044Y10 ,,, p. 	p 
I,J1,q1b oW 1 144 f 41/0(2 W44.  /3 £II 1042 
4I C 1302 	YaO a e.041447* 	?444D 13 4.4117' 1O(Z bo'4./b. .p*'•o 	.J-, pg 	Is 	ev 101i 	5.1 
)Øpp.IV 	L,a'l 	Sp/.a.VID. bota4/.r Opjaj&. - 'V/ay 	,w,r.o. .ps 	3g,s.4_ 
- -- 	. . ._ 7 	X1301 	,. 
is . 	P3J. 1061 4p.j Lo.. 	8185 /.',gqvF aI/v1a Fpa,, 	Ia 	OP.. 414. 0P447 1 I/ç 4o Siq.v 	10 £wp,ps.,j.v 	Alo7 13 PAILIPASA-A&A 
13  PSAL I fOq ca,r 	Rvrpa6b 
81J1 1•G4/ VAj 	,, 	Pagpa.pa pap /4044'(D 1?7U 	13 P44A /4/1710740 Pit loss) I 014471 I4#4 84/.l1w p,1JY04 ..j.J 	41 
3 MAZ C 1) CO4. 74 V 5 . 	" 1364 4*'3 U410. 
. -- 	- .................... 
b44"b. 15 P1 IOSJ 164/4.'W5 0P24478M ,..p.&- '3 P44./ #034 	Al-, 	4, r.  
fl,ap 	, 04I+iED 	L4 
4)0.vv 	4. tjE 	1p214 
13 P$V ,os/s  IPAIZA 1  fZ410,14 £,/Ae, io 	Li,, - 	
- PagosjE /4' ISPAW'06f 444*/S Ml 	I'43j3 4 O/g 	V.avg 	La.ge 	p4' 
3sory v'a&vss P&.issie 	•iI .) 'l,4a_,aalqY.CZ). - 130z 	I0Y IJ PAW 10Amens 13 P3,1/1/066 all 	 5y474/7' 
C 1 302 	III  oao4 a 	I..v4 	3fl1.t £A'4v40 s.l6 ,j pj fO&f ,1 
30 1161te. 7) -44'-VF 	70/30 00*42 £oC.E4b3 30 "44 IS PI '06/ ./,.,' 
13 Phil ioifq ..., 
... — __. 11) vAi../ 	.2./IJ.44094/D. . .. 	.._ .---.--.---- ._ 	.. k- rso, P2,(v4• 1.4 	
1JV./ 	14V4N 
L3_PSth4 1066 II,1 h'c. 	155. 5417-. 1.o's 	1 	0pp-oar4 	- Or,,vq iipqyh' ,o ..:: 
.
oIJ!_&'.z t) eg4V4 	244 /3R4k'/ CIS 524O 4 
.)/SS04.,4*pay43'_. 
a) S'VPM a 4/ 	,_,W5 /444.41,(D 
i) 	O73 DP4/d 







•--- '/r#qrEi9/1_ .71Lp%334#y4.p /3p/p)J4.3. 





- 	- i3o 	c, a) &ilrPur 	L,..'c 	V.zT - - - - 113 P  
- - - 	- - _.. - 
— ............ 
-- - 	 - - - 
--- 
-- .. - 	- 
93 7501// 1068 1/j# 	/1, 	- #J.vpy4/ 	Svi- 301j3 	7, 	OP 	414/ -- 0PK&ftr/1V4 10 -- 	- 307 DDaJ4/ thy U,sgsq 	// - 
Ac l3 o/ R4l4-- ----- 
,00 	- - 	4 
11/rpgghrug4/ Do,,a/ , 	k1301 •) T,iso 	cp,e*4/ 14'Llis 14',7,A-Y4'2 	04" 71 AA 	1g.r Oq 4 
- s,.j,io/1 D,ic,.i. 94 A' 	11,,?. a.) 	 524Y4 1).(#74ilb. T)F,P-.IIb as lit li&s - 
3) x: pvrAcvs4/pJ0 40E4D5 
 
172 le 81 $ 




rrl(4 	', 103. 
SYSTEI Zilb S 	tZ42 Cod?CL/cA/ 
INDENTURE LEVEL ________________ 
REF. DRAV5IN3 	44 - 2 
t'ISS!ON 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
D...TE_. t.ARCH 	E.2 
SHEET 3 CF3 
COMPILED BY-J. LYCA1E 
Identification ipm/rrinttoflcl rs-.1LURE 	(ODES Operoticinal 




 NEXT H,riEFr 





IS POCV 10 65 ?&ESOUZE R.5cva 	C,,A5 5i 	1óo 	co a Y''4- 
AOIL tiaz iv Comm is PswWlobs, 4 S.Ex 	.V44T 	fi4-g 
50 eI/4 	,v 	sirso 
Oivi6.E)4L I'. 	r&e,5v/r XIN IAS 	C405k. 
80514$ 0'I.t1301 
.14i.V(. X8PI 	9044,15. ,) /spy /061 	4,4d Ooypor. 
IS P5,/I01 cjy. -o ooj g,lVibooJvI. c,is.e 	Cox- 	L.iK$ 
.ji&a( 
L) IJPV I0 	I_D41/0 0011-0 r is P5/I lo5doR) - 
18 PAV iDU/P0 
- 	- 
. 	ppy ID4,34L0.o/W0 0u1Pv)' -. 	- - -. 	- - 	
- -- ,p.u/0g 	
4L4 
ir1301 -. 
- __• - 	- 
- 	 -- ) /3 PDIC iob3 	11141-I 	
O.rpsIT 1 	 - - 
- 
-- 	- - 
$)11 PP/bass 	004 04- 	OsiTPer 
) is si 1051 d,.' ovvr 
iS Fk ,otI 
)i; cVicc/ 	a(si1 DV-000r 
I) 
 
13XY1057 Dsa4"i6D 1? 
/3 PR /057 AWAAD
- 
.4,51 £OPP4.V 
q) V4j s Li  044 - 
iv) ?pg,100' 1-4  
- ii) iS KY 'P5k 	*4 - 	ifVvr$b - 
/qA oJDo,.P/I Fq,45 	C b. 
5,4vtbo,JIJ 4aa ,W IC1301 çs foaJa iS b0.LPJ ZOO iiwzaa 'os /54't 	¶t64 4 4-$b 	SI 465n'4( 
15 x 105$ 
4 ) 5) .144.515 	6/vga 2).C4E /101 
I 	5Y4ç(. /.$/514 51144,5Ss Ib,g.4váj 	V4A vi S71.5 
-- 5g44 i,o, 	4sz z) 7'op,i, p,j 	s 
Vsiiisb 	i-v F.smt 
-- 	-- t,_d'Sk' F*agp- s) y,a'i V4Lv$. FA/a Csoigo. 
- 	-. 	- - - - 
0 /507 dad 	(YULAI 8,-op 	Bvvr.to.J 4/L a 	OP.e/1 srvar 
.JP Sqea,vsv.- vs .ç ,.' Pessauve c-avoIpr 	Lival Z P4i1105 i 	P5 kW 1088 4 .54&Sb 	i 5rajtP 
/44. VS 4s4.sJ 	6.15/5,1 •) f.PP4 	5r,ig.,C. 
. 400 	/00/I ,i 	'5r44( Cv01P51$550* WAX iD/ 	,as.,5 
J" ml  
l/IIU4r$p 	5s'j'lP 
- 	- -- 	- 	
- 5104$. 
-- - 	
- - - 	gaaii 
pP$XQr,d4 /t'46 	ro Paxaim 13P4/.'ieaS 3 PsW/I 105.6 t1 fm..'e..€ 	sv,s./,ii' - 
8a$-40.d 	va-' 13 PQ to 	isro,aa SI 	o, ,vs-  IP1 alsar 	5i-/0 
- - ia 
4v..so 	as 	ro 
 
_i3 0 if I 005 - - 
Ys.J Sty' 	$3Q4 vAA Vf 5ru-i- -r'? 	*r •70' 	
/4i0 A0S5 	V00'$ 404 	i-v 442 0yts 	,. 	VII 6.11o.' 
- - -- -- - 
13 PP '°" 1 ''s 
50045 	00.5$. 
r. 	 a 
-- - 3) /1 - Y 1 00.5 	54445 5.S.04 
l3jR '0l.5J-0.00- 'v 	dov-. 	60/a.. OS'S 
- -- - - -- 
- 0.0/S0S 	4.Vb 	/3ay/DSS 
-- 	- 	- 
- 	- 
- 	- - 	- 	- - - - - -- 	- -- 	-- 
r4, 	 - 
#I 	PSi.' 	/0551.7 PuPS M' - g,g51g5 	£-.aas 14545 	i-a 	.'5r. oP$OAs'4/. 
- F555PJ 	A/ .0/301 is Pal 106 	gq s.- e.'.-.. 4. o. 	 Aa4.'oSD 	I'd 
.5'7 	V 	VS Pao.ang 	SI .V3Oi ) 1.$ '14. 	4304 5I 	- - 
- O.51a.otçs 4'Di 53/4 I065 	.00.4475 I 3 051/1 /0 
- - 
- - --------- - 
- 	- 5o' 	Islist /aiO 
ci51.445 	08./Id 4. I4./Z 	4,00 	&v,4b - - - 	
- ./ty 	•/0 /30, 0081414., 'ko- ,n,.'-*ili 	 .S/ - 
- 
Pjp 	£.es,D3 3 	'(Au'S 	/o/ 	C#O63 	-- - 	 - 
- -0.000.E0 	5$ 04515 0 'oPS 0.0.15143  
r3qk C, I) v4ss'I 	ro/li COPS.CD 
51.051 	0,. 446 iv - 	-- 1/44. 	7p5 	05 	101.052'. 
01 
FF1 	30 Oi FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 SYSTEI' i 	 &s ep oy pp ESA  
INDENTURE LEVEL ePP0r 




ShEET_' OF 3 
C Or/PILED BY_ J. LYGATE 






j-br rticcio; Function 
E*tec cr 
Ft ovisions, 3 Ss 
AND 	CAUSES LEVE - E 
13 * V 	11>01 3YP46. 	13w'J #003 r4lJLs SWUf b0) ol c 	4b S it SYf4,C 	P P44/4/ 13 kzsW 1001  Oro 4 D,J 	cv#c.'T.ob 
,)RJ,Jç 	54tfl)P ') V4 	£T)C0 to t,, 	 5T.47 '7 	'9 b,-+1'g0 D(V P', od 	o o r ó o/go#' 	cWv) ..., 
) Po-,o,.j& 	S rucr F.WI1 	C 10/ /g.1c. rl #00, 	'5 Cqac4e 	.140 
3) WEJ I VcA Ild '*s 4tD bolrof (,JAW) 	ow 	#9 
- 	 - - - 	 - 	
- 
3 xW 	#002 'I4V6 Pg,,f,rs 	/3 7p 1• /4 0Pf./ S W.0 r BD.)#I #Q 	4Bpv',( 1 3 xzso' /002 
0Pff'-4T0 	OWL//S 4 40 	98OW4 
11,.... rn. ,y •) L/0 I/.(45704,c ##1004E(S 	
OAT..! POi/e OW 
-. 0001 .0 /100 •) 	 2 
- ro 	C , 30/. j) l/E'Jr 	v4A L/$ ''t 
13 	P1 	101/ PORE Jyzo45 SM/j Ill'S "I 	S '4 d4.& 	- - -. OPif £47,iJ<. ,.,,p&L/00 0 Q #h4., ?,oS.so.LRS S,/.'rDD.4#j OL,,o-gb 0L/Ezspb 12.13 
4 
lOb/CAf00 	.11b 01 	K 1 1201 ) 13 	PT 	l0l 	##qW .5lI/lh STOOD 	.I A/. 
 #0 )),soW4z4O AL4a#s .V..0-' 
0&'TR0ALS2Z iO.,,sRo"o z) ,i 	Plc •o, h/4.E0 	S/OcT - P'o.c.i 	5.1..?./ 
O.V4,1). ,j. ( #1 rS od 
13 	.LCV 1003 1 14- L 	Co.jr,o& C.o'IOALS 	I,o,b 0P0.0_100/4 	09 004t.IA/4. .L.T./.O4. 	I/i 13 455 1001 #3 )./ 1003 '4.01 	I..) 	444 13 A54./ /001 4 %4.?jf 	I/I 	LéL/E 
- /T( 	li! 01301 #'41LSPP.14/ 5.1301 	241.6 OPT.m'O C.445.D. LOrE. 000g 	
,O.VW03 34Trde 4214//TO 
O .fpjl  A.. 	or-AIR - - opsiOrDO AOrEor 4A4/o0lS. 
.1 
	
13 47 1003 4-AL 	Al 244-/S 24.4...,( L5V4L  Ava 
-- fr. 	is 	L 	#0,3 
1 34-44.1 #001 /40446 'Z.IV,003 
51.)oo 
4 	PO4,r,00.'U Sp/c,( 
s#/,l roo140 _02 0P40$T/A/. #4' /3 /.5#f41 /p/)0 ,'.3'P.2il .4yg 	/) 1.4W 13 joWn' #001 1 
h""_'4- c-3o/ 	&'so- op400/Fo. 44rE. , ..,r#ore-s 	....o'- 
.) 109 00 	1.10 	0u .ou- 1c1y 444- ord.(Q - b.911. 
&) 	'3 4-1 	1003 A ,4 W op.,..roo - 
b) 
	
13 4-C 	'003 
Pf'S€$l,00140 - /3 4-414 
/007 4EV.4L 	D-ib 
1) V4.ve OIL/co ,.ov4S S/Fl 
1)  
IS 0 / 	10 0 3 1 44 ,/E l'eo,ur$ 	00.10.,-.' C415 ST'- o P5..4rWç A 	11-44 	
#0' '3 L 4 /c'OP 5,,/tPp.dd. /3 #O.~ C 	'.03 '3 LO1OW ,'Ool 
. I..oU A 14./( 	0/060 '3/ ames 4LA..T4- ,4,e,rg3 V*L/-!  
- (R0#'Y 	0/30/ .) /,.,r,01I0 	s razic 9/01 
IV 	C /002 s) VL47 vo,w- 	1A,..s 	0234' '2 /4/1,001 #4400 023(04/03 	1Z 
a) D5/0P/ 	'4/4S. "#.'o A.eV0#.o 
Dp9'J - 
OD  
/W4 go 01.. FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS  
SYSTEM I1  Sf441 £A 	PS/OA/ 
UDENTURE LEVEL '/r 
REF. DRAWING 	4-i f 81 
 
DATE_ MARCH 1962 
SHEET z CF_ 
COMPILED BY—J. LYGATE 





FA LU RE 	t ODES Operational 
froo& 






PmOrS LCCLL NE) -- H6r1EF ERr 
AND CAUSES FECTS LEVEL E FFEO er 	d 
l 	LSJ.L 	,oO EAT1.4 	Loi.J ,9p4'p41 
O,vr/AIç. #003 - - /3 L4L /007 /3 .&C'J bOY . bl'YA#Jb 	AJ 	IS 
L$/. 
.E4 	£#)tT#/ I3.k11lOO 	## i) jFiPU. 	4j.h0 	I64rt #(T 	
Co4E0 4448.ItS e.&D4S loop 	#1PAJ48 	f4,4.#8O/ 
F4/d ,Y41S 	%'4.e 13 	LOLL 	100 3 L/ lOOP AfAeS . 
0PS84,PR. 03 .L(l /007 
C/3D). pi,y Pit r 	LI/FE .SdDRILD. bOEOWDI oP.ez41'2r #*o 
DvEoIob &#/F. 	i..(V#4 - 
$/F(I43 
13 £ 3,1,1 /008 .f.po4 	Ihç#/ I#Jir,qr.fO 6h')P P4/A2 	Yp0PE/F.Af4. 0P.629Y,./5. 13 	
44h'*' /007 — 6o'd7Ri0W/I Alor av DEdv/Fw 	oR /344h' loo  V 4 FOIAQREUJ RFvPq4..a' 
.C4 15.L 	£i.JI1-.1/ Dou.J 	,; LE'1E4. t) FlYPiIAO$ 	LI/lEO 	IhOLAfEb 
./FY ORORPZZI 
- 
/Nrr,4,pb 	OLI 7O r. 4iAPh3. 
1A) C/30/ POP 3)C0474#r3 	Aosob 
) DOTPOY )J.IE 	4g1E2,. 




to P3'I soot/if Piwasoar R$AF4VE £4445 £4,.&o 	ye 	2 ,of 
pl-p.4r,bJ6. P&L56Joi.r 4/0f P8Pgoi/O.4 	#4/ U8EV4442# is Po.Id #007 8 P/FE 	VO4i'V 
	A.0&X0JU  
4FhV47 35h#R.f 	id ) #1/6 C/lb. 1044 
P.l$) C../30' 	E.43/F 7104 	T/l.'Ib D 
"i' m OP/F/I 	Dl 	1vr694 0o# 
— 	 - - - ,' z) ,/q/iI.e 	srb''. C.o/lOED 
.. DP#M#J. 6uoifEdl 
4o#oi 	VS *o 2) v*&vE 	?#If 	od.fT. 
IS P6k' /003 44 
i14L11& 	70/17 	3*'D1 
,3P 	too V 4LIM 
IS PLIC.7 IO'Z 46i)ff 	1#iFE- o0L0 S/b.c 044O 	OPFM' 
opD44r/A'<. C..1301 	/l4P03(D '3 POI 1008/f 5#/U1'D....3A/ /S Pit*' 0002,90b 1 	7'5/lW /001 3 I1,z,vs 	A'vsP#i 
FR/F//rI/lA- 4PIUM I/I 	K/IO/8.Z_ j) is PY 	(DOl. 	o.,.,/&o 0//Pu? 
h' sr:s' k'irq' At -cip S P44' /007 /4111/4 7/F5 	5k'A'f 
i.) iS PT It OS 	,1/F 001POP PR.f1SUR.E. /4 PSI) 	100114 A.4VJf. be 
.4 4/. 
15 pbq 	04l.4 WI/Al ou(PO1 0PK/F8 C(dL 
is PDIC- 10031141/4(0 orPdf 
,s 	'cu iov 
)15 	PbY 1063is.J/#I.0I'PL)P 
o) is pt 	lool 	4o4fiJo OoTFvy 
.7 
	
if PV 	IDO) 4.041/JO OiflPilf 
t iS'./ /053 	i/EN/Sb 
q) vlbLvS 	81/ 
/0 PoSiliDI.Jit 	£rVc..  
Q 
111(11 	10 03 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SYSTEM , 	PMIJAI.5 P.s-u0A 1  
INDENTURE LEVEL Cp,po.'r 




SHEET 3 CF 3 
COMPLED BY-J. MATE 




r. E 	-4E f , )'7 
E lap rd:  cir 
Func!,on 
 CJSES to 3e 
Frovls ors 
Remarks 
I. s- ro 	O.e24Yé 2A71A14 4(0 S#.'44 	
'6 A/. I ISPAh 1002 if P5. 	#064..' V r 
1S 	P.S&L iS09 .1Q4 
00.4 01 	Ic 
10 AILS IAIfI4'4 	•iI is P1 I602 C*50' 	44/Y/4f5 lflPII.S 	Li* 	16044?.0 
#c ,o# ,.*.J a) 	. *.j,'AcTS 	cI!26Z1 #6 P*L.L 	F609 
b.fflWdb. IS PR 1eeiJ g4IYD0.)*/. 
PAC"OeX FAI.L4 3) 	C4,86A1b Lo - 
osvea si 
640J 24 A4&; auYPr 41AIe 	5*'04". - 	-. 	.. - 	. 
.--. 
-- - 
?R.E56 	4• U PP S 	564( v&r r4/4S 	fo 	0?A64 1 
5 r4,e r ()' ZfAu 	01*. PUff? 446 L4f.CA ?Y 440 Z'# T.4 7) 94/ 54i.VAI PrnyP 0,'96 3XQ 3 54i1L.i*.* 
iS P.SX 	I 60 
- £L)17C#j . 	p.1yp 	si*.i a('i 410414D 
aq.c 5,dr59_.u.. Srofr.66. ?UP#P Qf 	.Jo.),I.A 
) 
- 	- 6su6.4 480I 
a) lffPU466 4,46d 	Sos.4r47. • 
rr li p  
- 1.4 	Z& 4 3) 	Q14L15 	I6T 
4.IAIi(40 	0 .q) 0.JyPi)T 	4jAJ 
I)'6.¼  
S P.S Vi,' /005 £r 	I/,ç,/ 11,1147(6 	i/.ry- 6.9f55 	10 	0P4R4YK. Or(641#W4. If P411/f 
I 601 uiooJ4 .107 '5 PAW 100 V 4 44D 	'i/LIJRI(. 
I) M'3*.44,AI*.4 YA'b PILS-56•/Q 4 D.1. 	, 	61601 
f41442'. • .. MIII, A VA 	0*' 1*. 	7667 . 
- - - 
bcAl.064f *( a) III)QA5.E 	/AS4 	4(40 
. b#.c'o. Z1e'isv. '6 P3#I'#/ IPAP 
*. 	7)6 0Y5 	,6db '4 .IC 
0.' 	iS02 b'- 
- 13S 84A 4. 0olPoT 1S*.I.6 	64/DR1 
•063 S441?2l0J.' 
- ........ 
i6 P4,/  
,S.i( 	5465*04 
is is/f/f ,00q 1617I4146 	64Ui- 7'*6 	
10 	0PSRP7E 
6,Pf641/d4 iS f4i/W #904 SV.'rJViJIJ *.' V*.fD .5 IAo' ,00 d# UUjR4V41944b  
I') 1H16#0CO3)PI..( 	04/45 10 pCRr.JQ,( b,,U.i 	,( X#SW 
1)4* 7461 	96 
 
Fif/L40. . 1a' 	c/ 
%.J/ 76.1': 33M.A'4644 	70I7P. 2) 	 *D. -. 
 
- -: 	. AW.46t.. b4'M.W 5C 
) 	o,1r47s 	.'.'50Z 
I.IAlA!S5 
4) o1'pd1 £14/4 	56'D27 
14I11. 	0P1p.4r1 
/4t/r,.,6o 66'.)?- 
• -._______ . - --. - 
SR IV 1001 /AAv'E 64*6 106$6 445 (4j• 
3y.)il t.M4 	Ic 5496 	6*2166 616I.fy 	73 i5 x264 	dcCl 43 	LS*'YSb 1/041/4 	1#C$ 	4/0,' ôP45/ 
I 	AA 4 AW I)  VAV4 	.sv.co 
1.51*14 	,?.(.t/11 b,o4r.45 	.1V4' 111,L0' ,6W/QS2 . 1,6* 	P1II.4 	514*45 
5Y31e1 PU&dç ) 	
6,.4& '.'24.Eb. 	.. 61691. b.'4245 £P40.' 	
Sq 84 	ç. 
£,6'VTbDI. 3) .1401 1/4/4 	040640, 
4)/S 	P3. I5,0 	boos AfOY 
- 4? 	z* MR 4. 
(I P(' 	Po4*,0o2C&6' s wvrpp.a / 4A 	" 	,S?6,,,. 60p*il fr. ii- ,.z 34' 	700/ dS. 3 7,4! 	0514I1 	oAf 
1/170. 	e1P. 5/81, o*J 	*4)Vg ,4/b.*4i'45 4*.qoAf 	5v614fl' 	660.6.) ) 	6 P6* I60 	0744/5 






qo o' FA!LURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
 
SVSTEt. 2,Jb 7'94.E PIPLAJ.JI 	1o,IPRL5./AJ 
It-ETURE LE\EL 




SHEET I CF 3 





, -. rLURE 	t....jES 
.. 
pfroioncI 





A'C 	C/SJSES EFC' 
is .*'/ ,ol v43. VE ELIiIy5 	, 14i..s oos OPXCqr/A/A 
I.AVLL #1/ &SF IS 4.4k' "OSC IC 1.5W/I /054 /5 ML1.4 101/ is 1.611/I /054 4 
9*fE iv rLO.J IV4LV( £711C9 MIS", 
4h4I15 14117141Z% 	ifr'6'1 lMD,94145 
C..'SO' Poi,fw.44'& 	OTOCf 
bQ9)iI. i#. £6/U? DoUJ6J. 
W 	0-loZ. ) vsvr VIA v.6 14145 OPEN' 








ISi,i:/ 	1055 AA-ACA C0&T14 4.JfRo.&s 	1.,q2) 0giJ 	 0  OPLQ4T,914 L.fVLL 	
il/ /5.651.4 /0.(2 IL 	.IFPjI CA/If 	sin oP,s,.roQ 4 
/4hV.f. 151151. 	iN' 4IL _OPEAI 	
- c..l50/ 	.44J4 OP(R47.EL. 105.f6. 1.41E b474fd 1414 - 
) #46/ 	0.6VP01 	FC9IV 4i..t 	07/I.f8 ../4 	Ain. 4' 
) 	If Li 	1055 	.. - 	-- 
1.4/. 	L  4r',4i 5J/iF7OdiJ 
6.) 	ii .4.0 	DES 
15 1./944 /055 
1.) f(s4c4.&Ia crIb 46/IRA/I. 
UlsVf Aroam  
- Posii#'4 	671,94. - 
,S,4ur 	robI6I6 	D OPAZAT/4'4 1,EV'$L #9/ /54S11,V/DCA 5DoJi1 646154 	/..)M#/ £)PLgAfoR 	f1 4. 
- 
_ 
C4/1.5C1.00s. 0,50/ 	,6.fS OPE/IArE6. .44rE. 
J. • .4 O 	4Ø 	0 U I Pdf AM 04w/IlS /.f$44 	
94/)) 
fLOM 4.4A1 	Al 	.Z'5f5 ,./ifl4IS £4'j'7 
IS 4? ,o$6 ,5L.c#/ef/%4 
I'llt/,474,3 	SWUi- 
bD.4A/ - 
- ._•.. 6.) 	.5 	A4 	,04E 
44sRN6. 
If,ó 	4,A.4i.Eb 
- - V4j..#.f dfiJ 
- 	-- 	- 4) PD5/7Io4'L 	.S7lA4. 
,6L51.4. /05 ErR/I 	4.0.4 06.0646. 166,/1057 l4uIii,0?SZAf.f Op'Z9r,d4. :çv.v - 
- is i/9& 	0 04$ if4.1#0SS .L#Y44/ 	CMI 	4444 
ifi/in 	$.Ui4c.ij if 	LAl.54 	I4i.€S ) iflpgi.i,4/...i56 ,Doi..cr4b 	- 4/Of 	CAO6Sb 
4469Mg C-/I.06g4. IifP4ifa 	1.0W 	1*1,440. 
#../ 	. .601. z.) 	JIA/.15 	fILLiP .5 	 /052 
IS LI lOSS 14446 DP(5Af94 )pTEfZ 
-- 3Loo 	Q" 	1/6/f 	66'ISYEb. f4/4. 
f4,. .IRC 	bsrsiv. (4Mj 	1.5.155 
Lb 47 94If0p.J 4./b 	iiI7i4f4 
IS /.4116lI054 Ere.4 	/Id /N,r,.QfgS LW/f- C4/L6 	to 	0PER47$ 0P.&.f Ill Ai4. IS 444W 10 S4 - 
.0p..i6/ 41'? 'bffIIfp .5 /51./Id/Off 	- 4 tM.t 	11f4h/Ib 	(41bU0.0 
1.51,14 	S6/,f'.1 bo../4 	I 	L.fCM .) 	g #66.6.45 4,41(6 	/501.4750 '4iE)) 
'At/9fE0 	99/ 4.445115, #521/OS 
ii.) ./S0i 	190 .) 	.JT.64.i4 	4Ue5b 
04 i"EVA. lWb#4Y45 P.Mrn4 - 





is 	PSv 	/05/ 1: .S4Cf7 fJ5vf 04,1.4 	Ire, 	h,47 cpF.M.4I/4 ?RJS/4.( 	
419r P955502-f ,.I 04 bg,r4,b pR i5 P5 11/W /064 4 0415 	i/44V5 49C44i OPfi 
V4i. 1(44 P.(6SoQE 'N •? /lgc*.. ,P*It4150 
546..51/-(b. . i6C'( 	5vC,69 ,6/,7,0'45 	9.9'?'?- 51 i4T554pR (#67417 
.'iO/ 	, Z 	'/491(5 	%'i.s 	Oa6I5 .10 8*2. 4 
,f 94.1 iD&O D9,*Il1 
&D.Vf .40 14 C. f 6411(1 	70 	'3 	#..91D 
FileA -40 02 
SVSTEt- ZS14<A ?PlI. 	0#fPL64l0A( 
INDENTURE LEVEL cppi,vr 
REF. DRAv.'u:3 	£4- 
MISS014 
hAILUKh MUU ANU 
DATE-MARCH 1962 
SHEET_ CF.- 3 
COt/PILED BY-J. LYGATE 





FTS Nurnbr on:.ccuor 
Function 
AY:D 	CIjSES Iode 
Frovisior 
LDj #vr - gi&s 	,'o 	oprAtsfre. DP$W#-. .a 	ias 	To 





ba..J.J 	if 	K1$02 gflpi,i, 	U456 	l40LAfb ZT, 4k.A 10 JA 
p/ AA&#V3. MIIVI4YL5 41i/- )PDDii/. 
bUCf'01  PasU 4 	..tqmyA 	f,sD If P5i 	,oq bg4dD 
$1 P 	I0Q7s.jDi 
, 	Pe 	e4s Jrs 
bot..)$i. 
pp,MYFe.K7r 
f*L 	$o) i) 	Sc-4h,D9'0 s,i 




IS 	PsWi/ 101.6 n', fq4 	4d 5,111 i4J,vlY4J II4-5 	10 	Lo;,--At of 
f/ /' /04.6 - sdPrD4J.1 1/a' If PRn' /o4$ 'S P4 10
, 11 4 a-ve.as. 	i05. 
Af,.riq;,Av 	PAI 4444115 1f4,alf*4,S 
- Pax s r uR.0 
>p0ji if ,,S01 ) 1fl9L14.4L' 	h/ATfS 	16-I471,f$ 
bsM4*'b. , 	pf 194.5 ,g p, ,, As/f .  
- £uJ.Tc,1 ),s41445 	a-s- ) CairA-r5 ,4 	4 	'- ,eO 4's L#4i11 	Q 
- 	- 125 	4. a o* ,Qglr,o 
- Xts 	a 4 . 001001 	L#..f 	0I/9O_ 
 
is-vomw 4,,y4ra-S sia.'za 	r. 	oe.50- 
0 .5gr/i.ç •  IS 	 ,avo - ,ipp.jiJ ,1ç-j j 	 5. , 	
1400 DO q 
IS pst. 	,op0 sig, 
ft4,4-.Cb J 
1C1403 504110.J 
P&58402€ If 51302 b'/A i) 	,MP$lL$g WhIiO 	/40L475D ,SPR ,04.S Irny,,v,$ 	sflW- ... 
- 0JSTC/l__ 540L5 .444.2 1)  Co,JY*CTh 	614vb - ,a,sar44 ft4Wo bO-1J- 
s) a,6c42/aftTD 25S4UZ.5 og11ero& PAYXCA 
4) oorpor ZjV( 54021. 
. I4ALMI4 ?.zCesoae 
- - - 	- 411b 	,.j,f,Ir$S 
611 
751114 IO1. IS' 	 - a-ioa 	-j/ irnl,#vts 	set,? - f4/45 	
l 	0p.554Y5 C)P.524r,ik. IS 14n' 	/01.,  *ioy 'S 	
14/1/01.0 	. opgyp f JLiR'sq.&s5 	crs25. 
-- 
- 
VP32.41.'9$ ,F 	#,iSDt •)1?K.2J?05OUP4-f 	i'fl5. 
/4,ASD. 
a) 4s45,5qqf2D 
 ,,4rsb 40SMS. 
is T 	1061 
jwf wrd	g,v( 
1#s'P. 	410 
- AG 	TlfP. 
I'4M 	4/4/4(4 IWIII4fF$ 5',I OU 
- 	-. 5ao-fD5 4f ) o...uraa-T6 	FL,02'A 
D.IV?0f 414 	5//OQf 
- 
JS PBC-/ I06 Pgszu( (i/LWY 	SUç.' 
jJY 	toO 	rAa 	DI 0P5.2A',A/. Zu&4Ar 	Oo*ifd/ 
,S P4.4' ,.oa 
l4,*. ,s P4/I 
iS PSA'H 100? 
4140 	*3 PSI/k' 'Dab 
D 	5.'T/11& ,j 	i( .50 'fz - CLOSED. 
,tr5M f4,4JD 
MAP  ,a,,r 
- c.o#Jrao,. 115LV5 $5 poz 	.1, ,/ A,qPuT 
AOAL. 
0 04*1494 
11,1 	P1 IDea 	4.14/We DuifiUl 
i) iS PDV,,e;a 41.14f4 	O),?UV  
P4'O 194.4 	/I4iI 	•.J1R/Y - - 
- a) .S PP,' ,aez a 	4"e1/ 	o/YPUf ---.- 	. - 	-- 
) ,a 	Fir ,,i 	*1(1 00mor  
- v) 'a 'Ii,,' 	,4,d,.lrPtir 
t)'2 	..1,.$5 0€c-Eb TO 
4*a 
0YO 
'.1 P03T,P*'fO 	61*11.1 
5Y,o43 	Ai F1 	'I'-')Y5b 
/3 	i1*/ 	I1.1 V.qh./5 ,2C.i925 C-oC&5D 
7D1rgAr,A14 CLV5a4 - .591154 ,er lsPsdd ,.oair 4 
2f0VC4* 	INS vaL.'f 	57 ., .s ,?*- 
,140'..7a5  






	 FAILURE IODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
S ''ST E t. ! ' 3mtc ?IP.6.L,A1. 	120#1PR454/O.41 
Ir:ETJRE LEVEL 
REF'. DFcAWN3 £ - 2I 
t'!SS'ON 
TE_.'E 	E2 
SHEET 3 CF_S 
CC_E EY_ J. L';'GATE 
jn;;zor, Item/lac 
iaerccr Fjr, 	or 
LURE 	3E E 
: 	 C/JSES 
Operocnc 
"CZ' 






(OIL..4 	P44 0pEz41'4/4. Lo'../ 	P& -U09S St 	P's /aa - if Mi 1400 If PJt 1400 4 
 
,S Pc' IOfl. 
s.ILE ,V K/SOS ,) 1.4 	,cgsoa Si5Y.SM. //4i1 	Cl.W /1/ 0511f4T45 SIIVT 0P.D4VIVA 	
9A 1 02jijs1 
'Iif,LVK. bis.V19c.E. o) 	P5y0/IJ.4 6VS b,ss.d4tçk• 
P'.45.4' 	.4)Y3'N 
if P4S'- 1090 .5 P.4I4 	'T.D 
TI'S 	.44" 	P0,," 	I'D 
s rP3.,$,p' 	4O*flQ4'4 
) P 	Pit,Fsr.ED 	5I' - 
4).S  Pie 	IOPO -- 	- --- --. 4IA.44. - 
- - . - 4) 	
W.' 	SI#.idL 	it PT lOTS. . 
4/L 	!h0Sgb. OT'A'. 
PP..EASOLE ,s( - IS PAVW I,.. ,%Psu.4,,oi.4. 4 
~ rw 
KI50a D/35d405 444505. ,d,y..srft *.'UTD 
L 7oi VI 0W 	£ TICK .VvP' 	ORITAC4..4b 




- ) 	.e,.yzoj. 	AJA1,f 	£sq/.. is 	•i/ iDtZ. 
r) tllLvf 	 - _.. -- ... -. - -  - 
MOO . L'graso./ Pag./4"/t 60/S-Il 
 
V41Ls 	0 P4.4V 6ffi)yD0i.)d - - 5$io..J ..Jor ,f - V 1003 
'4 
) 	19PP.EQ 	.4TPCC. 
 
- - - - 
IS I'V lO.ct. ',44.iI 	- Reff Pe i F5 	,s 41.i.S 	iAo.S-S 5VUTDO*)d ;,Qs ,,J P,P4uWf 4.qs 	o4S VII 13 PSi, 1909/9 Psosa.s AAW&B IS PV 10T2 4 .s 	it PS.( 	,s,o 	iAwc 
To 	fJ-o.-J 	TO i) VOLIT 	51i,.4 Soft 
P55541011 i(PDCv' IO2 To *6.s,&i-5 £s54 I'n'go'oor 5)5T4'V SérpD,C'f 	rArla ISO" #501 	AZSM s'pfrn44' 
%4424 51STE/' P0471004 	.41tIS £V1Eff 	
S/Of a l30# P44'S5I.44 IDolS ISNZDL ID(2 51 0P.A1O. Psv53004 	1.4' 	.4riv,P," 
DOE/sIC 	54'VPDII.M i/tNT VIMV,(4',LS as43 
i/SAIY.Eb. D&S - 03-04r,N 93 SiP& Cl . ,isf -JIAA 	AFA44A ISe.  
I4VTS Vii )123.4V&6 	f.4ft 	8/ - - - 	- 14 ^V IDOl 
1$ ii/ 	/003. V4LV$ Pj.4MYS 	4i93 I4,2S 	0 P.S-.V1 	. £WUVDD'.i,J 1 	51445 C.0?IP&54610*' Y314•' • lS"i54' /D03 it 	i( 	i/O!. 4 ifs//i/e/ 	/505.114.4 
10 VAD.-1 	$ROft' VO/.4,5 	5YC.K . b1JP0,'.'r 	f IJYQOS. 	5f5f 
4.4/5i 	/91 ,AIbiS*ftS i.19//h '155..4b. 129h45.DOY/0iI 	D5505S2 
,iI%C'2 	VP a) ?DSrp,o/f5 	£7i,4ft 4s15 	2 	1, J5 	
•1 	PIP o'.'S- 0P4V. 
440 	s.i5S 
.5 	V 13 	r,45 SS.C5. - -- C-Dfl'Pt56 5/5 .4 Y.4YSIV 	IV I 	,f P4.9 T(5 
.5i061100. 50'f 	(i95 
,75r1 •,5 	.4'.9'N 
is 	's.i 	166 3/'? russo s Rz4 , ,vr tss i. arr . "r. 
o pss. Y'54 4 r i,s .'s/ 51 9s,r..wb P' 5 Psg' 11&4 OiJ 	i/4i./5 	4.p4.c4b 
• S 4 I'Y1 VII'S- P,j55 	// ) 	/5Q4 1'PA. S.P././ti.'$b. Ic /502 	44,.&5 7ZS7. 
 
VøsVf 5fUi 
Z..JZ 	349 4 bo..JiI. SI'14/f. 
//4V5 	SD//a 	C4.454 
£C5S5, 212 an. VI4i( 	o/i0 	A0S5D. 
Q 
Q 
APPENDIX D4 FTA OF THE MURCHISON GAS COMPRESSION SYSTEM 
D4.1 Introduction 
D4.1.1 Analysis Approach 
D4.1.2 Layout of Appendix 
D4.2 Results of Analysis 
D4.2. Level Control System Fault Trees 
Gas Blowby 
Liquid Overflow 
D4.2.2 Surge Control System Fault Trees 
Compressor Surge 
Recycle Valve Open 
D4.2.3 C1303 Ruptures 
D4.2.4 C1302 Ruptures 
D4.2.5 C1301 Ruptures 
D4.2.6 K1502 Discharge Ruptures 
D4.2.7 Severe Fire in Gas Compression System 
D4.3 Discussion of Results 
D4.3.1 Modelling of Operator Intervention 
D4.3..2 Problem of Liquid Overflow 
D4.3.3 Gas Blowby 
D4.3.4 Pressure Safety Valves 
D4.4 Functional Dependency Diagrams 
D4.5 Fault Trees 
Appendix D4 	 313 
D4.1 Introduction 
The FTA of the GCS investigated the causes and failure paths that 
result in hydrocarbons being released into the Module. The analysis 
was restricted to failures in the control and shutdown system. The 
analysis was limited to the Gas Compressors K1301/2 and K1501/2. The 
reinjection compressor was omitted because of its complexity and 
several other systems were also not studied. These include the: 
lube & seal oil systems 
unit control logic 
Avon gas generator 
fuel gas system, and 
sales gas metering system. 
The objective of the analysis was to identify the concurrent failures 
necessary to cause hydrocarbons to be released into the module. 
D4.2 Analysis Approach 
The fault tree analysis of the GCS was carried out in accordance with 
the procedure discussed in Appendix C4. 
The subsystems which were identified during the FMEA of the GCS were 
studied by developing a fault tree whose top event is caused by the 
failure of the control devices that comprise the subsystem. For 
example, the failure of the level control system may result in liquid 
overflow or gas blowby. The following subsystems were analysed and 
are listed below with the top event caused by their failure. 
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They are: 
level control system 1) gas blowby 
ii) liquid overflow 
surge control system i) recycle valve open • 
recycle valve closed 
compressor surge 
turbine overspeed 
After the fault trees for the subsystem failures were completed, fault 
trees were drawn for the rupture of each of the condensate knockout 
vessels, starting with C1303 and working through to C1501. A fault 
tree has also been drawn for the rupture of the discharge line of 
K1502. 
Throughout the study the failure of the Ud system is recognised as a 
cause of failure. However, the failure of the UCL has not been 
defined, nor developed to primal events. 
D4.1.2 Layout of Appendix D4 
This appendix has been written with the assumption that the reader is 
familiar with the GCS and FTA. Appendix Bi contains a detailed 
description of the GCS and Appendix C4 describes how an .FTA is carried 
out. 
Section D4.2 describes the analyses that were carried out and explains 
the assumption inherent in the fault trees which were drawn. The 
fault trees are contained in section D4.5. Functional dependency 
diagrams were used to aid the study and these are contained in section 
D4.4. The results of the study are discussed in section D4.3. 
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D4.2 Results of Analysis 
The fault trees for the principal subsystem failures were drawn and 
verified. These trees formed part of the basic building blocks used 
to construct the larger trees which investigated the causes of 
hydrocarbons being released into' the module. 
D4.2.1 Level Control System Fault Trees 
Fault trees for liquid overflow and for gas blowby were drawn. These 
top events represent the worst case failures of the system and the 
trees were developed to basic failure events. 
Liquid overflow is the more hazardous of the two top events 
investigated because a slug of liquid will severely damage the 
compressor, possibly breaking the compressor blades. The results show 
that several failures must occur simultaneously for liquid to overflow 
from a condensate knockout vessel. 
Both fault trees are based on the level control devices fitted to 
C1303. They apply to C1302, C1301 and C1501 since the instruments 
fitted to these vessels are identical. 
a. Gas Blowby 
The fault tree for gas blowby is shown on sheets FTA 21/1 and 2. FDD 
D4.4.1 shows the interrelationship of the components making up the 
level control system. 
Gas blowby occurs if the liquid in the vessel falls below the outlet 
level, thus allowing gas into the outlet pipe. 	Generally, liquid is 
fed to a vessel which operates at a lower pressure. 	Therefore, gas 
blowby may result in the downstream vessel being subjected to a 
pressure above its design pressure. 
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The fault tree shows that both the level control valve and the 
shutdown valve on the liquid outlet must be open so that the liquid 
outflow exceeds in inflow. The level must fall to a sufficiently low 
level before the extra low level switch will cause the shutdown valve 
to close. Therefore, the causes of the level falling are depicted in 
FTA 21/2. 
FTA 21/2 shows that should the level transmitter fail, the level 
control valve will be misdirected. It is assumed that the operator 
has insufficient time to rectify the situation as the low level alarm 
is delayed by the failure of the level transmitter. 
A similar assumption is made in FTA 21/1 as the failure of the extra 
low level switch renders the extra low level alarm inoperative. 
An inspection of the tree shows that the level transmitter failing and 
the low level switch failing simultaneously, is the most likely 
minimal cut set. 
The tree takes a pessimistic view because it is assumed that the 
delayed operation of the -level alarms gives the operator insufficient 
warning. 
b. Liquid Overflow 
The fault tree for liquid overflow is shown on sheets FTA 22/1 to 4. 
The overflow of liquid from a compressor suction vessel may cause 
severe internal damage to the compressor and result in considerable 
repair work. For liquid to overflow, the mass inflow must be greater 
than the mass outflow causing the liquid level to rise. Overflow can 
be prevented by shutting off the inflow or by ensuring that the outlet 
is unrestricted and has sufficient capacity to prevent the level 
rising. 
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FTA 22/1 shows that the inflow may not be isolated because the 
shutdown valve on the inlet is not closed. This may be caused by 
shutdown not having been demanded or by the valve failing to close. I 
have taken a pessimistic view and have assumed that if the extra high 
level switch fails to operate, the operator has insufficient warning 
and does not initiate shutdown. 
An additional warning is provided by the high level alarm. If however 
the level transmitter has failed, then the alarm will be rendered 
inoperative and the level control valve will be misdirected and 
restrict or block the liquid outlet. This is shown in FTA 22/2. 
Mass inflow exceeding mass outflow can be caused by high inflow or 
restriction of the outlet. The event "high inflow" was not developed 
but would be caused by a complex series of failures of the instruments 
in the separator. These instruments are duplicated and therefore it 
is unlikely that high inflow would occur. 
FTA 22/3 shows how the outlet may be restricted by the shutdown valve 
being closed. Announciators are connected to the valves which 
indicate whether the valve is open or closed. Thus, if the valve is 
misdirected, the operator is given the chance to intervene and take 
remedial action. 
FTA 22/4 shows how the level control valve may be insufficiently open 
because it has been misdirected or has stuck. 
P&ID EA-216a shows that gas may be drawn from the second stage 
separator C1002 to C1303. 	I have assumed that the GCS is operating 
normally and that 13 XV 1414 is closed. 	I have also assumed that 
bypass valve 13 XV 1101 is closed as the system would be shutdown if 
after startup 13 XV 1101 moved off the closed position. 
The most probable minimal cut set is when the level control valve is 
misdirected by the level transmitter and the extra high level switch 
fails simultaneously. 
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D4.2.2 Surge Control System Fault Trees 
FDD D4.3.2 shows the interrelationship of the instruments that 
comprise a surge control system. Compressor surge occurs when the 
flow of gas is low or when the compression ratio rises under constant 
flow conditions when operating close to the surge point. Compressor 
surge causes the compressor to vibrate. The loading on the blades is 
increased and may cause a blade to break. 
Surge control systems ensure that a minimum flow is maintained through 
the compressor by opening a recycle valve. Gas then flows from the 
discharge to the suction. 	Compressors K1302, K1301 and K1501/2 are 
fitted with anti—surge devices. 	The fault trees discussed in this 
section are for the surge control system protecting K1302, but apply 
to the other systems. 
a. Compressor Surge 
FTA 30/1 shows the two conditions which give rise to compressor surge, 
low flow, or turbine overspeed which increases the compression ratio. 
However, the recycle valve must also be insufficiently open before the 
compressor will surge. 
The event "low flow" has been left undeveloped as the likely causes, 
low flow from C1003, rupture in C1303, or gas blowby, are events which 
initiate shutdown. Turbine overspeed is the most likely cause of 
compressor surge, when operating close to the surge point. 
FTA 31/1 shows how turbine overspeed can be caused by the failure of 
pressure indicator and controller 13 PlC 1071. Because the four 
compressors are powered by a common driver, the Avon gas generator and 
GEC power turbine, the failure of 13 PlC 1071 affects all four stages 
of compression. This is a common mode failure. FTA 31/1 is developed 
only for failures of the control devices and does not show the 
alternative causes of turbine overspeed. Their existence is 
recognised by the undeveloped event "other causes". 
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Turbine overspeed can be prevented by the shutdown system which may be 
activated by the operator, or by an extra high pressure switch fitted 
to the compressor discharge. Other instruments fitted to the gas 
generator, trip the system when the speed becomes excessive. 
FTA 32/1 and 2 show how the recycle valve may fail to be sufficiently 
open to prevent compressor surge. 13 PDCV 1115 may be insufficiently 
open because the valve or its positioner is stuck. Alternatively it 
may be misdirected because of the failure of a control device. 
Vent valve 13 XV 1104 however, must remain closed if the recycle valve 
is to be misdirected by the control system. 13 XV 1104 vents the 
control line of the recycle valve when shutdown is Initiated. if 
shutdown has not been initiated, this valve remains closed. 
The failures in the control devices which may cause the recycle valve 
to be misdirected are shown in FTA 32/1 and 2. Any one of twenty 
different causes can result in the recycle valve being misdirected. 
However, each of these faults is protected against by 13 XV 1104. 
An inspection of the tree shows that five events must occur 
simultaneously for compressor surge. These are: 
cause of turbine overspeed 
recycle valve is insufficiently open 
extra high pressure switch on compressor discharge 
fails to operate 
shutdown not initiated by operator, and 
Shutdown not initiated by device on Avon gas generator. 
b. Recycle Valve Open 
FTA 33/1 and 2 shows the causes of the recycle valve opening. This 
will cause the compressor suction pressure to rise and is a component 
in the trees which investigate vessel rupture. 
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The recycle valve is opened when shutdown is initiated and causes 13 
XV 1104 to vent. This is the correct operation of the system and the 
causes therefore are omitted. 
There are twenty three different causes of the recycle valve being 
insufficiently closed. No one minimal cut set is more likely than 
another. The probability of the top event occurring Is therefore 
high. 
D4.2.3 C1303 Ruptures 
The third stage compression suction scrubber C1303 is protected 
against overpressure by a wide variety of devices which initiate 
shutdown or relieve the excess pressure in the vessel. FTA 60/1 to 4 
shows the relationship of the events which may cause the vessel to 
rupture and release hydrocarbons into the module. P&ID EA-214c in 
Appendix B2 shows the instruments in this section. 
For rupture to occur, the vessel must be exposed to a pressure greatly 
in excess of its design pressure 24 Bar g. This can only occur if 
there is a source of overpressure and the pressure safety valve fails 
to relieve the excess pressure. 
Two PSVs are fitted to C1303. An interlocking system prevents both 
PSVs from being locked off or on simultaneously. 
Three sources of high pressure were identified, downstream, upstream 
and by backf low. Each of these sources is developed back to basic 
events in separate sub-trees. 
FTA 6012 shows that high pressure from the third stage oil gas 
separator C1003 is the upstream source. This event is undeveloped as 
It would involve a study of the pressure control devices on C1003. 
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The other events in the tree show how the shutdown system protects 
C1303. 
There are two methods of protection. 	The first is to isolate the GCS 
by closing 13 XV 1102. 	I have assumed that 13 XV 1101 is closed as 
shutdown would be initiated if this valve had moved off the closed 
position after startup. Secondly, the pressure may be vented by 13 XV 
1103 opening, or should this valve fail to open the gas may be vented 
to the flare system via 13 XV 1055. The latter valve is situated on 
the discharge of K1301. Both valves open when shutdown is initiated. 
The conditions that the pressure is not vented and that the pressure 
Is not isolated are met if shutdown Is not initiated. This event is 
very unlikely as three conditions 'must be met. 13 PSHH 1119 is 
situated on the compressor discharge and a rise in suction pressure 
will result in a rise in the discharge pressure and the extra high 
pressure switch will initiate shutdown. Should this device fail, 
shutdown could be initiated by a downstream shutdown device like 13 
PSHH 1066 in the next stage. Shutdown can also be initiated by the 
operator in response to the process alarms which warn the operator, 
but which do not initiate shutdown themselves. This event has not 
been developed as high pressure alarms are fitted to the compressor 
suction and discharge. The operator may also respond to other 
indications. It would be both difficult and time consuming to extend 
the tree to accurately illustrate these interrelationships. 
FTA 60/3 shows how high pressure In C1303 can be caused by the recycle 
valve 13 PDCV 1115 being insufficiently closed and allowing high 
pressure gas from the compressor discharge to flow to C1303. This 
event is developed in FTA 33/1 and discussed in section D4.2.2 b. 
Protection is afforded by the shutdown system and the structure of 
this sub-tree is similar to FTA 60/2. There is no means of isolating 
the source of pressure other than by the recycle valve itself. 
Therefore the event "pressure not vented" assumes that shutdown is 
initiated but that both blowdown valves fail to open. 
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Thirdly, high pressure in C1303 can be caused by backf low from the 
second stage of the GCS. This is the least likely cause in my opinion 
as FTA 60/4 shows that the non—return valve must fail and the shutdown 
system fail so that the pressure is not vented before backflow could 
happen. Additionally, the pressure sources are protected by the 
shutdown system as shown in FTA 70/3 and FTA 70/4. 
A study of the minimal cut sets shows that rupture because of high 
pressure due to the recycle valve being open has the smallest number 
of simultaneous failures needed to cause the Cop event. These are: 
PSV fails to lift 
13 PDCV 1115 insufficiently closed 
13 XV 1103 fails to open, and 
13 XV 1055 fails to open. 
The condition that the pressure is great enough to cause rupture must 
be met. This is unlikely as the normal discharge pressure is 
approximately 20 Bar g. However, as the condition persists the 
pressure would rise. 
D4.2.4 C1302 Ruptures 
This tree is shown on FTA 70/1 to 5 and has a similar structure to the 
tree for C1303 ruptures. Therefore, only the principal differences 
will be discussed here. 
K1302 cannot be isolated from C1302 and FTA 70/1 shows high pressure 
from K1302 as an additional source of high pressure. The event "high 
pressure flow from K1302" is developed in FTA 70/2 and can be due to 
high suction pressure or because of compressor surge. Compressor 
surge has already been discussed and the event developed in FTA 30/1. 
Account is taken of the failure of the shutdown system to vent the 
pressure via 13 XV 1105, or via 13 XV 1055. 
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The failure of the pressure sensing devices is included in FTA 31/1 
and therefore not included in FTA 70/2. 
Shutdown valve 13 XV 1005 isolates the second stage from the first 
stage of the GCS. I have assumed that if shutdown is initiated, 13 XV 
1005 closes so that the pressure can only be vented via 13 XV 1055. 
The event "pressure not vented" appears in sheets 3, 4 and 5 of PTA 
70, and reflects this assumption. The assumption that C1302 ruptures 
at a pressure below the setting of the PSV on the discharge line of 
K1301 is pessemistic. 
D4.2.5 C1301 Ruptures 
EA-215b in Appendix B2 depicts the instrumentation in this part of the 
GCS. FTA 80/1 to 5 shows how C1301 can be caused to rupture. C1301 
can be fed with gas from the test separator C1004 or from the first 
stage oil gas separator ClOOl. It is also fed with gas from K1301. I 
have assumed that the dewpoint control system is bypassed. 
The causes of high pressure from the upstream sources are developed in 
sheets 2, 3 and 4. FTA 30/5 shows how high pressure may be caused by 
recycle valve 15 PDCV 1062 being insufficiently closed. 
The recycle line serves the two pipeline compressors K1501 and K1502. 
Gas is taken from the discharge of K1502 at 215 Bar g and is fed to 
C1301 which is designed to withstand a pressure of 83 Bar g. 
The pressure in C1301 is normally vented via 14 XV 1007 on C1401 to 
the cold relief system. When the dewpoint control system is bypassed, 
as I have assumed , C1301 is vented via 15 XV 1001 on the discharge 
line of K1502. 15 XV 1001 on the discharge of K1501 does not open 
until the pressure falls below 29 Bar g. The event "pressure not 
vented" shows only the failure of 15 XV 1052 to open as I have assumed 
that 15 XV 1001 functions normally. 
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I have omitted the event "high pressure due to backflow" as there is 
no new source of gas introduced into the downstream part of the 
system. 
I consider high pressure from a downstream source the most likely 
failure path. The following events must occur simultaneously: 
13 PSV 1008 fails to lift 
15 XV 1052 fails to .open 
15 HCV 1637 open, and 
15 PDCV 1062 insufficiently closed. 
This minimal cut set assumes that C1301 will rupture at a pressure 
less than 140 Bar g. 	If this is not true, then 15 PSV 1052 which is 
set to lift at 140 Bar g will relieve the excess pressure. 	This 
assumption is pessimistic. 
A tree has not been drawn for C1401 ruptures or C150 ruptures because 
of the siulilarity of these trees to FTA 80/1 to 5. 14 XV 1007 provides 
an additional means of venting the pressure, causing the minimal cut 
sets for the rupture of these vessels to be larger than the one 
presented above. 
D4.2.6 K1502 Discharge Ruptures 
EA-216c in Appendix B2 shows the instrumentation in this part of the 
GCS. 	FTA 90/1 and 2 is drawn for the rupture of the second stage 
pipeline compressor discharge line. 	The structure of the tree for 
"K1302 discharge line ruptures" would be similar to this one. 
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There are three ways in which pressure can be vented from this 
section, via: 
15 XV 1052 
15 PSV 1062, and via 
15 PCV 1072. 
Pressure control valve 15 PCV 1072 is controlled by 15 PT 1072, and is 
used to regulate the reinjection compressor suction pressure. The 
setpoint of the control can be adjusted by the operators in the local 
and main control control rooms. This device offers an additional way 
of depressurizing the discharge line should the normal ways fail. 
The most likely source of high pressure is compressor surge. Because 
compressors K1501 and K1502 are interlinked, K1501 would feed gas to 
the suction of K1502 at high pressure, thus increasing the severity of 
the failure to control compressor surge. 
The following failures must occur simultaneously for rupture to occur: 
15 PSV 1068 fails to lift 
15 XV 1003 closed 
15 PCV 1072 insufficiently open 
15 XV 1052 fails to open 
15 PDCV 1062 insufficiently open, and 
turbine overspeed. 
In my opinion the rupture' of the discharge line is very unlikely. 
D4.2.7 Severe Fire in Gas Compression System 
FTA 100/1 to 3 shows how a severe fire in Nodule 6 might occur because 
of the rupture of part of the GCS. 
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FTA 100/1 assumes that for a severe fire to occur the fire protection 
systems and the shutdown system must fail. If the shutdown systems 
and the detection systems have failed, and the operator does not raise 
the alarm, the fire protection and shutdown systems may not be 
initiated. In my opinion this is extremely unlikely because of the 
variety of ways in which shutdown can be initiated. For example, if a 
vessel ruptures, the downstream extra low pressure switch will 
initiate shutdown because of the fall in pressure. 
Because the system is complex, it is difficult to draw a tree that 
accurately represents all the possible ways in which the top event can 
occur. For example, the tree does not consider the effect of missiles 
generated by the rupture of a vessel on the other equipment in the 
module. 
The pressure sources in the GCS are the oil gas separators and the gas 
compressors. When the shutdown is initiated by the fire and gas 
detection systems, the gas in the separators is vented into the flare 
system and the compressor train is stopped. At the same time the down 
hole safety valves in the wells are closed so that the production 
systems are isolated from the reservoir. It is very likely therefore 
that a fire in the Gas Compression System would burn itself out as the 
sources of fuel are isolated. 
FTA 100/3 shows the causes of hydrocarbons being released into Module 
6. It is restricted to the rupture of equipment as a result of 
instrument failure. 
The minimal cut set of greatest significance is listed below. The 
following events must occur simultaneously: 
U.V. detection system fails 
smoke detection system fails 
operator does not detect fire 
electrostatic discharge of sufficient energy to cause ignition 
gas detection system fails 
leak not detected by shutdown system, and 
C.1301 ruptures 
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The event C1301 ruptures has a minimal cut set of four failures. 
Therefore, for a severe fire to ensue in Nodule 6, ten conditions 
must be satisfied. 
D4.3 Discussion of Results 
The fault trees that have been presented in this appendix have been 
drawn assuming the GCS to be in its normal operating mode with the 
dewpoint control system isolated. Separate trees would require to be 
drawn for hazardous events that could occur during startup and 
shutdown. 
The analysis was restricted to considering the ways in which 
hydrocarbons could be released into Module 6 as a direct consequence 
of instrument failures. The trees that have been drawn do not show 
thathydrocarbons can be released due to small leaks. For example, gas 
may escape at valve glands, instruments, fittings and flanges. 
The fault tree drawn from API RP 14c which is contained in Appendix 
C2, shows that mechanical deterioration due to corrosion can also be a 
factor in hydrocarbons being released. This was not taken into 
account in this analysis.. However, It should be pointed out that the 
corrosion rate in the GCS is automatically monitored on the Murchison 
Platform. 
The fault trees show the protection afforded by the shutdown system. 
Although the risks inherent In compressing gas are high, the shutdown 
system ensures that a minimum of four simultaneous failures are 
required to cause the rupture of equipment. No quantitative analysis 
was carried out. In my opinion however the probability of vessel 
rupture is small. 
C1301 in my opinion is most at risk as a result of the failure of the 
recycle valve 15 PDCV 1062 failing to open. 
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It would be prudent for the pressure in C1301 to be calculated 
assuming that shutdown has been initiated and that all valves function 
correctly. In this way the risk could be assessed and measures 
adopted to rectify the situation if the risk is found to be too high. 
D4.3.1 Modelling Operator Intervention 
Throughout my analysis of the GCS I have found it difficult to 
accurately represent the opportunities given to the operator to 
correct deviations from the normal operating parameters. The 
assumptions that I have made are pessimistic. 
The design emphasizes the dependence on the correct operation of the 
shutdown system. The analyst can work out what indications the 
operator will have given a particular set of circumstances. The 
operator may misinterpret this data and fail to prevent the fault 
condition from arising. 
Most analysts remodel the fault tree to take account of operator 
intervention after the basic structure has been decided. It is often 
difficult to relate the failure of a device which causes an alarm to 
fail and misdirects a valve, so as to avoid logical errors arising. 
This is an aspect of fault tree analysis which requires further 
investigation. 
D4.3.2 Problem of Liquid Overflow 
It was stated in section D4.2.1b (Liquid Overflow) that if the level 
transmitter fails and the extra high level switch fails to operate, 
liquid in the vessel would overflow. Using the design flowrate of 
• liquid in the outlet of C1301, I estimate that at least one hour would 
elapse between the level transmitter failing and liquid overflowing. 
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This time would be shortened if the liquid carried over in the gas 
from ClOOl was greater than the design parameter. During this time 
the operator may notice that the level indicator is reading low or not 
registering, and check the level by looking at the level gauge fitted 
to the vessel. In this way he could detect the fault. 
The suction scrubbers and C1301 are situated on the floor level of 
Module 6, five meters below the Dresser Clarke compressor. It is 
therefore unlikely that liquid would overflow into the compressor. 
However, severe damage could be caused by a slug of liquid being fed 
from a vessel to the compressor. 
Should a compressor blade break, the blade may have sufficient energy 
to puncture the compressor housing and cause gas to escape. 
In my opinion the likelihood of a liquid slug damaging the compressor 
In this way is small as the operator has a large amount of time to 
rectify the situation. FTA 22 is too pessimistic. 
D4.3.3 Gas Blowby 
Gas blowby may appear to be a serious problem as the minimal cut set 
is similar to that for liquid overflow. This is not the case as a 
high pressure switch and pressure safety valve protect the downstream 
vessel which is being subjected to high pressure as a result of gas 
blowby. 
Rupture of the downstream vessel would only result if the pressure to 
which it was subjected was sufficient to cause rupture and if the 
protection devices failed simultaneously. 
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D4.3.4 Pressure Safety Valves 
Pairs of pressure safety valves are fitted to each pressure vessel and 
to the discharge lines of compressors 1(1301 and K1502. These valves 
are fitted with an interlock mechanism which prevents both valves from 
being locked off simultaneously. This of course also prevents both 
valves being locked on at the same time. 
The interlock mechanism allows each valve to be tested and calibrated 
without lowering the standard of overpressure protection as the other 
PSV must be locked on before maintenance work can commence. There is 
much to commend this practice as it ensures that a valve can not be 
incorrectly locked off. 
It does however reduce the potential protection that could be offered 
if both PSVs were locked on simultaneously. The effect would be to 
add an extra failure at the top of the rupture fault trees as both 
valves would have to fail simultaneously before the vessel could 
rupture. 
The implementation of a revised testing and repair practice which 
included the rigourous checking of the valves after maintenance work 
had been carried out could permit both valves to be used 
simultaneously. 
In my opinion the level of protection afforded by the shutdown system 
as it operates at present is adequate. The change suggested above for 
consideration in my opinion would improve the standard of protection. 
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D4.4 Functional Dependency Diagrams 
FDD D4.4.1 Level Control System 
FDD D4.4.2 Surge Control System 
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Figure D4.41 	Functional Dependency Diagram 
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Figure D44.2 	Functional Dependency Diagram 
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D4.5 Fault Trees 
FTA 21/1 Gas Blowby 
2 Level Continues to Fall 
FTA 22/1 Liquid Overflow 
2 Level Continues to Rise 
3 Shutdown Valve Insufficiently Open 
4 Level Control Valve Insufficiently Open 
FTA 30/1 Compressor Surge 
FTA 31/1 Turbine Overspeed 
FTA 32/1 13 PDCV 1115 Insufficiently Open 
2 13 PDIC 1115 High Output 
FTA 33/1 13 PDCV 1115 Insufficiently Closed 
2 13 PDIC 1115 Low Output 
PTA 60/1 C1303 Ruptures 
2 High Pressure Upstream Source 
3 High Pressure Downstream Source 
4 High Pressure Backflow 
FTA 70/1 C1302 Ruptures 
2 High Pressure from K1302 
3 High Pressure from C1002 
4 High Pressure from Downstream Source 
5 High Pressure due to Backflow 
FTA 80/1 C1301 Ruptures 
2 High Pressure from K1301 
3 High Pressure from ClOOl 
4 High Pressure from C1004 
5 High Pressure from Downstream Source 
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FTA 90/1 K1502 Discharge Ruptures 
2 High Pressure due to Compressor Surge 
FTA 100/1 Severe Fire in Gas Compression System. 
2 Fire 
3 Release of Hydrocarbons 
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